

présente à l'aide de diverses structures littéraires. De cette manière la 'valeur' d'une oeuvre d'art ne cesse pas de s'établir ou même de se retirer; une société quelconque peut attribuer à une oeuvre littéraire une grande valeur, valeur qui se verra diminuer subséquemment, ou la valeur d'une oeuvre peut aller croissant selon la succession de concrétisations. L'objet esthétique coïncide, d'ailleurs, avec son expression comme les valeurs d'une oeuvre d'art coïncident avec l'interaction oeuvre-lecteur. De cette manière l'objet esthétique exige la parole et devient même le principe fondamental de la critique littéraire, et en s'extrapolant, il devient le motif de la communication;²² et cette communication implique la valeur de la raison et de l'intelligence parce que l'objet esthétique doit correspondre dans le domaine de l'intersubjectif à l'oeuvre qui l'a suscité. Mais l'intelligence dont il s'agit est, pour reprendre un terme à Bergson, une intelligence intuitive par le fait que le lecteur choisit, consciemment ou inconsciemment, la manière dont il remplit le texte lors d'une concrétisation; et celle-ci se forme non pas lors de la contemplation de l'oeuvre une fois la lecture terminée, mais plutôt au cours même de cette lecture. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il n'existe qu'une seule concrétisation valable mais plutôt que, dans le domaine de la critique littéraire, la concrétisation est sujette, elle aussi, à l'interprétation. Le critique se trouve alors contraint par les paramètres objectifs de l'oeuvre d'art; c'est dire qu'il lui faudra tenir compte de l'objectivité des valeurs esthétiques qui en fondent l'objet. De cette façon il échappe et à l'idéalisme qui veut que les valeurs esthétiques soient immanentes et au réalisme pur qui s'accommode mal de l'objet intentionnel qu'est l'oeuvre. Mais il est aussi contraint de faire attention à la fois aux détails du texte, aux niveaux sémantique et structurel, et à la diégèse, à sa présentation et à son sens plus large, métaphysique même, que celle-ci évoque, afin de pouvoir présenter à son tour l'objet esthétique qui se formule à partir d'une lecture de l'oeuvre d'art et qui se réalise dans sa propre expression.

University of Toronto

22 Il faut insister ici, à l'encontre d'Iser, que l'objet esthétique qui se crée par une concrétisation est justement un concept de communication par le fait qu'il a besoin d'une formulation linguistique pour se faire connaître.

NILLI DIENGOTT

Reflections on Narrative Poetics: Aspects of Franz K. Stanzel's Typology Viewed Through a Genettian Perspective

I. INTRODUCTION

This essay is a critique of Franz K. Stanzel's narrative typology viewed primarily through a Genettian perspective. The point of my critique is to show that competing narrative typologies need not be mutually exclusive and that some reconciliation between them is possible though limited to certain aspects. Specifically I will discuss some aspects of Stanzel's *A Theory of Narrative* in the light of what I call the Genettian model, which comprises Gérard Genette's basic model and its modification by Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, who incorporates some of Mieke Bal's proposals.¹

Dorrit Cohn has analyzed at length Stanzel's typology as it appeared in the German original (1979) and has compared it with Gérard Genette's 1972 model. My aim is more limited in scope. I do not attempt an inclusive or comprehensive comparative evaluation of the work of these two theorists. Rather I examine Stanzel's theory (in its English version) in the light of the Genettian model in order to show how Stanzel, whose work was published seven years after Genette and whose English translation appeared twelve years after Genette, did not benefit from insights provided by the Genettian model in order to correct some of the problematic aspects in his typology as analyzed by Cohn.² I hope to demonstrate that the Genettian model

1 Mieke Bal's ideas were developed in a series of articles and in her book *Narratology* (1977), the English version of which appeared in 1985.

