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Book Reviews

*FRANCIS SPARSHOTT. *The Future of Aesthetics*. Toronto Buffalo London: The University of Toronto Press, 1998. Toronto Studies in Philosophy. xii + 173. CDN\$ 35.00.

In the not so distant past, when the philosophy department in which I teach was undergoing an external review, the consensus of the review-committee was that in the area of aesthetics it was arguably the strongest department in Canada, having then a full third of its faculty writing and teaching on aesthetic issues – the strongest, that is, save for any department, as one of the committee averred, "in which Francis Sparshott might happen to teach." Since at the time Sparshott was teaching in a philosophy department at a rival university, it was a measure of his reputation that not one of my colleagues bridled at this rider. That their collective expertise in aesthetics might nearly equal that of Sparshott alone was a judgement my colleagues seemed almost flattered to accept.

The theme of authority is one that Sparshott himself explicitly raises. This book derives from lectures, and lectures "implicitly claim a higher ground" than "the stance of simply one person talking to other people" (92-93). Moreover, it consists of not just any lectures but an annotated version of Sparshott's "Ryle Lectures," delivered at Trent University in 1996. It thus has the imprimatur of a named lecture series, and in its published form, the added distinction of the "Toronto Studies in Philosophy." Since aesthetics survives today for the most part as a marginalised sub-discipline within professional philosophy, its future is in doubt. In this regard, however, the agis of Ryle's name is ironic. For Ryle himself (who was – to add to the irony – Sparshott's supervisor for the B.Phil. degree at Oxford) "objected to aesthetics" on the grounds "that the study was spurious from the beginning," and to emphasise the point, affected a posture of philistinism (101). Although tempered of late, this sort of dismissive attitude still prevails in the mainstream of Anglo-American philosophy. From that perspective, only the effete and fuzzy-minded are expected to get seriously exercised over aesthetics and its future. That Sparshott does, belies such reproach, and serves as a caution to those who would dismiss aesthetics out of hand.

The question of authority arises too because of this book's scope. Sparshott's thesis is that "the future of aesthetics depends on the future of

philosophy in general; and the future of philosophy depends on the future of the university; and the future of the university depends on the future of civilisation" (16). Taken together, these are matters about which no one could seriously claim to have an exhaustive and definitive view. "Nothing in this book," Sparshott writes, "pretends to be authoritative or up-to-date. It is intended, rather, to be illustrative of what needs to be borne in mind" (xi). At the end, he returns to this theme. "I am an authority only in the classroom or on the library shelf, in a context that has no vital significance. My hearers and readers need feel neither threatened by my authority nor indignant at my presumption. I get out into the real world only by climbing down from the podium to the classroom floor, and leaving the classroom – and the school and the schoolyard – by the same doors and gates as the rest of the class" (93). This is not a gratuitous reminder. Sparshott insists that this book "is to be taken as essentially involving and inviting reflection on its own procedures, both as a series of lectures by a stranger to strangers [although this description is questionable] and as a philosophical mediation" (97). The reminder is also part of the argument. That there are authorities who are entitled, not by a presumptive superiority, but by a collective (a *koinonia*, in Aristotle's sense) of hearers and readers committed to the value of fundamental and comprehensive reflection, and yet who also, simply as persons, are each compelled to find his or her own way in the world at large as one individual among others, is a condition upon which all of the interrelated "futures" Sparshott considers depend. This relation of authority to the world is an essential part of the intellectual and cultural structures that support aesthetics, philosophy, the university, and civilisation in their mutual dependence.

By his own admission, Sparshott's argument is not straightforward. "My books," he writes, "tend to consist of asymmetrical and intractable masses of material only partially ordered. Such order as they have points to the process of their ordering, just as their arguments fade away into accounts of how arguments may be supported and met" (96). By the prevailing standards of "rigorous demonstration," this form of argumentation will seem imperfect, and its trajectories too heterogeneous. But "imperfect form," understood as "a transient and unstable outcome of heterogeneous forces" (97), is just the model for argument that Sparshott adopts. This model does involve analysis and syllogism, but its overall form is aesthetic. In this book, the model is represented by a double presentation: "a more or less consecutive exposition of the material integral to the project, and a mass of annotation, some of it contributing to the project as such, but much of it contributing to my actual project in this book only by being an essential part of it. An essential feature of this material is that it is non-linear." This account is itself teasingly dissonant, placing the "project as such" in tension with the "actual project," the "integral" in tension with the "essential" and the "non-linear."

Without presuming to do it full justice, Sparshott's consecutive

exposition can be readily traced. Aesthetics depends upon the confluence of three separate lines of inquiry: the first concerns the status of beauty among values, and the part beauty plays in human thought and action as something admired for its own sake; the second concerns the logic of criticism and aesthetic judgement, the rational basis for disputing preferences and tastes; and the third concerns the proper place of the fine arts as organised modes of practice among the arts and sciences, and the role of works of imagination in the economy of the human mind. Taking up any one of these lines of inquiry inevitably involves one in the others. But "it is only if one pushes these lines very hard, to see where they go, that their convergence comes to seem part of an inescapable dialectic. And it is this dialectic that makes aesthetics what it is" (16). Yet only when philosophy is studied in a certain way, and carried on at a certain level of intensity, can this dialectic emerge and aesthetics flourish. But the pursuit of philosophy with such depth and energy, requires as an ideal the comprehensive mapping of our knowledge, and a certain kind of human sociability informed by that ideal. These are sustained by the institutional structures of something like a university, embodying the ideal of total knowledge. As such, the university is civilisation's central institution, civilisation being understood, however, not as the arbitrary order of a particular political imperium imposed on the less powerful, but as a unifying structure of knowledge acquisition and exchange adopted in part for its own sake.

Sparshott appreciates that this line of argument involves highly contestable views about aesthetics, philosophy, the university, and civilisation. He himself sounds discordant notes: Aesthetics is marginalised; philosophy has devolved into the parasitic practises of logical analysis; the research university pursuing the ideal of total knowledge has disintegrated into the consumer university, impelled by an uncontrollable chaos of proliferating quests; and the idea of civilisation as a unifying structure of knowledge has fragmented into the pragmatic pieties of multiculturalism. But even as repudiated and rejected, philosophy and aesthetics persist, since to repudiate philosophy is still to philosophise and to reject aesthetics is still to affirm some values over others in ways that require reasonable adjudication. Moreover, what is ultimately important is not the direct realisation, perfectly or even partially, of the ideal form of aesthetics, philosophy, the university, or civilisation without discord or disruption, but the imperfect forms that eventuate in our on-going attempts at that realisation, attempts that lack all vitality without a genuine and continued interplay of convergence and divergence.

