Works Cited

Canetti, Elias. *Kafka's Other Trial*. New York: Schocken Books, 1974

Caruth, Cathy ed. *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1995.

Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History*. New York and London: Routledge, 1992.

Gammel, Irene, ed. *Confessional Politics: Women's Sexual Self-Representations in Life Writing and Popular Media*. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1999.

Gibson, Nancy and Suhadra Devi Rai. Review of K. Tal's *Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literature of Trauma*. *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature / Revue canadienne de littérature comparée* 25:3-4 (September/ December 1998). 677-80.

Henke, Suzette. *Shattered Subjects: Trauma and Testimony in Women's Life-Writing*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Herman, Judith. *Trauma and Recovery*. New York: Harper Collins, 1992.

Potvin, Liza. *White Lies (for my mother)*. Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1992.

Tal, Kali. *Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literature of Trauma*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

Wiesel, Eli. "The Holocaust as a Literary Inspiration," *Dimensions of the Holocaust*. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1977. 4-29.

Williamson, Janice. *Cry Baby!* Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1998.

In The Thin and The Thick of Social Construction

WILM ROBERTSON

> There are philosophers of science who write essays defending torture as an instrument of public policy and others who disagree, but qua philosophers of science, they are no better qualified to discuss such matters than is a truck driver or a Xerox repair person. Likewise philosophers of science should claim no more expertise on the ethical issues than, say the man with an office adjacent to mine, who is a classical archaeologist; less, perhaps, since he is the world expert on ancient Mediterranean archery.
>
> -Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?*

Imagine a well-constructed police station. It is solidly built and possesses a number of diverse rooms (much more difficult to imagine what goes on in there), but it stands alone. Wide boulevards separate it from the rest of the city and it is protected by ramparts and a complex system of moats. It is very hard to enter and the policemen inside the building seldom emerge. Occasionally, one of them may stick his head out of a window and shout and else hang a banner from the roof. Both shouts and banners attempt to correct the behavior of the other inhabitants of the city. These citizens often speak carelessly. Sometimes they even write confusedly using words that lack clear definitions. This infuriates the policemen inside the building. They hate confusion, linguistic carelessness and (above all) ambiguity. They are the city's discourse police and it is their task to impose clarity upon their lackadaisical fellow citizens. Watch your language, they order, or we'll watch it for you. However, a difficulty always arises. They are usually rebarbative when approached and their shouts are often too highly-pitched to be easily understood. Their banners are written in a peculiar dialect of their own. In order to be policed, you must ask for admission. Since entry will probably be denied, you will then have to learn how to read the banners. It will prove to be an arduous undertaking.

Ian Hacking's analysis of the language of social constructionism provides an exemplary case. Hacking has observed what seems to be a problem and has set out to offer correction. The problem arises from the commonplace assertion that something, X, has been "socially constructed." (He begins chapter 1 with an alphabetical list of recent titles that have all asserted that

Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/Revue Canadienne de Littérature Comparée
CRCL/RCLC June / Juin 1999
0319-051X/99/26.2/$10.00/©Canadian Comparative Literature Association

some aspect of culture or nature has been "constructed." It is an uninspiring list.) As another philosopher once noted in a different context, "There is a good deal of loose talk about games these days" (Suits 152). Substitute "social construction" for "games" and you will have in view the impetus behind Hacking's book. There is, he observes, "a lot of sloppy thinking out there in the culture wars" (221). Non-philosophers do often talk loosely, in particular when they are excited or deeply worried by some "global bogeyman" or other. What is to be done about loose talk? A literary scholar might say, Let it be; or else, Let a thousand discursive bouquets bloom. A professional philosopher will not happily indulge such license. There will be reasons behind the epidemic of loose talk. Some of these (at the least) will be misconceived. Unexamined assumptions will be in the air. Distinctions will have been made that will not bear up or else may not have been made at all. Philosophers have been trained to spot foggy assumptions and sloppy distinctions. "We must mind our distinctions," Hacking writes (67). Distinctions, indeed, appear to provide their forward battle-grounds. Distinctions may have to be rejected or redrawn; new ones may need to be made. If there is a commonly-accepted definition, it may prove to be inadequate. A new definition may be required. Once all this conceptual work has been accomplished, the loose talk may cease. Perhaps. However, future loose talk, always attentive to its own expansion, might simply incorporate the philosopher's analysis, in parenthetical comment or in notes, as further grist for its churning mills. Future books written from within the social constructionist model will very likely cite Hacking.

