

'The Whole World is Watching!'

The 1968 Chicago Riots

by Tyler Dawson

Abstract

In 1968, the Democratic Party of the United States held its convention in Chicago. Thousands of anti-war protestors arrived to picket the democratic process and voice their concerns over the Vietnam War for the upcoming presidential election. With prior knowledge of the coming protests, the Chicago Police Department and city administration expected violence and prepared themselves accordingly. As a result, the convention was plagued all week by violence in the streets as protestors clashed with the police. At the end, the violence was declared be the result of excessive police brutality. Scholarly works on the pre-existing conditions of Chicago that lead to violence have not been fully considered. In looking at the complexity of violent protest, this essay intends to examine the leaders and their intentions – on both sides of the conflict – and determine the causes and impact of one of the most iconic political clashes in twentieth century America.

“I went to the Democratic Convention as a journalist and returned a cold-blooded revolutionary,” wrote gonzo journalist Dr. Hunter S. Thompson in reference to the horror of the Chicago riots.¹ The year 1968 had already been a dramatic one for Chicago; following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in Memphis, Tennessee twenty blocks of the ghetto had burned down in rioting.² Now, with demonstrators preparing to protest in August, the city braced itself

for further unrest. The protestors that arrived varied from pacifists to anarchists, from New Left students to “bizarre flower folk.”³ The result would be days of war in the streets with the world watching through their television sets as protestors and police clashed violently. The debate regarding the rioting has to do with the nature of the riots, and the extent to which each side can be blamed for the violence. The debate can be distilled further: to what extent did the protestors and police assemble with the intent to fight? Therefore, we must question where the blame is to be placed for the rioting, and how the violence progressed. The Chicago authorities precipitated a build up of police and military forces and material in preparation for the Convention, increasing fear of a violent confrontation. While counterculture leaders had committed themselves to non-violent protest in the weeks leading up to the protests, factors beyond their control had contributed to the radicalization of the protestors. When the clashes with the police began, protestors responded in kind, which aggravated tensions and finally resulted in the pitched rioting of Wednesday August 28, 1968.

This argument is one that diverges from traditional discourse on the Chicago Democratic Convention. The blame has previously been placed almost entirely on the police, which is a justifiable identification of fault,

given the excesses of the police department and the overwhelming consensus in the literature that there was a police riot. However, this consensus belies the complexity of the incidents, in which the intentions of the leadership of the counterculture and the circumstances created by the city of Chicago were at odds. This proved an overwhelming contributor to the inevitability of the rioting. In order to make this argument, there are three steps that will be taken. First, an examination of the state of Chicago before the Convention was hosted – from the historical precedents set by Mayor Daley, to the training given to the Chicago Police Department. Secondly, a review of the intentions of the heads of the counterculture movement, and what they hoped to accomplish by coming to Chicago. Finally, looking at Convention Week itself will reveal the confirmation of my suspicions. Violence began early in Convention Week; however, the leadership of the counterculture finally broke towards the middle of the week, helping to escalate the conflict further.

Mayor Daley and the Chicago Police Department

In April of 1968, when there was rioting in the West Side ghetto, Mayor Richard Daley issued a “shoot to kill” order in response to the tentative approach that the police commissioner had taken in order to maintain order.⁴ This shows the extent to

which the Mayor was willing to go to ensure order was kept in his city – indeed, nine African Americans were killed during the April rioting.⁵ Furthermore, having accepted the offer from Lyndon B. Johnson to host the Democratic Convention, Daley pledged in an interview with the *Chicago Sun-Times* that there would be “no one coming in...to take over Chicago at convention time or at any other time.”⁶ Daley’s record indicates that he was true to his word, as Chicago police attacked a peaceful parade and demonstration on April 27, 1968.⁷ In preparation for the Democratic Convention in August, Daley wasted little expense on outfitting for war. Gas masks had been ordered for the police department at the beginning of the year, and all police officers were trained in their use and carried masks throughout Convention week.⁸ Furthermore, negotiations with the Illinois National Guard had them stationed in Chicago for “training assemblies” so that they would be close at hand without the appearance that they were there intentionally to quell violence.⁹ The planning of the Convention was, in fact, far more complicated than preparing for protest; however, these examples demonstrate advance planning that suggests the Chicago authorities were expecting a fight.