The cover of this book bears a full-page photograph, supplied by the author himself, showing him on a beach, the sea barely visible in the background, sitting head bowed and hand on brow in the seat of what looks

to be the washed-up carcass of some dismembered vehicle. The impression is overwhelmingly one of melancholy and ruin. Yet Sparshott seeks to reassure us. "A ruin as an object of romantic reflection," he writes, "typically provokes a pleasing melancholy. To me, that is only a very special case of something more profound: the endlessly complex fascination of the harmonies and dissonances that result from multiple forces working together on the material world" (95). This fascination expresses too the particular aesthetic appreciation of life that animates Sparshott's discussion and gives it hope, the belief that one finds such fulfilment as there is only in the temporary realisation of imperfect forms (172). Confronted with this image, however, some readers might not be so sanguine. (ROBERT BURCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*RICHARD BAUMAN and JONATHAN HART, eds. *Explorations in Difference: Law, Culture and Politics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996. 246 pp. CDN\$ 24.95, paper.

Difference is not an intellectual plaything, a seductive and mere ivory bauble. As the essays collected in *Explorations in Difference: Law, Culture, and Politics* demonstrate, out in the streets and on our screens difference is increasingly the divisive currency of the civic realm. *Explorations in Difference*, ably and imaginatively edited by Jonathan Hart and Richard Bauman, collects a number of postmodern accounts of culture and law which focus upon various theoretical or discrete historic interactions between stigmatized groups and Power. As the editors observe, these essays wrestle difference from its "sequestration from social and political engagement" into the fray of Canadian and international situations, in the Sartrean sense, canvassing (among others) homosexuality, feminism, abortion, aboriginal rights, the larger discourse of "special interests," the re-inscription of the French Revolution in the plantation societies of Guadeloupe, and IRA hunger strikers. The editors candidly acknowledge that their authors "both celebrate and lament postmodernism, often in the same essay," and that the book itself, embodying "differences on difference," is intended to be a heuristic collection assisting further explorations of the differences circulating in Canadian and world communities (18).

Explorations is split in two movements: "Theoretical Accounts" and "Instances." The first part opens with Ross Chambers's essay, "No Montagues without Capulets: Some Thoughts on Cultural Identity." Chambers's work on symbolic scapegoating and community building is both supple and optimistic. Through an exploration of the dynamics of constellating gay identity, it draws out some of the key issues of cultural and individual identity developed in subsequent essays in the collection. Chambers's argument is

that it is possible to move toward a viable and nuanced society, an opened and more complex "we," as he puts it, in part by breaking down the core fiction afflicting both dominant and stigmatized groups – that individuals possess a comprehensive and singular cultural identity. To further this opening of identity in the sociopolitical realm, he proposes that minorities engage in a political practice of "inclusive address" and successive anti-scapegoating alliances which refuse the position of the alienated scapegoat. Chambers glosses the empowering nature of the inclusive move: "when a member of a scapegoated community says 'we' to a figure identified with a dominant group, asserting the former's participation in the dominant group and enlarging the ambit of community, that assumption of an enlarged community displaces the dominant group and usurps its capacity to define what constitutes an in-group: it [the dominant group] is no longer positioned as being able to offer (or refuse) participation to the noise-making other. . . . Instead, it is the dominant group that is invited to participate in a community of which the other is already a fully participating member" (60).

Chambers' essay is followed by Jennifer Nedelsky's "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship." Nedelsky's work usefully reflects on the institutional mechanisms required to ensure a continuing debate about the nature and quality of both individual and group rights. Nedelsky's work begins from the premise that the "neat characterization of constitutionalism as balancing a tension between democracy and [static] individual rights is not adequate for the actual problem," particularly in Canada. Nedelsky asserts that constitutional rights are "as much collective choices as laws passed by the legislature" (69). She argues that rights ought to be analysed as existing not so much to protect the autonomy of the classical liberal subject, but rather to dynamically structure social relationships so as to foster autonomy within interdependence. Democracy and autonomy are therefore "linked together as values that require each other and can potentially be in conflict with one another" (73). Further, she rejects the position that constitutions function simply to protect ordained rights from the vagaries of democracy. More subtly, Nedelsky's work recognizes that constitutions and judicial interpretations of constitutions are positioned both within and beyond the democratic sphere. A constitution is important because its endless re-interpretation compels the courts to provide a forum for an ongoing dialogue about the legislative treatment of rights. Constitutionalism thus provides an institutional mechanism for "continually asking if whether our institutions of democratic decision-making are generating outcomes consistent with those values" (72). Constitutions can help to forestall the degradation of discourse and reasoning observed where one group is preparing to legislatively sacrifice another's rights: "when we understand the constitutionalization of rights as a means of setting up a dialogue of democratic accountability, we redefine the kinds of

justification necessary for constitutional constraints on democratic decision-making" (84).

Nedelsky's implied sub-argument, that institutions such as constitutions are required to brake a potential descent into democratic irrationality in which the rights of minorities are put at risk, is echoed in Christopher Norris's defence of the tools of evidence and reason in "Enlightened Pursuits: Truth-Seeking Discourse and Postmodern Scepticism." Norris flatly rejects the Foucauldian equation of "truth seeking discourse" with torture (94). Norris holds that as a consequence of rejecting dialogue, reason and cultivating relativity, the vertigo induced by postmodernism ultimately gives onto an impotent quietism: one "can do nothing to challenge... injustice and oppression since it [generic postmodernism] offers no arguments, no critical resources, or validating grounds for perceiving them as inherently unjust and oppressive" (95). In the end, Norris asserts, the rhetoric of plurality and difference "comes down to the advice that one should cultivate the private virtues and cease the vain effort to square those virtues with a sense of our larger... responsibilities" (95).