2 A most glaring example of his disregard for criticism of his model is in footnote 87, p. 272. He dismisses Cohn's extremely perceptive argument for omitting the autonomous monologue from his typological circle by saying it is unconvincing, but does not explain why he considers it so.

offers some distinctions that Stanzel could have used to clarify his model, without necessarily having to give up his typology as a whole.³

A few preliminary remarks are in order. The Genettian model is a systematic attempt at a narrative poetics divorced from any historical or interpretative considerations. Stanzel's typology is far less systematic, and deliberately so, since he wants to take into consideration historical as well as interpretative dimensions. His typological circle is fluid, whereas the Genettian model attempts to be precise in its taxonomies. His definitions are often ostensive, whereas the Genettian model's are not. Stanzel will often discuss the interpretative implications of his typology, whereas the Genettian model is indifferent to them. We have here two different theoretical orientations. Yet it seems to me that Stanzel's work is typical of the state of narrative poetics where different models coexist without influencing each other, even when no contradictions exist between them, at least in certain respects. I will try to demonstrate in the first part of this essay some of the problematic aspects of Stanzel's discussion of his external/internal distinctions as they pertain to perspective and mode (without repeating Cohn's trenchant comments). In the second part of this paper I will show how an adoption of some distinctions found in the Genettian model could clarify Stanzel's typology without affecting its totality.

This paper, then, is a critique of Stanzel but a critique that takes as its starting point the position that from a practical point of view, different narrative poetics should attempt to be more co-operative. Such cooperation may serve the application of narrative poetics to interpretation, which is something that Stanzel is interested in since he introduces the interpretative dimension in his discussion.

II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EXTERNAL AND THE INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE

II.1

Cohn demonstrated in a perceptive and detailed argument how problematic Stanzel's notion of perspective is and suggested subsuming it under Stanzel's mode (174-79). In the English translation, Stanzel claims to have benefitted from Cohn's comments (xv), yet he rejects her suggestions (50). An

examination of Stanzel's chapter on perspective reveals several problems. Before I discuss them it should be noted that mode is defined by him as answering the question who is narrating, i.e., it focuses on the reader's relation to the process of narration (47-48). Person is defined as having to do with the realm of existence, i.e., the relation of narrator to fictional characters (48). And perspective examines how the reader perceives fictional reality and how he orients himself in fictional space, both outer and inner (49).

A close examination of perspective uncovers four different meanings in which it is used, and which underlie the main distinction dominating perspective, that of external versus internal. These meanings are usually not explicitly stated, neither are they clearly differentiated from each other nor is the relation among them made clear.⁴ Only the first meaning is clearly stated. Internal perspective means that the point of view (which, as Cohn remarked, is really a *modal* concern in Stanzel's typology) is located in the main character or center of events. External perspective means it is located outside the main character or in the periphery of events (111-12). This meaning of external/internal has to do with the issue of importance or centrality.⁵

A second meaning, not specifically defined, is inferable from Stanzel's discussion of problems of classification in forms that are transitional, namely, inbetween authorial-with-external-perspective and figural-with-internal-perspective narrative situations (112). This second meaning implies that internal perspective has to do with the criterion of penetration into the thoughts and feelings of characters, while external perspective means that characters' inner thoughts and emotions are not disclosed.⁶ Since for Stanzel this meaning is brought up in the context of determining whether the perspective is external or internal in the sense of centrality (in fact, it is one means among others, such as use of dialogue or scenic representation), it should be subsumed under meaning one.

The third meaning is the most 'charged' since it includes an initial meaning and two related submeanings. Unlike meaning one (centrality) Stanzel does not actually define external or internal in the third sense.

4 Uspensky (1973), for example, also has several meanings in his discussion of point of view, but they are clearly defined and differentiated.

5 This is the only meaning mentioned in Docherty's review. It should be pointed out that "centrality does not necessarily have anything to do with a character's perception, consciousness, or other discourse-mediating functions" (Chatman 193).