As discourse policemen, philosophers possess a number of distinctive strengths–a sense of how arguments have been conducted elsewhere and elsewhen, of what may go wrong and why, an ability to carry out close analysis, and an enviable knack for locating striking examples. The problem is not that philosophers find it difficult to speak clearly, or that they cannot be lucid, but that they are trained to talk only to each other. Philosophers do not usually possess the skills to communicate with others, non- or even anti-philosophers, in order to convince them that the new definition, with its clarified assumptions and streamlined distinctions, should be accepted. Sometimes it might seem that they could as well advise a lover not to spend so much on flowers.[1]

1 Although he makes a number of moves to suggest that he is addressing a wide audience (and Harvard UP must have thought that he was doing so), Hacking leaves little doubt that he has written, primarily, for other philosophers. He is clear that professional philosophy is a definite discourse, adequately followed only by those who have been trained in its practices. (Hence a philosophical analysis of some cultural problem or non-philosophical methodology becomes an introductory textbook in those practices.) In the passage from *The Social Construction of What?* that I have quoted as an epigraph to this review, Hacking makes the claim that only a trained ethicist can have a valid idea of whether torture is good or bad. (A mere philosopher of science would have no better sense of the rightness or wrongness of torture than would, say, "a Xerox repair person.") Even words themselves have no proper standing until a philosopher has used them and lent them cachet. A term such as "kind," or more strictly "natural kind," is said to have been brought into circulation by William Whewell and John Stuart Mill (106), even though it has existed as a substantive since Middle English and even earlier. It has always been well established in Modern English. (Shakespeare uses "kind" often to signify a free-standing type with a distinctive nature.) It has always possessed, more or less, the meaning that Hacking gives it. What he seems to mean is that it did not have a philosophical cachet until Whewell and Mill defined it. "I like those ancient trades [epistemology and metaphysics] that I ply," Hacking writes (234). No difficulties in that, of course, since every academic should like his/her (more or less) ancient trades. However, Hacking never lets his reader forget that a professional philosopher has written this book and that it has been conceived and written with the full range of philosophical tools. "We analytic philosophers should be humble," he proclaims early, "and acknowledge that what is confused is sometimes more useful than what has been clarified. We should diagnose this situation, and not evade it" (29). The patronizing tone, and the implications of bemused tolerance, are difficult to miss. Such statements are ways of having your dialectical cake even while consuming it (out of existence). Philosophy, Richard Rorty observes, has no essence, but "it does have a history" (62). That history reveals an intellectual discipline, once concerned largely about truth and the ways in which various other disciplines attempt to establish it, but now concerned, having been transformed into an intellectual elite, in how the members of other disciplines speak.

Social construction is a metaphor, Hacking claims, that has become tired, even "boring and blunted." Too many people use it for too many (unexamined) purposes. "We fear a case of bandwagon-jumping," he writes (35). The metaphoricity of social construction appears to lie in the fact that "construction" indicates both a process and a product, but in all the "careless talk and enthusiastic bravura" (67), constructionists lose sight of the implications of their own language: nothing is actually being built. Anything "worth calling a construction" must have a "history of building" (50). Since social constructionists do not build, nor yet tell the story of building, they have killed their own metaphor. This strikes me, for reasons I shall give shortly, as rather too precious. Still, there are certainly a good many tired metaphors around and it does make sense to draw everyone's attention to this fact. "Philosophy" seems to be one such metaphor. Few, if any, professional philosophers love wisdom (or believe that any such thing exists), though they may well love brilliance, incisiveness and cleverness. (If dead metaphors are a genuine problem, an authentic reason for rejecting arguments, then what should one make of Hacking's observation that "those very words, 'social construction', can work like cancerous cells" [3]?) If nothing (in particular) is being built, what does take place in a constructionist analysis? This leads directly to Hacking's central point, one that he develops at length throughout the course of his argument. "Construction stories are histories" (37) which recount origins and trace developments, always with the larger

purpose of unmasking claims of normalcy and inevitability. Nothing is natural, though human beings love to claim that what they accept and believe in *must be* (of course, it is obvious, right minded folks will agree, don't *you*?) natural, and nothing escapes its own contingency. Construction stories tell about unmasking. Hacking turns briefly to Karl Mannheim for the concept of unmasking, though he grants that Mannheim was largely interested in unmasking "entire ideologies" while social constructionists are usually engaged in a "more local sort of unmasking than Mannheim had in mind" (54). This sounds right. Social construction does aim to unmask claims of normalcy, inevitability and naturalness; and in their place, it locates contingency, arbitrariness and multiple (not taken) paths.[2]