Norris' analysis that the postmodern framing of difference can yield apolitical or even conservative political conclusions finds support in Christine Synowich's "Some Disquiet about Difference." Synowich builds upon the work of Mouffe, Laclau and Iris Young to explore the long term and macro-level inadequacies of focusing upon the bare concept of difference as a basis for society, even where the gaze intends to be a progressive one. In particular, Synowich broods upon Mouffe's insights about the danger of taking identity as a prime basis for democratic politics. Synowich's work cogently points out what one CBC commentator has recently referred to as the "cineplexing of society" and the fragmentation of the body politic into a "mass of self-feeding groups." Synowich articulates a key downside of insisting upon difference as a prime value in the political system: she worries that a loss of social empathy and of common values existing independently of a citizen's particularities may ultimately result in the loss of a shared public discursive space or *agora*, as Hannah Arendt might understand the term. Synowich, like Chambers, spells out some of the limits of difference as a political concept and gestures toward more fertile ground:

it is not clear how the idea of difference can shape political theory. Instead of identity itself, we should focus our attention on the interests that accrue from different identities and the extent to which they figure as claims for justice.... If we are the bearers of incommensurable, diverse identities, we cannot expect political institutions to recognize and convert these identities into sources of unity and cohesion.... we can live diversely in common only if [substantive] inequality, not difference, becomes our focus. (131)

The second part of *Explorations in Difference* is equally stimulating. Sheila Noonan provides an analysis of feminist theories of consciousness and the discourse of abortion rights in "Pertaining to Connection: Abortion and Feminist Legal Theory." Richard Devlin, a law professor at Dalhousie, contributes a moving account of Irish resistance to British Rule as it was very literally embodied in the hunger strikes and "dirty protest" of Bobby Sands and the other IRA hunger strikers of H Block in 1981. Pamela McCallum contributes a piece on Alejo Carpentier's historical novel, *The Century of Enlightenment*, which through baroque allegory and dream play charts the great emancipatory project of the French Revolution and the major texts of the Enlightenment as they are re-inscribed on the social and political spaces of the Caribbean. In "Rights and Spirit Dancing: Aboriginal Peoples versus the Canadian State" Claude Denis, a sociologist at the University of Alberta, offers a provocative analysis of a civil lawsuit filed by David Thomas, a Coast Salish person, against Daniel Norris and several other aboriginal persons who abducted Norris and held him against his will for four days, subjecting Thomas to ceremonies intended to heal him. Thomas' female partner had requested that he be subjected to these ceremonies, hoping that it would help their marital problems and Thomas' alcohol dependency.

The essays in *Explorations in Difference* are undergirded by what Hart and Bauman identify as an incommensurate tension in postmodern theorizing – a tension the editors find encapsulated in the respective positions of Lyotard and Habermas on the concepts of knowledge and legitimation. Hart and Bauman set up Lyotard's pulverized, avoidant small narratives and incommensurable language games position against Habermas's thesis of a life world spun from the web of presuppositions common to a speech community (6).

In front-line legal practice I think that there can be no real contest between these two positions: Canadian law emanates from a solidly Habermasian take on the world. The fundamental legal interpretative moves taught to law students – the canons of construction – suppress the discontinuities and ruptures focused upon by postmodern analysis. To take an overtly Foucauldian position in legal practice is to court, at a minimum, eventual disbarment. However, as many of the writers in the collection point out, the law's very insistence on continuity and coherence renders it, on a theoretical level, a prime subject for deconstructive and postmodern analysis.

Although some authors broach the issue, none work directly on the burning topic of the politically-driven bad-faith use of the concept of difference and there is scant acknowledgment of the existentialists' contributions to the intellectual history of difference in the political realm. By chance, during the protracted writing of this review, I happened across a copy of Sartre's *Anti-*

Semite and Jew. Written in the aftermath of the Second World War, and attuned to developments in French society, the book psychoanalyses the psychology of the anti-Semite and that of the othered – the Jew. Breathing at moments in its lucid dissection of the origins of pathological constructs of difference, *Anti-Semite and Jew* is a useful reminder of the impenetrable and irrational underbelly of difference, as Norris argues.

Difference has proven to be a richly generative concept: by turns narcissistic, insurgent, and often lethal. *Explorations in Difference* is a fresh and bracing collection which evidences both the rooting of postmodern thought in Canadian intellectual history and a maturing and nuanced response to, and assessment of, the extravagant work of the European masters. (JOANN M. BLAIS, EDMONTON)

*MARÍA JOSÉ VEGA and NEUS CARBONELL, eds. *La literatura comparada: principios y métodos*. Madrid: Gredos, 1998. 265 pp.

La literatura comparada: principios y métodos presenta una visión de conjunto del curso teórico del comparatismo literario desde su nacimiento académico en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX hasta el presente. Destinada a los estudiantes universitarios en lengua española, la antología de ensayos de Vega y Carbonell aparece dividida en tres partes organizadas cronológicamente y que se corresponden con tres grandes estadios en la evolución de la disciplina: Cada una de estas partes incluye una introducción general, que ofrece los datos históricos más importantes, y un número variable de ensayos (17 en total), entre los que se encuentran algunos de los textos más representativos del comparatismo, así como contribuciones recientes sobre sus últimas tendencias.

La primera parte aparece dividida en dos subapartados. En el primero de ellos, que incluye ensayos de Joseph Texte ("Les études de littérature comparée à l'étranger et en France"), Benedetto Croce ("La letteratura comparata") y Charles M. Gayley ("What is Comparative Literature?"), se estudia el origen institucional de la literatura comparada, esto es, desde la aparición de los primeros escritos programáticos hasta comienzos del presente siglo, momento en el que la literatura comparada empieza a contar ya con una presencia universitaria y académica, revistas, congresos y bibliografías. El segundo subapartado se refiere a la etapa de consolidación de la literatura comparada como disciplina académica durante el periodo de entreguerras y recoge los modelos de comparatismo que se conforman en torno a la práctica de Ferdinand de Baldensperger ("La littérature comparée. Le mot et la chose") y Paul Van Tieghem ("Préface à *Le préromantisme*") y culmina con la aparición de los primeros manuales de literatura comparada y con la generalización de firmes protocolos de trabajo e investigación.