6 It is to be noted that the criterion of penetration into the characters' minds is the sole basis for the Genettian model's distinction between being focalized from within or from without.

3 In all fairness I should note that Genette's *Narrative Discourse* is as guilty of near ignorance of Stanzel's earlier work of 1955 (whose English translation appeared in 1971) which predates Genette's by about fifteen years. However, in his *Nouveau discours du récit*, Genette fully recognizes Stanzel's contribution, discusses it at some length and attempts to take it into account in his discussion of narrative situations (see especially 77-89).

Rather, his discussion relates to different issues from which his meanings can be only deduced. He does say, however, that "the opposition internal perspective-external perspective serves to describe how the reader's apprehension of that which is narrated is regulated by means of the spatial and temporal categories of perception" (112). He claims that internal perspective (referred to also as perspectivism) has affinities with the spatial category of perception, while the external (called also aperspectivism) has affinities with that of time.

This meaning, then, has to do with regulating the *reader's* perspective. Stanzel's distinction of spatial and temporal is far from clear, but he claims that narration is *the* temporal dimension in narrative and it is dominated by what he calls "the 'and-then' scheme" (113). This I understand to mean the temporal progression of events. Since external perspective has affinities with the temporal category it means the reader's perspective is drawn by the enchainment of events, by questions such as "what happens next", i.e., questions of interest or curiosity.

What he means by the spatial category is more obscure. Spatial has to do, apparently, with the relations between persons and things in space (113). Since the perspective here is the reader's, internal perspective, according to Stanzel, has thematic significance, which external perspective lacks: "[o]nly in the case of internal perspective does perspectivization become semiotically significant" (113) for the reader. (It seems from his discussions that semiotic is used as a synonym for thematic). The thematic significance is inferrable from his discussion, which claims that describing an object from a fixed point of view within the fictional world or "the limitation of the range of knowledge or experience of the teller- or reflector-character (limited point of view)" (113) both prove of significance for the reader. An internal perspective, then, would present relations of things to persons in space, preferably limit them to a fixed point of view and to a circumscribed knowledge. External perspective, presumably, would not bother with detailed spatial presentation and merely give the bare minimum which is necessary for the reader to perceive the development of events. What I have just stated is inferrable from the examples he gives (118-19).

Connected with this third meaning of perspective (the reader's perspective) are two submeanings, which have to do respectively with selection and gapping on the one hand, and subjectivity on the other. The first submeaning is connected to the difficulties of spatial presentation in a temporal medium. The presentation of relations of objects in space is always done in terms of their semiotic significance, i.e., "the accentuation of meaning attached to particular objects" (116). Because of the temporal medium, a selection of the significant aspects of space is required and this in turn leaves gaps or indeterminacies since only certain spatial features are

amplified while others are barely sketched in. The difference between internal (perspectival) and external (aperspectival) is in their selections and gapping. Perspectival presentation may limit itself to an objective (camera eye) description of a fixed view with thematic significance or to the view of a central character. An aperspectival presentation gives no indication of the relations of objects in space, it does not highlight elements and as such the description is more gapped and has no thematic significance according to Stanzel.

It should be pointed out that selection and gapping are primarily author or text related issues: the text is gapped or selected, or the author selects and gaps *but not the reader*. Yet the definition of perspective was initially presented by Stanzel as being reader oriented. The contradiction is not irreconcilable since the reader perceives the gaps or selected items. However, theoretically speaking, selection and gapping are not usually classified as the reader's activity.

The second submeaning of internal perspective (perspectivism) is figurative "in the sense of view of a thing as it presents itself from the personal, subjective point of view of a novel-character or narrator" (123) it "means subjectivization" (123-24). External perspective (aperspectivism) is therefore, by inference, objectivization.⁷

Although subjectivity/objectivity are defined here in terms of the presentation *within* the fictional world, they can be reconciled with the third meaning — the *reader's* perspective — if we say that certain ways of presentation create subjective or objective impressions in the reader. What I find hard to reconcile is in what sense the figurative meaning of perspective is a spatial-temporal category. It seems to me that subjectivity/objectivity may be seen to belong to the narrator/reflector's range of knowledge or experience in the sense of attitude or ideology. As such, this figurative distinction would belong to a discussion of relations among narrators, reflectors and implied authors, which indeed affect the reader's perspective but are not spatial/temporal categories of perception.