Of course, on its own, the preparations by the city do not incriminate the Mayor or the police force in

anticipating conflict in such a way that suggests they intended to start a fight. It does, however, clarify that Chicago had a history of dealing with unrest in an authoritarian fashion – and whether justifiable or not, it sets the stage for the Chicago Democratic Convention.

Mobilization for Protest

For the city of Chicago there was legitimate cause to prepare for unrest. The counterculture groups preparing for Chicago were comprised of disparate and ideologically varied factions, which is important for a number of reasons. One of the most significant results of this prior to the convention was threats made against the Convention and the city. Police intelligence had received reports that there were plans in motion to assassinate key political figures, which understandably gave them cause to be wary.¹⁰ It seems dubious that this excessively violent action can be attributed to any mainstream portion of the counterculture, but it does illustrate the complexity of the entire operation from the perspective of organizers and protestors. The consequences of such information were that all threats therefore had to be considered, even ones as ludicrous as lacing the water supply with LSD.¹¹ While the police response can be dismissed as overkill (in retrospect, it probably

was) it does help explain and justify the steps taken by the city administration.

The Walker Report, a document concerning the Convention was submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence by Daniel Walker and suggested that there were over twenty-four different groups represented at the protests, which is important because it speaks to the variety of voices that showed up.¹² However, following the events eight specific and significant counterculture leaders were arrested and charged “with intent to ‘incite, organize, promote and encourage’ riots in Chicago.”¹³ By looking at these leaders, the multifaceted demonstration can be culled to a more understandable level. It has already been established that Chicago was prepared for unrest, it – certainly, it will become apparent that individual officers were fully ready to violate regulations by using force indiscriminately. But, did the Chicago Seven (for number eight, Black Panther Bobby Seale, would be tried separately) really organize the protests with the intent of sparking widespread violence and rioting as was alleged in their trial? Or, did the events simply spiral out of control? Out of the groups that showed up and organized the protests, the most significant were Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Youth International Party (Yippies) and the National

Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (Mobe). Out of the Seven tried in the Chicago Conspiracy Trial, Tom Hayden (of SDS), Abbie Hoffman, a Yippie, and David Dellinger can be looked to in order to determine if the organizers planned for violence.

Dellinger was the leader of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and a pacifist who believed unequivocally in the importance of non-violent demonstration and protest. He writes: "Nonviolence has the power to win tangible victories against seemingly overwhelming odds," a philosophy that he would also apply to his preparations for Chicago.¹⁴ In the view of Dellinger, the intent of the demonstrations in Chicago was to hold "a combination of movement workshops, decentralized actions and massive rallies, marches and street protests,"¹⁵ and that furthermore, it was "never the aim of the Mobilization to invade the Amphitheatre or disrupt the Convention."¹⁶ Throughout the planning stages of the protest, Dellinger was emphatic that he wanted the protests to remain nonviolent.¹⁷ As one of the key organizers, this speaks to the commitment to non-violent protest. That being said, he was only one man out of many.

The rest of the organizers took a more ambiguous position on violence; however, they were still not disposed towards inciting violence. What they did accept was that violence was all but certain in Chicago, and felt that there should be a method to deal with the inevitability of fighting.¹⁸ In order to explain to protestors the potential for violent conflict, Abbie Hoffman writes, “This is the United States, 1968, remember. If you are afraid of violence you shouldn’t have crossed the border.”¹⁹ Indeed, when Tom Hayden was working in Chicago as an organizer, setting up alternative medical facilities to deal with the injuries that protestors were expected to receive was a priority.²⁰ However, Rennie Davis and Tom Hayden also penned a pamphlet in which they explained how a moderate approach would elicit a more sympathetic response from the public and ensure the moderate group inclusion in Chicago.²¹ The most significant evidence against intent to commit violent protest is contained in Tom Hayden’s testimony before the National Commission on the Causes of Prevention and Violence, and the House Un-American Activities Committee. He said:

I believe that violence should never be ruled out as a method of change...however, I believe also, I always believed, that Chicago was no place for violent confrontation...I didn’t believe that violence should be part of the planning or preparation or

conception of Chicago...I make no secret of the fact that I am not nonviolent, but often people who are not nonviolent can be the most nonviolent, because they know what they are doing, and they want to make sure the means suit the ends, and the means in this case for me was a mass mobilization of a peaceful kind.²²

Hayden's testimony presents an interesting example of how the vision for the demonstration in Chicago was decidedly peaceful, even if some members who participated in its planning were not themselves advocates of non-violent resistance in all circumstances.

This argument is reinforced by Abbie Hoffman's attempts to acquire a permit to hold demonstrations in Lincoln Park, which he felt was a necessary goal and would reduce the possibility of violence in the streets.²³ This permit would be part of a treaty between the city and the demonstrators that would reduce the potential for violence in a way that Hoffman assumed would be advantageous to both sides.²⁴ However, the city denied Yippie and Mobe requests for a permit to sleep in Grant or Lincoln Park, and after a court appeal, Judge William Lynch (who happened to have been a law partner of Mayor Daley) dealt the final blow to the lobbying for a permit.²⁵ It had been rejected on the grounds that Daley would not provide a venue for the protestors, in

the hopes that this would discourage them from coming.²⁶ If the protestors had not intended to maintain the peace, it makes no sense that they would have lobbied so hard to obtain the permit that would have greatly reduced the potential for violence. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the organizers of the protest did not intend for rioting and violence at the Democratic National Convention

Chicago: August 1968

Regardless of the lack of a permit for their demonstrations, the fear inspired by Mayor Daley's boosted police presence, and the potential for violence, protestors arrived in Chicago to rally against the Vietnam War. Given the intentions of the protestors prior to the Convention, why did violence actually erupt in Chicago? The answer, at least in an initial sense, rests in the hands of the Chicago administration and the police force.

The factors in place before the Convention began are necessary to understand the chemistry of the protests. The news that Mayor Daley was preparing his forces for violence spread rapidly through those considering an appearance to protest in Chicago. According to David Dellinger, the possibility of facing lethal force used by security forces "chilled" the

protestors, prompting many to stay away from Chicago.²⁷ Therefore, the more stalwart and less moderate members of the counterculture were the ones that showed up. These demonstrators were the ones that were willing to brave the possibility of serious injury or death.²⁸ It takes a Herculean amount of courage and conviction for protestors to stand up to heavily armed police, and the widespread resistance against the police can be explained by the understanding that there were fewer moderates in the crowd under different circumstances. It has been pointed out that the leaders of the demonstrations did not intend to have militant and violent protests. However, circumstances beyond their control – that is, the actions of Mayor Daley and the city of Chicago – made it such that their initial plans went awry.

The denial of the permit to the protestors is the simplest place to start. Abbie Hoffman said that the refusal of the permit to allow protestors to sleep in Lincoln Park was inconceivable, and that even though it had been denied, he did not expect the curfew to be enforced.²⁹ As it happened though, each night of the Convention, the police cleared out the park, forcing protestors into the streets. It must be made clear that the fighting was initiated by the police force by clearing the park, as this is crucial to understanding the events of Chicago. That is not to say that the protestors were blameless, for they

certainly were not. Throughout the week, demonstrators lobbed bottles and rocks at the police and vandalized property. Obscene language was also noted in The Walker Report as a contributing factor to the strained relations between the police and protestors.³⁰ John Schultz, writing from the crowd of protestors says, “it is legend by now that the final insult that caused the first wedge of cops to break loose upon the Yippies was ‘Your mother sucks dirty cock!’”³¹ Therefore, the protestors did play an active role in provoking the police – but the question remains whether or not vulgar language and thrown bottles are equivalent to the beatings administered by the Chicago Police.