Don't ask for the meaning, "ask what's the point" (5). If social constructionism has become an issue, it is not merely to define it, or even to argue that it must have a definition,, but rather to discover its "point." Why would scholars spend so much energy in attempting to show that human practices, even their discoveries, are historically contingent, far from being "natural," not in the least inevitable.? What is the point to social construction? Hacking's analysis of social constructionist procedures (assumptions, methods

2 Hacking's turn toward Mannheim and the concept of unmasking serves his argument. Social constructionists do seek to unmask, and in so far as they attempt to unmask an established order they "are properly put on the left" (95). They may be revolutionary, rebellious or merely reformist (9), but they will try to be unsettling to normal assumptions of inevitability. It does not follow that they always, or only, unmask. It certainly does not follow that *everything* needs to be, or should be, unmasked. With unmasking, as with so many other intellectual enterprises, the Law of Diminishing Returns quickly sets in. (Around the need, or justification, for unmasking revolves the actual center of Hacking's argument since the problem of *inherent-structurism* dominates the discussion: if an actual thing possesses an inherent structure, this may be discovered by the methods of the natural sciences. The process of scientific discovery cannot be unmasked, or at least not in the same way that a political ideology might be. Of course, it might be the case that aspects of the *process* of discovery, such as laboratory procedures or intellectual menus, might be.) It is a bit odd that Hacking does not assimilate the constructionist unmasking with the long-standing tradition of critique. Since the Enlightenment, thinkers (Mannheim's own tradition) have been attempting to unmask the hidden assumptions and undeclared principles of orthodoxy (normalcy and power) that powerfully mask themselves as "natural." The most obviously absent name from Hacking's book is that of Karl Marx (cited once in the context of introducing Mannheim, but not in the index). The other "masters of suspicion," Freud and Nietzsche primarily, are in the background somewhere, but not given credit for their contributions to the tradition of unmasking. Peter Sloterdijk observes provocatively that philosophical "ideology critique" is the true heir of "a great *satirical* tradition, in which the motif of unmasking, exposing, [and] baring has served for aeons now as a weapon" (16). Hacking may not have used "critique," though that is surely the correct term, for the unmasking tendencies of social constructionism because he wished to reserve "critique" for an entirely different dimension of his argument: Kant's exploration of the grounds of knowledge points the way to one sense, as narrow as it is precise, of "construction." Hacking may simply have ignored (naturally? constructedly?) an intellectual tradition not studied in the works of professional philosophers.

and the determination of evidence) follows two major paths, though there are many small by-ways and secluded picnic-areas. First, he defines the social constructionist project and suggests a model of what it must entail whatever the particular topic (the *fact*, or set of facts) that are said to have been socially constructed. Second, he tests the claims of this project against several resistant, and undeniably tough, areas of human investigation and model-making, the natural sciences, the biological sciences, child abuse, weapons research and geology ("Rocks"). In each of these separate investigations, he resolutely acts the role of a discourse policeman, pointing out the flabbiness of language in the writings of social constructionists, their usual carefreeness with regard to evidence and their unfortunate confusion as to whether they are discussing facts or ideas. In his final chapter, Hacking assesses a heated controversy between two anthropologists, Gananath Obyseyeskere and Michael Sahlins, over the death of Captain James Cook. (Was Cook a god in Hawaiian eyes or merely a chief who would become a god?) At this concluding point in his argument, Hacking seems to adopt the role of a judge at a competition of ice dancing.