A fourth meaning of perspective is connected with Stanzel's distinction between *sayer* and *knower*, or *narrator* and *reflector*, and the concept of *focus*. To anyone familiar with the Genettian model, Stanzel's teller/reflector distinction seems to correspond to the distinction between narrator and focalizer in the Genettian model. But Stanzel states explicitly that Genette's concept of *focus* is a way of distinguishing voice from mood, whereas in his scheme this distinction has to do only with perspective (focalization) (114). Again, the meaning of this distinction is not clear, but if I understand

7 Stanzel also treats these terms as distinct styles to be found in novels of different centuries, thus giving them a historical dimension as well (Cohn 175).

Stanzel correctly, the teller/knower seems to be a thematic distinction and hinges on the concept of focus. Focus is the "foregrounding of a certain thematic aspect by means of narrative perspective" (114). Focusing is a means of distinguishing knower from sayer in external or internal perspective by means of highlighting certain features, making them the focus of interest. Focus can cover attention directed to the narrating self, or the episodic prominence of a minor character, or penetrating only the mind of one character by an omniscient narrator. Here, I fail to see the connection between teller/knower and focus. This meaning of perspective suffers from Stanzel's attempt to arrive at descriptions, if not at definitions, ostensibly. Since he claimed that the knower's and teller's perspectives may diverge, for example in Mann's *Death in Venice*, he feels the need to find a concept to describe more precisely such divergence, and focus is the term Stanzel chooses. Focusing is a way of highlighting which of the two is thematically more important. What is not clear is why he even bothers with the teller/knower distinction and how that distinction is connected with the internal/external perspective which is his main concern, though focusing is concerned with manipulating the reader's perspective.

To sum up, the chapter on perspective demonstrates that Stanzel's claims to have benefited from Cohn's critique are not apparent. His discussion is confusing because the terms are too charged with meanings, some of which can only be inferred from his ostensive discussion rather than from any clear definition. The relationships among the different meanings are not clear and they do not all correspond to his initial definition of perspective as orienting the reader in space and time.

II.2 MODE: EMIC AND ETIC TEXT BEGINNINGS

This section of Stanzel's discussion also appears unclear to me: "Etic openings are those which are merely determined externally, extralinguistically and not structurally. Emic openings, on the other hand, are those which are determined internally and structurally" (164). Stanzel cites the opening sentence of Mann's "The Tables of the Law" — "his birth was disorderly" — as an example of an etic narrative opening. While an emic opening is the one he cites from Kleist's novella *Michael Kohlhaas*: "About the middle of the sixteenth century, there dwelt on the banks of the River Havel a horse-dealer named Michael Kohlhaas..." (165). He equates the etic opening with reflectors and the emic with teller characters. He further states that emic openings are not confined to literary texts, while etic openings are not tolerated outside literary ones.

It seems to me that if one examines Stanzel's definitions of emic and etic in relation to his internal/external distinction, then his teller characters should be considered etic while reflectors should be emic. His use of

external/internal in this case is not a matter of mode, or, conversely, if it is a matter of mode, the definition he provides for emic/etic clashes with it. External/internal are categories, according to the definition, which correspond to structurally determined (emic) as opposed to non-structurally determined (etic) beginnings. If so, Mann's opening sentence, "his birth was disorderly" is emic, since one can only know who this "his" refers to in the context of the fictional world, i.e., it is internally determined. Whereas the Kleist opening is determined by the narrator, who, as I will mention later, is always external to the events he narrates about. In other words, the definitions from text-linguistics that Stanzel uses, have nothing to do with mode; they hinge on an entirely different conceptual framework — structural vs. non-structural.