The initial contributing factors to the violence were as follows. The city had made it such that expectations for Chicago were for violence, resulting in a demographic shift among the protestors, with those at the radical end of the spectrum dominating. Furthermore, they refused to grant a permit that would allow the protestors to sleep in the parks, which resulted in the police clearing them to the streets each night at 11 pm. This provided the ignition for the riots, and movement to the streets allowed for ample territory to fight and protest.

The vast majority of responsibility for the fighting, therefore, rests with the Chicago authorities. The police were excessive and irresponsible in their use of force throughout the week. On Monday August 26, 1968, a police car approached a hastily constructed barricade erected by protestors, with the intent of bulldozing it.³² However, the officers trapped a girl between their car and the barricade, prompting a stoning from the outraged demonstrators, which destroyed the police car.³³ This demonstrates the poor judgement on the part of police, and how such actions provoked responses from the protestors. In terms of justification, though, at least the girl was a protestor – there are numerous accounts of police arbitrarily assaulting other citizens. In fact, Playboy owner Hugh Hefner was clubbed as he was out for a walk, prompting massive financial donations to the American Civil Liberties Union.³⁴ Over the course of the week, police also beat medical workers attempting to help tend to the injured.³⁵ Journalists were harassed and had their equipment destroyed by vengeful officers.³⁶

It is impossible to characterise the rioting in Chicago as anything less than a police riot, particularly on Wednesday August 28, when the clash of the two camps outside of the Conrad Hilton resulted in an outrageous display of police brutality. By Wednesday,

protestors had faced days of arbitrary beatings and excessive force at the hands of the police. In kind, the police had been working long hours, were harassed by their opponents verbally and had bottles and other projectiles thrown at them, which had worn them down.³⁷ The irony of course is that police were bothered by actions that are petty in comparison to the beatings that they had dished out. But whatever the excuses were, it is important to note that opponents were radicalized by Wednesday of the Convention.

To put this back in thematic perspective, the leadership of the organizations still attempted to maintain some order where possible. The Walker Report alleges that protestors had crafted dangerous weapons that could be used against police, which contributed to the tension.³⁸ The organizers, however, had attempted to confiscate such deadly implements when they came across them.³⁹ After all, the police were still armed with guns, and it would have been senseless to escalate violence to such a level. Therefore, to some extent the organizers still tried to maintain a grip on the proceedings. Interestingly, though, Schultz actually disregards the role of the organizers once the fighting started, saying that he ran past Tom Hayden hiding away from the action on a doorstep and that “the real leaders were out in the

streets, the leaders were the men at your elbows when anything was happening.”⁴⁰ This implies that the leadership had lost control of the protestors, and their vision for a peaceful protest was disintegrating.

By Wednesday, the possibility of peace had been completely eroded. Tom Hayden, livid with rage at the beating of comrade Rennie Davis called on the protestors to spread throughout the city: “Let us make sure that if blood is going to flow let it flow all over this city. If gas is going to be used, let that gas come down all over Chicago...let this whole stinking city be disrupted and violated.”⁴¹ The protestors then moved along Michigan Avenue, past the Hilton Hotel with the intention of marching towards the Amphitheatre where the delegates were meeting, in what Dellinger kept repeating was to be a non-violent march.⁴² Here the police met them, sparking what Norman Mailer calls the “Massacre of Michigan Avenue.”⁴³ This violence was recorded extensively, as the location near the convention centre put them directly in the view of the public.⁴⁴ This would make it onto national and international news, something that the protestors were joyous about, as perhaps it would gain them favour in the public eye. It is this event that earned itself the title of ‘police riot’ in the literature on the Convention, as the police set upon the protestors with the world watching. For that

reason, the “Massacre of Michigan Avenue” is significant both as a historical event, as well as its symbolic importance to the Sixties, and the Democratic Convention as a police riot in which the government attacked protestors. Indeed, the horrors of the violence prompted Senator Ribicoff, in a speech to support candidate George McGovern to remark “with George McGovern as president of the United States we wouldn’t have those Gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago.”⁴⁵