Hacking believes that social constructionists hold that facts are contingent and might have been otherwise. That is, from a social constructionist standpoint, nothing has come to be necessarily or naked of the influence of human intelligence and culture. (Take "social" to be shorthand for all the encompassing systems of human intelligence, cultural, political and economic.) He also believes that they are motivated exclusively by the recognition that some cultural practice, some X, is being taken for granted and hence has come to appear to be inevitable and by the consequent intention to unmask this X. Once unmasked, the X will be shown to have been contingent, not inevitable, and that, being "quite bad as it is," it may be done away with or else "radically transformed" (6). Thus constructionists are not "building" much of anything, as Hacking remarks, although one might well reply that he is helping to *re*build one or another of the many conceptual schemata that surround us and inhabit our minds. When Hacking insists, rather unnecessarily, that he does not "favor the language of social construction" and hopes that he has "represented them fairly, if cautiously" (122), the reader already knows this, but it is hard to see why. Is it only the tiredness of the metaphor? The conviction that they are not actually *building* anything? Or intellectual revulsion at the spectacle of so much aggressive unmasking at the hands of humanists and social scientists, untrained as professional philosophers? If the last point has any bearing, or even a partial bearing, upon Hacking's argument, then it must rise largely from the evidence he has selected to explore. The social constructionist project seems weakest when turned upon the natural sciences. If there are inherent structures, and it does seem either that there are or that thinking would be more tenuous on the contrary assumption, then the process of unmasking is wrongheaded or perverse. It can only be trivially true with respect to the context of scientific

discovery, laboratory practices, nomenclature (a quark by any other name would be what? A non-quark? an almost risible point) and exclusions (some classes of people cannot easily follow careers in science). Hacking is at his strongest when he examines the uses of social construction in the sciences, in particular in brilliant chapters on "Madness" and "Child Abuse," topics about which he plainly knows a great deal.[3]

What Hacking everywhere ignores is the way in which social constructionism has become the default position in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Very few scholars and teachers would want to say that certain cultural practices are "natural" or "essentially" this or that. Instead, cultural practices, as diverse as sexual pleasure or eating a pizza, are taken to be embedded in an economic-social matrix. Whatever is given in nature (if anything) will have been transformed through various constructing/distorting forces, all ultimately economic, of a particular society. That, at least, seems to be the working assumption of social constructionists. Everything, including the human body, is shaped by social forces. The human penis, Judith Butler writes, is a "phantasmatic" body part (88-9), but so, it might be said, is the vagina, and all the other body parts as well. The body "interpellates consciousness clamorously," pulling all manner of non-bodily associations into play (Wilson 255). An age of transplants, pig-grown body parts and ever-better prosthetic parts will only make the human body more phantasmatic, more mythic (and hence more constructed), not less. The body, as human beings experience it, cannot be reduced to physiological data, still less to anatomical models. It is "clamorous" with social detail, some of which is mythological (the body's tale), much economic (its use-value, its exchange and transaction values), none of which is quite as clean-cut as an idea.

For the social constructionist, nothing in the world is either solitary or bare. Gender, as Hacking allows early on in his argument, is the most illustrative case in point. Even if sex is a biological given, and not every social constructionist would want to admit that it is, the way it is focused and directed, the shapes and expressions it takes, the avenues and methods of satisfaction that are open, are all constructions. They are not inevitable and

3 With regard to discovery in the natural sciences, I leave the validity of Hacking's argument to others. He discusses in considerable depth the work of certain social scientists, such as Andrew Pickering, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, who have written to unmask the assumptions, as well as the practices, of science. Any reader interested in the response of a Nobel Laureate physicist should consider Steven Weinberg's review of Hacking's book in the *TLS*. Any reader who thinks that Weinberg, a professional scientists after all, or Hacking, a professional philosopher, may have overreacted to the social constructionist project or have ascribed inevitability (whether out of professionalism or pique) to the skimpily contingent, should read Londa Schiebinger's recent study (also with Harvard UP). Despite firm-handed policing, the social constructionist thesis may still be defensible.

they are, most definitely, not natural since they vary from culture to culture and from time to time and even from place to place within a single culture. And so the claim that gender is "naturally" or "essentially" one thing and not any others (e.g., "women are naturally more risk-averse than men") would also be a claim that some cultures are right, or more correct, than others. The fear of committing oneself to such absolutist claims leads some, but not all, social constructionists into relativism, though (as Hacking clearly notes) this is a further, and not necessary, step beyond social construction. (I have seldom had any doubts that I am not a relativist. Ever since the 1988 Olympics, when the practice became widely known in the West, I have found the Korean delight in dog meat, and their customary barbaric methods of slaughter, to be morally repugnant. I would have no doubt that I, or someone more qualified, could methodically show how the practice came about and how it has been socially constructed.) Many other categories of human experience, such as race, ethnicity, religion, language and class, have all been given, at one time or another, various essentialist definitions.