III. STANZEL AND THE GENETTIAN MODEL

The second part of my discussion focuses primarily on Stanzel's unexplained neglect of issues introduced in the Genettian model, which could resolve some of the confusions in his own discussions, without destroying his typology. My comments relate to three points: the disregard for the concept of narratee; the inconsistencies regarding his concept of mediacy and narration; and his disregard for the distinction between narrator and focalizer.

III.1 THE NARRATEE

Nowhere in his discussion does Stanzel take account of the narratee. This concept was dealt with extensively by Gerald Prince and is part of the Genettian model. Stanzel's statement that in *The Catcher in the Rye* the narrator addresses his remarks directly to the reader and that "the possibility of this kind of communication" (57) raises amazement, should have no place in a typology that recognizes mediacy as "the generic characteristic which distinguishes narration from other forms of literary art" (4. My emphasis). Mediacy, as Stanzel himself recognizes, involves a mediator. Stanzel overlooks the fact that mediation takes place not only on the addressor side of the communicative model, but on the addressee side as well. The narratee occupies the same ontological status and space as the narrator, i.e., he is a fictional entity and is always addressed by the narrator.⁸ Holden is,

8 Narratees, like narrators, can range from totally disembodied entities (but who, unlike minimally perceptible narrators, have not even a voice since their sole role is to listen) to fully dramatized ones (e.g., the first narrator in *Heart of Darkness*, who becomes Marlow's narratee).

therefore, addressing a narratee and not the real reader and there is nothing to be amazed about.

III.2 MEDIACY AND NARRATION

My second argument has to do with the mistaken ontological status assigned by Stanzel to narrators. From his above quoted comment on Holden's address it is apparent that for him narrators and real readers occupy different ontological positions (hence his amazement at a fictional character addressing a real reader). However, when it comes to the ontological relations of narrators to characters, Stanzel claims repeatedly that the narrator can occupy the same ontological space as the characters who form part of the fictive world. "Either the narrator exists as a character within the world of the fictional events of the novel or else he exists outside this fictional reality" (48). Since this is his position, he bases his first/third person distinction (which the Genettian model rejects, and for the very reasons Stanzel himself mentions (48)) on the fact that in first person narration the narrator (e.g., a David Copperfield) exists in the same world as the other characters of the novel while the third person narrator (e.g., in *Tom Jones*) "exists outside the fictional world in which Tom Jones, [and] Sophia Western ... live" (49). This is what he calls the distinction between the identity and non-identity of the realms of existence.

Again, disregard for the Genettian distinction of levels (Cohn 165-66) and their implications is a source of great confusion. Since Stanzel insists that "whenever something is reported, there is a mediator" (4), who is fictional, and that mediacy is the distinguishing characteristic of narrative, the question that immediately comes to mind is how the narrator can occupy the same level as the things he reports on. This is by definition a logical impossibility — the narrator can *never* occupy the same realm of existence as the characters he reports about. As a *narrator* he is always and in every instance extradiegetic — *outside* the events or the fictional world or the realm of existence of the characters. Even in first person narration the "narrating I" *never* occupies the same realm of existence as the "experiencing I," even though they are the same person.⁹

9 See my discussion (1986) of the full implications of the Genettian model for the typology of narrators.

The incoherencies regarding the narrator's ontological status could be resolved if *narrators* were seen to be part of the *fiction* (i.e., are not real, unlike the real author or reader, who are) but outside the *fictional world*.¹⁰