Un segundo bloque abarca desde la posguerra europea hasta la década de los ochenta y explora la contestación metodológica del modelo positivista, así como la búsqueda de paradigmas más rigurosos en los que asentar la disciplina. Aunque la crítica de este modelo de comparatismo se extiende a lo largo de muchos años y procede de muchas vertientes metodológicas, una de ellas llegaría a convertirse en representante paradigmática de la "revuelta contra el positivismo": se trata de la conferencia pronunciada por René Wellek en el segundo congreso de la International Comparative Literature Association y publicada con el título "The Crisis of Comparative Literature". Además del ya clásico trabajo de Wellek, Vega y Carbonell incluyen traducciones al español de los trabajos de Henry Remak "Comparative Literature: Its Definition and Function", D.W. Fokkema, "Comparative Literature and the New Paradigm", Hans-Georg Ruprecht, "Littérature comparée et rationalité théorique", y Pierre Laurette, "La littérature comparée et ses fantômes théoriques".

La tercera parte está dedicada a la literatura comparada de los últimos diez años. A través de los ensayos de Gilbert Chaitin ("Otherness"), Jacques Chevrier ("Les littératures africaines dans le champ de la recherche comparative"), Bill Ashcroft ("What are Post-Colonial Studies?"), Armando Gnisci ("La littérature comparée comme discipline de décolonisation"), Susan Sniader Lanser ("Compared with What? Global Feminism, Comparatism and the Master's Tools"), André Lefevere ("Comparative Literature and Translation") y Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek ("An Alternative Comparative Literature"), se exploran los problemas básicos del comparatismo actual y sus relaciones con la teoría literaria contemporánea y la traducción. Tras el advenimiento del postestructuralismo, la deconstrucción, la crítica feminista, los estudios culturales y el postcolonialismo, los autores seleccionados analizan el impacto de estos movimientos en la literatura comparada.

El volumen se cierra con una detallada guía bibliográfica. Ésta incluye una relación completa de instrumentos bibliográficos impresos, esto es, de las bibliografías de la literatura comparada, de las asociaciones, de los contenidos de las series más importantes de actas de congresos y de las revistas especializadas, con comentarios sobre su difusión y naturaleza y sobre los medios de actualización y seguimiento de la disciplina. En un segundo subapartado se detallan los manuales y volúmenes colectivos de introducción o actualización de la literatura comparada, con comentarios sucintos acerca de aquellos que son accesibles en español y con un resumen del contenido de los manuales publicados más recientemente y que reflejan, por tanto, el estado actual de la disciplina. Por último, se incluye una lista, muy restringida de artículos y estudios programáticos relevantes y de las publicaciones que dan cuenta de los estudios literarios comparados en diversas partes del mundo.

Vega y Carbonell han seleccionado los textos de acuerdo con tres criterios. En primer lugar, han preferido los de naturaleza teórica y

programática; es decir, aquellos que de forma explícita y manifiesta tratan acerca de la definición de la literatura comparada, diseñan sus ámbitos de trabajo y aplicación, reflexionan sobre sus métodos y procedimientos, critican modelos anteriores de la disciplina o establecen la finalidad de la comparatística. No hay pues, deliberadamente, artículos o contribuciones destinadas a esclarecer casos prácticos o aplicaciones, a pesar de que sí hay una profusión de ejemplos literarios que ilustran las instancias teóricas expuestas. Esta restricción no implica, en absoluto, un desprecio por la relevancia de los trabajos aplicados; es más bien una opción inicial para proporcionar, en primer lugar, los trabajos clásicos de naturaleza programática, y una selección unitaria y homogénea. Sólo si se accede a qué pensaron, sucesivamente, varias generaciones de comparatistas acerca de la naturaleza de su disciplina puede comprenderse mejor la impostación y desarrollo de los casos aplicados. El segundo criterio de selección ha sido el de la relevancia, influencia e impacto que ha tenido cada una de las contribuciones en el curso del debate sobre la naturaleza de la literatura comparada. Este criterio, no obstante, ha sido matizado por un tercero, el de la accesibilidad en español de los trabajos aquí recogidos. En general, los editores han preferido incluir los más relevantes de aquellos autores que no habían sido todavía traducidos al español. De este modo, no sólo se han dejado a un lado los textos escritos en español sino también algunos de indudable impacto que habían sido ya traducidos de manera apropiada. Tal es el caso, por ejemplo, de René Etiemble, al que hay frecuentes referencias en la segunda parte de este volumen y del que no se ha incluido texto alguno, ya que muchos de sus artículos más significativos eran accesibles en español. Sólo hay una excepción—por lo demás muy llamativa—a este principio: se trata del trabajo de René Wellek, “La crisis de la literatura comparada”, del que hay una versión anterior pero que los editores han considerado indispensable incluir para poder explicar un giro fundamental en los estudios comparados de los años sesenta. El extraordinario impacto de este trabajo, que junto con “Comparative Literature: Definition and Function” de Henry Remark, es uno de los más citados de la comparatística de este siglo, ha llevado a los editores a considerar sus inclusiones de forma excepcional.

Concebida como libro de texto para los cursos de literatura comparada en las universidades españolas, la antología de ensayos de Vega y Carbonell es de gran interés para aquellos comparatistas que trabajan en el ámbito hispánico. Además de presentar una valiosa colección de ensayos programáticos inéditos en lengua española, las introducciones que preceden a los trabajos seleccionados sintetizan de forma eficaz los cambios principales experimentados por la disciplina desde sus orígenes hasta el momento presente. JUAN-NAVARRO SANTIAGO, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

*SUE CAMPBELL. *Interpreting the Personal: Expression and the Formation of Feelings*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. 204 pp. US\$ 39.95, cloth.

Ancient philosophers are well known for the attention they paid to the emotions. Plato's *Symposium* was devoted to exploring the significance of love, and Aristotle's *Poetics* argued for the importance of the tragic emotions of pity and fear. In the last century, however, philosophers of mind have paid far more attention to beliefs and desires than they have to feelings, and the whole realm of affect has tended to disappear as a distinct psychological category thought to play an explanatory role.

Sue Campbell's *Interpreting the Personal* is an eloquently expressed and well-argued contribution to the philosophical analysis of feelings. It will be of value not only to philosophers, but also to those with an interest in the political significance of the strategies we use to express our affective lives to others. Campbell's book engages extensively with contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind, but does not presume familiarity with any individual philosopher. Her clear definition of philosophical terms helps her reader negotiate complex argumentation. Her extensive use of literature also helps to engage her readers and convey her points, but the book is conceptually rigorous and not an easy read.