The Aftermath: Chicago and its Effect on American Politics

The events of 1968 finally came to a head in Chicago. Protestors clashed with police despite intentions for non-violent protest and the Chicago Police Department exercised unreasonable force against the demonstrators. Conscious of the media presence, demonstrators had chanted: “The whole world is watching!” However, their cheers would be in vain.⁴⁶ As it turned out, the reluctance of the organizers to endorse violent protest turned out to be correct, as the demonstrations simply alienated more people from their cause.⁴⁷ In 1972, when George McGovern ran for the Democrats and was handily trounced by Richard Nixon, Hunter S. Thompson wrote that:

“The ‘mood of the nation’ in 1972 was so...blindly reactionary that no presidential candidate who even faintly reminded ‘typical voters’ of the fear & anxiety they’d felt during the constant ‘social upheavals’ of the 1960s had any chance at all of beating Nixon...the pendulum ‘effect’ that began with Nixon’s slim victory in ’68 was totally irreversible by 1972.”⁴⁸

The effects of the rioting in Chicago had profound implications for electoral politics in America. The Democratic Party would change its tactics, and attempt to appeal to the counterculture voters in 1972.⁴⁹ George McGovern later remarked wryly that they had been running a campaign in ’72 that could have been successful in 1968, when the Sixties peaked.⁵⁰ Furthermore, convention planning in 1972 would necessarily revolve around the potential for extensive violence. The Republican National Convention, which originally was to be held in San Diego, was met with hostility from San Diegans, who wanted to see nothing comparable to the events of Chicago in their city.⁵¹ When the Republicans convened in Miami Beach in August of 1972, there were in fact riots and protesting. However, it appeared that Chicago had instilled some lessons for police and city administration, as the police violence was not excessive. Tear gas was used on protestors to control the crowd, however, Hunter S. Thompson remarked that the most significant difference between Chicago

and Miami was that the police “were not beating me into a bloody, screaming coma.”⁵²

The riots that occurred in Chicago at the 1968 Democratic National Convention represent in many ways the culmination of the counterculture protest movement in its interaction with federal politics as well as the inevitability of institutional backlash. The preparations of Mayor Richard Daley and the city of Chicago engineered a situation where conflict was inevitable, and violence highly probable. The city went through a build up of security forces and powerful rhetoric that kept more moderate counterculture protestors away from Chicago. Looking at the protestors, the Yippie, SDS and Mobe leadership attempted, despite their reservations and fears, to organize what was supposed to be a non-violent protest. Despite the constant lobby to obtain a permit for the demonstrations, the city refused, which made confrontation inevitable as police cleared protestors out of Lincoln Park each night of the convention at 11 pm. This forced demonstrators out into the streets of Chicago, where much of the rioting occurred. The combination of circumstances aggravated both sides over the course of the week, and the tension finally culminated in the police riot on Wednesday August 29, 1968. Captured by television cameras around the world, the protestors had hoped that this would at least sway public opinion in their favour. It was not to

be – Richard Nixon won the presidency, riding the wave of the conservative backlash from his ‘silent majority’ supporters. However, the Convention changed the strategies used by parties, and also importantly, would result in a deviation from excessive police violence against protestors. The events of Chicago in August, 1968 are best understood as an inevitable culmination of the tensions of the Sixties, where the tide of the counterculture was broken, ushering in a new era of conservative administration that would shape America for decades.

¹ Douglas Brinkley, editor’s note to *Fear and Loathing in America: The Brutal Odyssey of an Outlaw Journalist*, by Hunter S. Thompson (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2000), xviii.

² David Farber, *Chicago ’68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 94.

³ Daniel Walker, *Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Streets of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), 92.

⁴ David Farber, *Chicago ’68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 94.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Eugene Kennedy, *Himself! The Life and Times of Mayor Richard J. Daley* (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), 213.