III.3 FOCALIZATION AND NARRATION

The final point I want to raise has to do with the extremely important Genettian distinction between narrator and focalizer and which Stanzel seems to agree with in his own distinction between narrator and reflector.¹¹ In fact, throughout his discussion he ignores it. When he defines the figural narrative situation he says "since nobody 'narrates' in this case, the presentation seems to be direct. Thus the distinguishing characteristic of the figural narrative situation is that the illusion of immediacy is superimposed over mediacy" (5). This statement is theoretically sloppy and is not possible from a Genettian perspective. Notice that Stanzel claims "nobody narrates," which immediately raises the crucial question — if no one narrates, where is the mediacy? But if there is no mediacy, reflectors cannot be part of his discussion of narrative, whose generic characteristic *par excellence* is mediacy. But Stanzel is aware of this contradiction since he talks about the "illusion of immediacy," i.e., there really is mediacy but it is not apparent. If there is mediacy then there is a narrator. Now, if Stanzel had really accepted the Genettian model, there would be no problem. According to this model there is no such thing as an "unnarrated" element in a narrative text — *everything* is narrated, including dialogues. Stanzel insists on the idea that dialogues are not narrated since to him "narrative parts are the segments of a narrative text in which the mediacy of narration is *expressed*" (252 note 52. My emphasis). Since in dialogues the mediacy is often not expressed overtly (though "he said" or other inquit forms are testimony enough for overt mediacy) he excludes them from narration. Again, the implications of such a stand for his theory of narrative is that large parts of narratives, where characters are addressing each other or themselves, should be excluded from his discussion. The Genettian model does not limit itself to overt expression

10 What this clarification would do to Stanzel's (and Cohn's) insistence that the first/third person distinction is valid is a question I cannot take up here. I think that Stanzel's claims about the distinction are weakened throughout his discussion by some of his own statements that imply that this distinction is not as absolute as it seems to be. For example his discussion (144-145) where his examples clearly cut across first/third person distinctions (and there are many others).

11 Stanzel (151) reproaches Booth for referring to both narrators and reflectors as narrators. This precisely was the phenomenon, especially noticeable in discussions of 'third person limited' point of view, which caused Genette to distinguish between focalization and narration.

of narration and assumes that when something is communicated there is an addressor and addressee, whether overt or covert, it therefore runs into no such confusions. The narrator always narrates, but his *perceptibility* ranges from very noticeable to almost unnoticeable (Rimmon-Kenan 96-100). The narrator can focalize through a character and thus the reflector (focalizer) is the one who sees, but *does not narrate*, while the narrator is responsible for the narration.

What does Stanzel have to say about his reflector? "Narration can be considered to be effected by two kinds of narrative agents, narrators (in a personalized or unpersonalized role) and reflectors" (48). And when he discusses mode he says: "[t]he opposition mode will be first described not in terms of the process of narrative transmission, but in terms of the agent of transmission ... the contrast between transmission by a teller-character and transmission by a reflector-character" (144). And a few lines down he defines the reflector: "[a] reflector-character reflects, that is, he mirrors events of the outer world in his consciousness, perceives, feels, registers, but *always silently*, because he *never 'narrates'*, that is, he does not verbalize his perceptions ... in an attempt to communicate them" (144. My emphases). Yet he also says that "He doesn't know that ...' can only be said by an (authorial) teller-character ... on the other hand, 'he doesn't know whether/how...' can also occur as the *statement* of a reflector-character" (266 note 69. My emphasis). Since reflectors do not verbalize how can they state? The absurdities and contradictions are obvious. A reflector is a 'transmitter' but he does not narrate, or verbalize. Since obviously Stanzel is not suggesting that reflectors communicate by telepathy, a clear understanding of the meaning of the focalization/narration distinction would do away with these contradictions. The narrator is always there — with varying degrees of perceptibility whereas the reflector only mirrors and never narrates.¹²

Because Stanzel misunderstands the implications of Genette's distinctions he makes some odd and incorrect claims. "While the concepts of reflector-character and teller-character comprise phenomena of the first as well as the third person, the concept of 'figural narrative situation' is applicable only to the third person form" (145). Clearly, this is not true from a Genettian perspective. Figural situations can exist in first person forms if the "narrating I" focalizes consistently through the "experiencing I" and if his perceptibility as narrator is minimal. This is a theoretical possibility that

12 Stanzel claims that the difference between telling and reflecting is epistemological since the teller-character is always aware of his narrating, whereas the reflector has no such awareness (147). Obviously, if the reflector never narrates he can have no such awareness. There is no epistemological difference. If there is *always* a narrator then the only difference is within *narration* in the degrees of perceptibility of the narrator.

cannot be excluded, although there may be very few examples to demonstrate it.