Social constructionists do want to unmask these sweeping and largely ill-founded generalizations, but they also want to do much more than unmask. At the very least, they want to show how the practice came about, how it developed within a certain society or social group, how it is become thickened with mythic encrustations and how it serves one or more group. How is power channeled in any given cultural or social practice? That is a question that prompts unmasking, but it also leads to inquiry about social development and distribution. It has both a thin and a thick answer. Unmask certainly, but also dance with(in) the tentacles. Studies of cultural practices focus upon the "operations of power in discourse which reveal not essences or truths or unalterable laws but the processes of selection, discontinuities and influence by which inequalities have become institutionalized" (Edwards 66). Much weight must be given to that word "institutionalized." Where did the practice come from? How has it been shaped? What are its possibilities for growth? For transformation? Both tattoos and pizza, to take two disparate examples, can be unmasked, both reveal social development and both serve certain groups (there is profit to be made from both, and many, many levels of power available within each practice). Tattoos are elite, operating with a comparatively small group; pizzas are mass market and extraordinarily non-elite. Both are excellent subjects for social constructionist analysis. If you have ever wondered why people have tattoos, or what kind of a practice it is, you will learn much of what you need to know through reading Margo DeMello's instructive study. Hacking hardly even sets out a road-map that you could follow merely to learn more..

Hacking's analysis of the social constructionist position tries it against some very hard cases, all much harder, but less obvious, than either tattoos or pizza. However, even if social construction fails to show the contingency, human-dependancy and instability of physics and other natural sciences, other

than trivially, it does not follow that it has no valid uses. In fact, as the default position assumed, if not consciously taken, by most humanists and social scientists, social construction is as much a world-view as a method. And, as a overall understanding of the world and all its varied operations, social construction trains the mind to look for connections, the tentacular historical spread of any single culturally-embedded object, and causes. The most important single name in the social constructionist project must surely be that of Marx who taught two memorable lessons about human culture: the underlying interconnectedness, and the economic causes, of things. Nothing (leaving aside quarks, cosmic radiation, supernovas and other such non-human phenomena) comes into existence unless from an economic infrastructure and without innumerable connections to other things. It will become, as Brian Edwars puts it, "institutionalized." When Hacking traces the intellectual history of social constructionism, he finds the important names, Kant, Russell, Carnap and Goodman, in the history of philosophy. These philosophers have attempted to show that the mind (in some sense) thinks experience and does so by the mental acts of constructing, rather like having a prehensile mental tail for grabbing things, categories, kinds and other conceptual schemata. This is certainly interesting, but it is disturbingly thin. Indeed, it is exiguous. And it bears about as much actual relationship to social construction, as a living intellectual position that provides both a local understanding of things and a world-view, as would (say) a botanical model of seeds to the eating of a watermelon. The model will not tell you that you must spit.

Consider the pizza. If anything is, pizza must be socially constructed (at least as much as a professional philosopher): an apparently simple product that has been slowly produced as the complex product of what people, in countless areas of production, have made it to be. When you eat one, what kind of connectedness have you entered into? Imagine it as the round center of a spider's web. What lines of causation stretch out from it in every direction? Even as you eat a slice (did you use your fingers? a knife and fork? surely not chopsticks? Did you dip salsa on it? Sprinkle it with dried chilli flakes?) it will be enveloped within invisible webs of causation on many distinct levels. Indeed, there will be much more web than you can successfully keep in mind. The tiniest bite will be economically entangled. How many people have stood between your mouthful and the field where the Durham wheat had been harvested that made possible the flour that led to the dough from which the pizza was baked? (The House That Jack Built has nothing over a slice of pizza.) After you have eaten it, the memory of the slice will be even more complicated since now you will have to add on your subjective reaction, appetite, taste, after-taste and (possibly) heartburn. The memory of a thing, though very different, is not less complicated than the thing itself. Still, if