⁷ David Farber, *Chicago ’68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 95.

⁸ Daniel Walker, *Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Streets of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), 101-102.

⁹ David Farber, *Chicago ’68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 154.

¹⁰ Daniel Walker, *Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Streets of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), 97.

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- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 93.
- ¹³ John Schultz, *The Chicago Conspiracy Trial* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 9.
These men were: David T. Dellinger, Rennard C. Davis, Thomas E. Hayden, Abbott H. Hoffman, Jerry C. Rubin, Lee Weiner, John R. Froines and Bobby G. Seale.
- ¹⁴ David Dellinger, *Revolutionary Nonviolence* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970), 240.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 307.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 315.
- ¹⁷ David Farber, *Chicago '68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 79.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 80.
- ¹⁹ Abbie Hoffman, *Revolution for the Hell of It* (New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1968), 107.
- ²⁰ Tom Hayden, *Rebellion and Repression: Testimony by Tom Hayden Before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and the House Un-American Activities Committee* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1969), 59.
- ²¹ David Farber, *Chicago '68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 90.
- ²² Tom Hayden, *Rebellion and Repression: Testimony by Tom Hayden Before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and the House Un-American Activities Committee* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1969), 72-73.
- ²³ Abbie Hoffman, *Revolution for the Hell of It* (New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1968), 107.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ John Schultz, *No One Was Killed: The Chicago Democratic National Convention, August 1968* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 4.
- ²⁶ David Farber, *Chicago '68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 151.
- ²⁷ David Dellinger. "From Atlantic City to Chicago: The Making of a Conspiracy," in *The Conspiracy*, ed. Peter Babcox, Deborah Babcox and Bob Abel (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), 142.
- ²⁸ Abbie Hoffman. "Freedom and Licence," in *The Conspiracy*, ed. Peter Babcox, Deborah Babcox and Bob Abel (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), 56.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 59.
- ³⁰ Daniel Walker, *About the Report, Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Streets of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), xiii.
- ³¹ John Schultz, *No One Was Killed: The Chicago Democratic National Convention, August 1968* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 87.

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- ³² John Schultz, *No One Was Killed: The Democratic National Convention, August 1968* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 109.
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, 124.
- ³⁵ Norman Mailer, *Miami and the Siege of Chicago: An Unofficial History of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions of 1968* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), 171.
- ³⁶ John Schultz, *No One Was Killed: The Democratic National Convention, August 1968* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 118.
- ³⁷ Daniel Walker, *Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Streets of Chicago during the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), 135.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 196.
- ³⁹ John Schultz, *No One Was Killed: The Democratic National Convention, August 1968* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 177.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 91.
- ⁴¹ David Farber, *Chicago '68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 196-197.
- ⁴² Daniel Walker, *Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Streets of Chicago during the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), 231.
- ⁴³ Norman Mailer, *Miami and the Siege of Chicago: An Unofficial History of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions of 1968* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), 159.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 180.
- ⁴⁶ David Culbert, "Television's Visual Impact on Decision-making in the USA, 1968: The Tet Offensive and Chicago's Democratic National Convention," *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 33, No. 3 (1998): 444.
- ⁴⁷ John P. Robinson, "Public Reaction to Political Protest: Chicago 1968," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* Vol. 34, No. 1 (1970): 1.
- ⁴⁸ Hunter S. Thompson, *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1973), 466.
- ⁴⁹ Herbert W. Simons, James W. Chesebro and C. Jack Orr, "A Movement Perspective on the 1972 Presidential Campaign," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* Vol. 59, No. 2 (1973): 172.
- ⁵⁰ Hunter S. Thompson, *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1973), 478.
- ⁵¹ Vincent S. Ancona, "When the Elephants Marched Out of San Diego: The 1972 Republican Convention Fiasco," *The Journal of San Diego History* Vol. 38, No. 4 (1992): <https://www.sandiegohistory.org/journal/92fall/elephants.htm>, accessed December 2, 2009.
- ⁵² Hunter S. Thompson, *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1973), 360.