Another wrong claim is that

the criterion of reliability could be more useful if limited to teller characters, that is, to characters who make verbal statements and thereby address ... an audience.... Only in this case can the question of reliability, credibility and veracity be a meaningful topic of interpretation. The criterion of reliability, especially if it also means credibility, is irrelevant in regard to reflector characters. (152)

This is a non-sensical claim because reflectors are notoriously unreliable. For example, Emma Bovary, Isabel Archer, or Stephen Dedalus are notoriously unreliable reflectors, not narrators. Again, such a theoretical exclusion would be impossible if the Genettian model's distinction had been adopted.

To sum up my discussion, it seems to me that Stanzel's book, though an admirable and comprehensive discussion of extremely important issues in narrative poetics, suffers from some serious flaws. His discussion of external/internal perspective and mode is still, despite Cohn's comments and suggestions, extremely confusing. The neglect of the Genettian model's narratee, as well as the Genettian distinction between narration and focalization and its implications for Stanzel's concepts of mediacy are responsible for some serious inconsistencies in his typology. The incorporation of these Genettian concepts and distinctions would clarify Stanzel's typology without destroying its overall flexibility and comprehensiveness.

Finally, within the broader issue of competing narrative theories, I hope that my critique has demonstrated that modifications of one theory by another may lead to clearer more useful distinctions which practical critics may apply in their interpretative undertakings.

Open University of Israel

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VICTOR O. BUYNIAK

Kraszewski's *Jermola* and George Eliot's *Silas Marner*

Some literary critics indicate that there exists a certain plot resemblance between a Populist work, entitled *Jermola*, written in 1854 by the Polish author, Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (1812-1887), and *Silas Marner*, a novel first published in 1861 by the feminist Victorian novelist, George Eliot. In this paper, an attempt is being made to study the genesis and the plot of both novels, and the critical and biographical literature to determine whether there was a literary link between Eliot and Kraszewski.

Various critics of Polish literature claim that Kraszewski was the most prolific Polish novelist.¹ Some even go further and call him the most prolific writer in world literature.² An author of some seven hundred volumes of novels, Kraszewski, in addition, conducted a many-sided intellectual activity as a man of letters, poet, playwright, publicist, literary and art critic; he was also talented in painting and music. Kraszewski did much to spread at home and abroad a knowledge of Polish national history during the years of foreign domination. He evidenced great sensibility with regard to the novel and great ease in writing.³ Kraszewski's career began when the Polish novel was in its infancy (1830s), and he left the literary scene after fifty-five creative years, when Sienkiewicz had already established himself as a national figure. Kraszewski spanned the nineteenth century with his novels, but they also depicted the history of Poland from pagan times to the uprising of 1863. They dealt with topical and exotic subjects and with regional and domestic themes. In style, they were similar to the realistic prose of Flaubert, Dickens and Turgenev. As a young student at Wilno University, Kraszewski read voraciously the works of Walter Scott, Jean Paul

- 1 Czesław Miłosz, *The History of Polish Literature* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1983) 256. Julian Krzyżanowski, *A History of Polish Literature* (Warszawa: PWN, 1978) 319.
- 2 *Zarys dziejów literatury polskiej* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1972) 350.
- 3 Manfred Kridl, *A Survey of Polish Literature and Culture* (Leiden: Mouton & Co., 1956) 393.