you are considering the pizza well, you will begin with the profit motive. It is not simply a question of who makes money from the pizza you have ordered (the owner of the restaurant, the cook, the waitress, the suppliers of ingredients, the various people in the trucking and distribution industries, the farmer, the suppliers of insecticides, the dealers in farm equipment and seed, the people who sell insurance and those who sell ads, and many, many more), but also who first saw that pizza was an ideal junk food, quick to make, simple to market, open to countless variations and close to addictive? It is a quick-to-make, colorful food that can be sold either as a whole or as a part of itself (the slice). But who saw that first? Was there something in North American culture that made such an insight possible? What steps then led from that insight to the subsequent transformation of the plain Italian pizza "rustica" into the familiar modern extravaganza? What kind of market is it that has made possible this rather amazing metamorphosis? What does pizza tell us about the present condition of North American culture? The common eating patterns? The social importance given to handheld food? The marketing industry? The common metaphors and allusions (". . . that's *amore*")? The appalling prevalence of obesity? No conceptual schema quite does justice to all the many questions that will perplex your slice of pizza.[4]

An old story reports that once Menippus Kynicus was aboard a vessel coasting the islands of the Cyclades. As the ship came in close to a small island near Delos, Menippus saw a crowd on the beach acting as if they were involved in a brawl. As the ship came in closer, it was possible to see that the crowd was actually a number of young men apparently beating a larger number of old women. Menippus wondered about this and asked the captain to bring his ship into the surf so that what was happening on the beach could be seen

4 A few years ago I sat down to eat with two Italo-American friends. We were in a tony hotel in Laguna Beach overlooking the ocean and something about the setting made me want pizza. I persuaded my friends to order pizza and so, following my suggestions, we ended up with two excellent "gourmet" pizzas, one with salmon and red onion, the other a fine vegetarian with feta cheese and Kalamata olives. My friends looked markedly glum and expressed dismay when they saw the pizzas. After taking a few bites, they refused to eat more. The pizzas "weren't pizza." That is, they weren't "rustica" or else they weren't what my friends could have bought in Naples or Rome, if only they had been there rather than in their native California. I tried to argue that "pizza" is a large flexible "kind" that admits both good and bad members and is open to what Hacking calls a "looping effect" (34). The local market determines what "pizza" is. Perhaps they meant only that the pizza was "bad"? No. It just wasn't pizza. I found myself entering into a boring social constructionist disquisition about the transformation of pizza in North America. They wouldn't have it. A chilly breeze blew over our table, and not from the sea. My friends were, it turned out, essentialists. For them, pizza had a fixed nature. And I, though I would not have said so beforehand, turned out to be a social constructionist. No doubt a social constructionist should not feel disgust at any food, if only it has been produced within the compass of recognizable culture practices. Oddly, such a person might even eat roast dog or "hearty soup" in Korea.

more clearly. Once they were in close to the shore, Menippus could see that the young men were attempting to force objects down the throats of the old women. He leapt from the ship and plunged ahead through the swirling surf to find out what was taking place on the beach. When he came up close, he saw that each young man had one or two old women by the arms and was doing his best to thrust an egg down her throat. Menippus was amazed and as he tried to figure out the significance of what he was seeing, he noticed a peasant at the end of the beach who was also watching the scene. Menippus went up to the peasant and asked him why the young men were so abusing the old women. "Oh," the peasant replied, "it isn't much, a common sight on this island. It is only the philosophers trying to teach their grandmothers to suck eggs."

Sydney, New South Wales

Works Cited

Butler, Judith. *Bodies that Matter: On The Discursive Limits of "Sex."* New York and London: Routledge, 1993.

DeMello, Margo. *Bodies of Inscription: A Cultural History of the Modern Tattoo Community*. Durham & London: Duke UP, 2000.

Edwards, Brian. *Theories of Play and Postmodern Fiction*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1998.

Latour, Bruno and Steve Woolgar. *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986 [1979].

Hacking, Ian. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999.

Picking, Andrew. *Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1984.

——. *Science as Practice and Culture*. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1992.

Rorty, Richard. *Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980)*. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1982.

Sloterdijk, Peter. *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Trans. Michael Eldred Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1987 [1983].

Schiebinger, Londa. *Has Feminism Changed Science?* Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000.

Suits, Bernard. *The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia*. Toronto: U Toronto P, 1978.

Weinberg, Steven. "Could We Live Without Quarks?" *TLS* (February 18, 2000): 8.

Wilson, Robert Rawdon. "Cyber(body)parts: Prosthetic Consciousness." *Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk*. Eds. Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows. London: Sage Publications, 1995. 239-59.