There have been important exceptions to the relative philosophical neglect of feelings and emotions, and Campbell provides a critical reappraisal of James, Ryle, and Alston, whom she identifies as taking a Neo-Darwinian approach to the study of emotions. She also critiques de Sousa and Amélie Rorty's cognitive/perceptual model of emotions. All of these philosophers, along with those who offer a social constructivist account of emotions, focus on what Campbell calls the “classic passions” – such as pity, anger, love, fear and shame. These emotions have distinct labels and are taken to issue in set patterns of behaviour. For social constructivists in particular, the norms of a given community govern what emotions may be felt and how they may be expressed.

Campbell argues that classic emotions, or classic passions, are wrongly taken as paradigmatic of all feelings. As a result, all of the above philosophers downplay the significance to our affective lives of what Campbell calls “nameless feelings.” Neo-Darwinian philosophers in addition ignore problems about how feelings are socially recognized and shaped through expression. If we assume that there is no problem identifying feelings – as we do when we focus on the classic emotions, and as Neo-Darwinists are even more likely to do, when they focus on emotions they believe we share with other animals – we fail to realize that recognizing the expression of a feeling involves interpretive activity. We may also fail to recognize how even classic emotions may be expressed in a variety of subtle and original ways.

Campbell's use of literature, both to give examples of literary works' clear and moving expressions of classic emotions and "nameless feelings," and to argue that literature can articulately express emotions without invoking similar emotions in its audience, is one of the strengths of the book. One chapter is devoted to a re-reading of the expression of love in *Cyrano de Bergerac*, and another involves extended study of a long poem by Michael Lynch. Campbell also offers sensitive readings of the expression of classic emotions and nameless feelings in works by authors ranging from Miriam Tlali, Sylvia Plath, and Adrienne Rich to Shakespeare. Some of the "nameless feelings" explored include Plath's expression of weird sinking hilarity and Tlali's expression of her character's feeling like a "white master's well-fed dog." In the process, Campbell also provides a convincing and original case for taking Collingwood, Ducasse and Dewey's expressionist theory of art seriously as a resource for understanding the sophistication of expression of emotion as an activity. It also represents a rare instance of philosophy paying serious attention to nameless feelings.

Like social constructivists, Campbell argues that both the formation of our feelings and their expression depend upon the expressive resources available to us, and the responses of others to our expression. Others are important to us not only because we seek to share our feelings with them, but also because the way we express our emotions actually helps form and shape our emotional lives. Campbell agrees with cognitive/perceptual models of emotion that beliefs and perceptions are causal antecedents to our feelings, but argues that feelings themselves do not exist in individuated form prior to their expression. She writes: "cause and response collaborate in forming all emotions" (95).

This does not mean that we cannot conceal our feelings. Instead, Campbell argues that concealment is given its significance within an account of expression. Feelings neither expressed nor deliberately concealed would not be shaped as particular feelings. Feelings need not be expressed linguistically. Campbell is careful, despite her frequent use of literary works as examples of the expression of feelings, to argue that language should not be seen as a privileged mode of the expression of feelings. She discusses Gary Cooper's character in *High Noon*, and argues that inarticulateness needs to be understood as an expressive style – one associated with action instead of language, and often expected of white Western men. This mode of expression differs from a life which makes absolutely no use of any expressive resources, which for Campbell would necessarily be a life without feelings.

Her analysis of the political ramifications of her understanding of the realm of affect is another of the strengths of the book. In the fifth chapter, she argues against feminist attempts to make use of social constructivist theories of emotions to claim that oppositional subcultures can develop and support

the expression of outlaw emotions such as feminist anger. While Campbell does not deny that oppositional subcultures may support the expression of emotions that are widely shared within that subculture, she argues that such accounts do not leave room for new meanings to emerge, and cannot make sense of the formation of a community with shared emotions. This is because they assume that emotions are only felt when they are already shared by a community with agreed upon conventions for expressing those emotions.

Social constructivism, for Campbell, while correct in recognizing the role of expression in individuating emotion, places too much emphasis on the role of shared norms in governing that expression, and puts too little emphasis on the first person point of view. For Campbell this is a serious flaw. It leads us to ignore those aspects of feelings which are of most interest to us, and which play explanatory roles in virtue of the way they lead us to understand a situation from the subject's point of view. She believes we need to see how an individual sees herself in respect to norms and conventions, and we need as well to look at idiosyncratic feelings and ways of expressing those feelings.

Campbell argues that we need not conflate the personal with the private. Even if we are committed to the Wittgensteinian view that no individual has uniquely privileged access to her own emotional life, this does not mean that we may only feel and express emotions that are widely shared and easily recognized. Instead, Campbell argues that we need to make use of a model of "triangulation." She develops this theory in her second and fourth chapters, and argues that we do not have to share others' responses in order to interpret them and their expression of their feelings. For Campbell, the expression of feelings is "an attempt to convey the personal significance of some occasion" (120). If others can communicate in ways that allow us to pick out the features of a situation to which they are responding, then our response to those features need not be shared with them in order for us to be able to understand them. Campbell draws on Donald Davidson's use of triangulation, particularly in "Three Varieties of Knowledge" (in A. Philips Griffiths, ed., *A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays*, Cambridge University Press, 1991). She argues: "it is the fact that we can have shared differential responses to common stimuli" which makes it possible to communicate feelings which do not rely on social conventions for their expression (112). The notion of shared differential response is intriguing, but does need further development in order to be truly convincing. In particular, I would dispute Campbell's claim that there are no criteria of correctness when it comes to the identification of nameless feelings (159).

In the sixth and final chapter of her book, Campbell focuses on strategies used to dismiss others' emotions, particularly those that claim others are bitter, overemotional, or sentimental. Campbell analyzes the way class and

gender function in these dismissals, and suggests they "police expression through the development or limitation of certain expressive resources that will, at the same time, allow for the dismissal of what is significant to women about our own lives" (180).

The last two chapters of her book are likely to be of widest interest to nonphilosophers, but it is only when the book is read as a whole that the significance of Campbell's account of feelings can be fully appreciated. She has sketched out an appealing alternative to views which either (1) maintain that feelings are formed prior to and apart from their expression or (2) claim that the formation and expression of feelings is entirely a matter of shared social rules. (AMY MULLIN, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

*SILVIA SPITTA. *Between Two Waters: Narratives of Transculturation in Latin America*. Houston: Rice University Press, 1995. xii + 246 pp. US\$ 37.50, cloth.

Since the 1920s, anthropological discourse has played an active role in Latin American narrative. This tendency has become even more pronounced since the 1960s, when a postcolonial sensitivity began to call into question cultural anthropology's assumptions about the Other and to foreground the unequal relations of power which frame studies of the Other. Sylvia Spitta's fine work, *Between Two Waters: Narratives of Transculturation in Latin America*, makes a timely contribution to the debates surrounding these issues. Spitta uses the theory of transculturation to analyze literary, religious, and pictorial narratives from the Conquest to contemporary fiction from Peru and Mexico.

The first chapter establishes the study's critical framework by tracing the evolution of the concept of transculturation in works by José María Arguedas, Angel Rama, Antonio Cornejo Polar, Gustavo Pérez Firmat, and Antonio Benítez Rojo. Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz coined the term in the 1940s to describe the mutual influences of cultures in contact and the new realities that this process generates. By foregrounding the reciprocity of intercultural dynamics, he sought to avoid the limitations of the term "acculturation," most frequently used to describe how one culture changed in the direction of another, dominant culture. Originally formulated to describe the cultural history of Cuba, Ortiz proposed that transculturation would offer the key to understanding Latin America as well. It is to this field that Spitta turns her attention. Thus, this chapter centres around the point on which subsequent (trans)cultural critics coincide: the importance of the theory in Latin-American efforts at establishing identities which are not derivative(s) of cultural systems imposed by (neo)colonial powers. Her work subsequently analyzes the de- and re-semantization of beliefs and symbols

as part of a broader effort to protect cultures threatened by their contact with colonial cultures.

In chapter 2, Spitta examines Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca's *Naufragios*. She reframes the chronicle as a transcultural text casting Cabeza de Vaca as a mediator between cultures and focusing on his deliberate manipulation of indigenous and Spanish cultural codes. She shows how he attempts to convince the Spanish Crown of his success as a Christian evangelist by framing his shamanistic practices in Judeo-Christian terms and, thus, obfuscating their American provenance. Ultimately, Spitta finds in Cabeza de Vaca's assimilation the roots of his proposal of a syncretic method of evangelizing which would attract natives by superimposing Christian symbols on their own.

Chapter 3 studies how this same process also allowed indigenous populations to continue to observe their own religious beliefs under the guise of practising Catholicism. This chapter's argument about transculturation hinges on the fact that priests in the Andes were charged with a task of cross-cultural translation whereby they accommodated Christian beliefs to a native framework in order to render them more accessible; this project of course presupposed their awareness of cultural differences. Spitta's identification of a transcultural dialectic between the forced imposition of cultural systems and resistance thereto through the reappropriation of the conquerors' symbols represents an important contribution to Latin-American colonial studies. And yet, I take issue with her characterization of the priests' work as "evidenc[ing] an early grasp of cultural relativism" (62; also 57). Cultural relativism entails not just the awareness of cultural difference, but also the recognition that each culture exists in its own right, not to be ranked in relation to others. The awareness of difference may indeed have caused the evangelists to question the universality of their own belief system; however, the fact that they studied the Andean cultures with the express purpose of eradicating them, precludes any discussion of this project in terms of cultural relativism.

Chapter 4 examines the incorporation of Latin-American elements into European forms in the works of the Cuzco School of Painting from the late seventeenth century through the end of the colonial period. Members of this school were native artists who reworked European aesthetic and religious standards in order to express their own culture. While this chapter focuses more on religious syncretism than on the portraits in which this is evidenced, nevertheless, Spitta offers an excellent discussion of the conflation of Andean and Spanish/Christian symbols and religious figures (e.g., Santiago Matamoros becoming Santiago Mataindios).

In chapter 5, Spitta, following Cornejo Polar and Rama, argues that Arguedas uses Andean oral culture and music, rather than causality and logic, to structure his novels. Thus, he exemplifies the transcultural strategies of

many postcolonial authors: he appropriates the tools of the colonizer, in this case the quintessentially Western genre of the novel, and uses it to describe a world to which the form is alien. Arguedas' adaptation of Spanish to Quechua syntax similarly reaffirms the indigenous culture's presence and power over the supposed dominant language. Spitta reads these strategies as literary manifestations of the ethnographic theories with which Arguedas explained the survival of Andean culture. Moreover, she recasts Arguedas' descriptions of Westernization as a dynamic of transculturation whereby indigenous culture is threatened while its vitality and viability are ensured by the ability to adapt to new challenges, not assimilating to Spanish culture but, rather, becoming something new altogether: indo-mestizo cultures.

Chapters 6 and 7 explore the links between transculturation, gender, and patriarchal society in Mexican author Elena Garro and Mexican-American Gloria Anzaldúa. She argues that for Mexican women — inscribed in history as traitors since la Malinche 'gave' herself and, ultimately, her people, to Hernán Cortés — transculturation must additionally rewrite this role and, by extension, reclaim the past. Spitta provides an outstanding discussion of the relationship between the judgments and reinterpretations of la Malinche and critical stages in Mexico's formation as a nation (179-80). She further succinctly identifies the different paradigms within which Mexican and Chicana women writers revalorize and vindicate la Malinche as part of their efforts to redefine themselves and establish a female tradition of Mexican cultural identity. Unfortunately, her analysis of Garro's story, "La culpa es de los Tlaxcaltecas," falls somewhat short of its promise: Spitta traces Garro's shifting of the blame from la Malinche to the Indian tribe that aligned itself with the Spaniards against the Aztecs, but does not succeed in showing how the issues of male discourse, malinchismo, miscegenation, modernity, and myth upon which her argument rests complement one another as different aspects of the transcultural endeavours of Mexican women writers. Similarly, her final chapter finds, in Anzaldúa's works, a geographic, cultural, and literary border space from which to conceptualize the transcultural experiences of Mexican-Americans, but again does not convincingly integrate the many texts, genres, and theoretical currents upon which it draws.

Spitta's book suffers from several other shortcomings. For example, the author never identifies the criteria upon which she based her selection of texts. Also, she does not explore the possibilities of a transcultural framework in the Caribbean beyond her initial discussion of Ortiz and the recent reappropriation of the theory by Cuban critics in the US. I question, too, Spitta's singling out of the latter as the only critics currently mobilizing it: Mary Louise Pratt's *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (Routledge, 1992) deploys transculturation as a fundamental paradigm for analyzing descriptions of Latin America's topography and efforts at identity-

formation. Moreover, Spitta could have used Pratt's notion of "contact zones" — "social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination" (4) — to explain why she limited the scope of her study to Mexico and Peru.

Nevertheless, these weaknesses ultimately underscore the importance of *Between Two Waters*, as well as the wide-ranging applicability of transculturation as a theoretical and critical framework. Her work advances — in more than one sense — transculturation as an autochthonous and specifically Latin American critical apparatus, and thus makes a significant contribution to addressing a problem that has long plagued analyses of Latin American literature and culture. (DEBORAH COHN, MCGILL UNIVERSITY)

*RICHARD A. YOUNG, ed. *Latin American Postmodernisms*. Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997. 282 pp. US\$ 25, paper.

It is well recognized that the application of the metropolitan term "postmodernism" to the Latin American periphery is, at the very least, problematic. Often argued is the region's at best "uneven" modernity and its need for its own cultural periodization. Also important is the continent's diversity which renders wholesale application of cultural terms inappropriate. Young's collection replies by proposing the provisional, self-questioning concept of Latin American postmodernisms in the plural. It considers the cultural condition of different Latin American subregions, focusing particularly (5 of its 17 articles) on the Caribbean, whose own diversity has been recently described along postmodern paradigms. Yet, as a collaborative project of largely Canadian-based scholars, and others representing varying relations of distance to postmodernism's center and its Latin American subject, the volume expectedly reflects virtues and limitations inherent in its place of enunciation.

The first three essays serve as an introduction to postmodernism in relation to Latin America. Vladimir Krynski's opening piece is particularly effective in synthesizing aspects of postmodernism from Habermas, Hassan, Hutcheon, Jameson, Jencks, Lyotard, and Vattimo; contrasting early receptions in Buenos Aires and Brazil; and arguing for a Latin American condition better described by Felix Torres's concept of "meta-modern." Krynski considers the exportation of postmodernism a product of capitalist globalization of economy and media. Alfonso de Toro focuses instead on "epistemological foundations" for Latin America's dialogue with postmodernity: Derrida's *différance*, Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome,

Lyotard's paralogia, Baudrillard's simulation, and corresponding reflections by Latin Americanists Brunner, Canciani, Lienhard, and Monsiváis. Unfortunately, he abandons this promising lead at arm's length to an ulterior aim: showcasing Borges as "inaugurator" and "quintessentially postmodern," a perspective unoriginal and problematic. Mixing intelligent hypotheses with contradictory conclusions, De Toro reproduces the essentializing discourse he had disavowed and illustrates the dangers of ahistoricity in reading Latin America "postmodernly." In discussing postcoloniality as a discourse of cultural parity, he promises not to depoliticize it; but this proves inevitable to an argument intent on denying the facts of capitalism and neo-colonialism as overcome discourses of modernity. In "dehistoricizing" Borges through a postcolonial reading he again fails to heed his own warning, as though personally exempt from the epistemological criteria he wishes to defend. Can we not accept that Borges was often politically incorrect? In the third essay, Daniel Castillo Durante politicizes the debate again by bringing Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of instrumental reason and Hegel's master/slave dialectics into his negative appraisal of the postmodern condition. Regarding Latin America, Castillo associates this condition with the image of the "rubbish heap:" post-industrial societies, at the center, dump their garbage on their own poor as well as on poor countries at the periphery, who in turn dump theirs on the various peripheries inside the periphery. That is, the dialectics of postmodernity and modernity, center and periphery, is reproduced domestically inside Latin American societies for the benefit of transnational power structures and local oligarchies. However, the organicist's metaphor adopted by Castillo is anything but dialectical: the organism or machinery which must excrete its refuse as a condition of continued operation and efficient production. The garbage that gets recycled down the chain of marginality may be technological and industrial in nature, but also symbolic and discursive; that is, Castillo is ultimately talking about knowledge and cultural production being recycled in the periphery. Many inconsistencies and counterexamples come to mind, but what disturbs me about this degrading model of the Latin American condition, which offers no true opportunity for subversion or redemption (except, perhaps, emigration to the North), is that despite intentions to the contrary it remits all social and cultural value to a first-world, ultimately classist axiology.

The next five essays treat Caribbean identity in a less polemical, more cogent, and equally engaging manner. Sabine Hofmann writes on "transculturalization and creolization," exploring how essayists like Edward Brathwaite, Édouard Glissant, Antonio Benítez-Rojo, and Gustavo Pérez-Firmat use traditional Caribbean concepts and postmodern reformulations to describe the region's identity transactions while distancing themselves from European concepts. George Lang relates Benítez-Rojo's idea of cultural

fractality and chaos to Glissant's use of rhizome as a Caribbean paradigm, applying this relation to the multilayered culture of Curaçao and its vernacular, Papiamentu. Lang argues that global processes and postmodern culture as a whole are intensified in the Caribbean, making its discourse central to cultural studies, contrary to widespread notions of cultural mimicry and Caribbean thought as inherently derivative. Catherine Den Tandt writes about salsa music and cultural identity in Puerto Rico, extending her commentary to popular and political culture in the fiction of Luis Rafael Sánchez, Rosario Ferré, Ana Lydia Vega and others. Supported by salsa historians, Den Tandt attempts to show popular music's resistance to dominant 'master codes.' Salsa, with its hybridity, fluidity, and popular anti-establishment urban flair, would be a metaphor of Puerto Rican identity. Its alienating role in perpetuating conservative gender, racial, and social stereotypes is neglected; and no adequate distinction is drawn between "Nuyorican" and Puerto Rican cultures. The critical gaze appears culturally extraneous and bookish. Yet, this same distance becomes corrective when Den Tandt questions Juan Flores's celebration of Puerto Rico's cultural fluidity as the site for "new versions of the postmodern subject," in the context of endemic political paralysis. Maximilien Laroché, in turn, warns that "to speak of postmodernity in a country like Haiti requires a distinction between the postmodernism of some and that of others." Laroché examines the "eccentric inversions of history" and "reverse perspective on the real" in Haitian literature as a trend originating in an awakening of consciousness mediated by Vaudou in 20th-century writers like Innocent and Roumain; extending through the "marvelous realism" of Alexis and the transitional Frankétienne; and ultimately informing the "postmodern" fiction of Fignolé and J.B. Schiller's amusing *And if We Invaded the United States*. The critic concludes with an insightful distinction: "In the time of the postmodernism of post-industrial societies, pre-industrial civilizations are living a History that is made without them and, more commonly, against them, a History they therefore neither can nor want to relate." Iris Zavala tackles the question of unity in the Caribbean and finds that its multilayered discourses of difference – national, linguistic, racial, historical – are stitched together by a "quilting point" which, paradoxically, lies outside: it is the US, the "manifest destiny" of capitalist influence which keeps the Caribbean from being whatever it wants to be. Thus, as a discursive construction, the Caribbean is an ever unfinished act of symbolization and "a struggle for the sign to appropriate the meanings of any such discourse that is not fixed in advance."

The following three essays focus on history and the fictional rewriting of first encounters between Europe and America. Catherine Poupeney Hart writes on Argentine philosopher Enrique Dussel's and French novelist Jean Marie Le Clézio's responses to Todorov's allegorical reading of the Cortés-

Moctezuma encounter. Putting into circulation modern texts based on "indigenous or mestizo chronicles" as well as Spanish accounts, the critic offers heterological insights concerning the reading/writing of history in pre-modern, modern, and postmodern times. María Cristina Pons writes on Juan José Saer's novel *El entenado* and its relation to the early historiography of the River Plate. Her article, informed by de Certeau, is this volume's highpoint in literary criticism. Amaryll Chanady writes a concise analysis of Abel Posse's *Daimón* as a rewriting of the Aguirre myth, based on Castoriadis's concept of "imaginary significations" and a postmodern notion of "rewriting" where knowledge is not just transmitted but constituted in the process of textualization.

There follow two transitional essays linking the notion of rewriting to a final cluster of articles on discourses of power by Latin American women. Daniel Chamberlain revisits the debate on the hegemonic appropriation of Latin American texts (Borges and García Márquez) into the canon of postmodernism according to Fokkema and Hutcheon, criticized by Paz, Colás, and Gerald Martin. Chamberlain proposes a reconciliation based on exploring a notion of (reading and narrative) "perspective" which he derives from a postmodern reception of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Accordingly, "perspective" is more than point of view; it includes all aspects of temporal and spatial perception, visual and aural, written and oral; recognizing with Ricœur and Hassan that perception is affected by belief. Although his jumps over levels of abstraction onto concreteness and his reconciliation based on multiple perspectives and beliefs are unconvincing, Chamberlain makes interesting suggestions: that the Western nostalgia for the lost art of oral storytelling is not necessarily felt by readers of Latin American texts; and that Latin America's "wealth of possible perspectives" ranks it among "the most highly developed societies" for the world of narrative. Both are reformulations of claims made first by magical realism, and later by postmodernism. Mónica Zapata explores in Laura Esquivel's *Like Water for Chocolate* the circulation of 'clichés' as a postmodern aesthetics of recycling which includes pastiche and melodrama.

The final cluster begins with Claudine Potvin's essay on postmodern feminism relocated from Latin America. Potvin warns with Nelly Richard that postmodernism's rhetorical decentering does not automatically guarantee the demarginalization of Latin American and women's discourses; yet she shows in a reading of Armonía Somers's novel *A Portrait for Dickens* that postmodernism is inscribed within contemporary feminism and vice versa. Reflecting on Argentine public life since 1983's democratization, Francine Masiello finds that women and cultural minorities are consistently ignored or misrepresented. The culture of melodrama and postmodern representation in the media and public sphere produce images of women and minority interest

groups which supercede and suppress the real daily struggles of private life by making them the superficial object of visual spectacle while denying them true access to the circuits of political exchange. Recent novels and films by Ricardo Piglia, Eliseo Subiela, Fernando Solanas, and Leonardo Favio reduce women to male emotional fantasies in exclusively patriarchal constructions of nationhood. Intellectuals lament their loss of status, competing with minorities sacrificed in designing national unity. The government deploys an official policy of forgetfulness which makes the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo appear like a historical aberration. As the voiceless are falsified and private reality superceded by public simulacrum, Masiello powerfully shows that women and minorities are the new "disappeared" in the symbolic arena of Argentina's virtual democracy. In this context of minimization, women writers and film makers like Bemberg, Stantic, Moreno, Montaldo, Gilman, Belessi, and Sánchez are exploring alternate ways of self-representation. Doreley Coll writes on Clarice Lispector as precursor of feminist postmodernism, considering Cixous's eurocentric "discovery" of her in the context of exclusion from the canon of Latin American Boom novelists. Through a reading of *The Passion According to G.H.*, Coll argues that Lispector's experimentation with language and philosophical reflection, positioned as a woman writing from Latin America, re-centers feminine discourse from the periphery, deconstructs logocentric doctrines, and subverts western control of the body through her paradoxical philosophy of love. Finally, Z. Nelly Martínez analyzes Cristina Peri Rossi's *The Ship of Fools*, a novel inspired by the medieval Tapestry of the Creation which serves the protagonist for mapping his symbolic journey to solve the riddle of identity. Ultimately the tapestry is revealed as unfinished, and the journey as incomplete and open-ended. The riddle is solved by the protagonist renouncing his phallogocentric identity, freed from the tyrannical father, and surrendering to sexual ambiguity.

This collection is both broader and deeper in scope than previous anthologies on Latin American postmodernity. (ERIK CAMAYD-FREIXAS, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY)

*AGNES C. MUELLER. *Lyrik „made in USA“: Vermittlung und Rezeption in der Bundesrepublik*. Amsterdam, Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1999. 249 pp. US\$ 50, paper.

Im größeren Umfeld der Problematik des Kulturtransfers angesiedelt, verweist die Beschreibung und Analyse der dynamischen Vorgänge der Vermittlung und Rezeption von Texten verschiedener Sprachbereiche auf ein Thema, das zu den zentralen Fragen der komparatistischen Literaturforschung gehört.

Grundsätzlich gesehen ist Kulturtransfer, oder, freundlich formuliert, wer übernimmt was von wem, warum und wie viel, als eine Funktion der Metapher des Weges zu verstehen, also der Überwindung räumlicher und auch zeitlicher Distanzen zugunsten von Mitteilungen und Hinweisen, die mit der Erwartung eines ökonomischen, ideellen oder geistigen Vorteils verbunden sind. Oder anders gesehen, Kulturtransfer ist ein universaler Begriff für die Vermittlung von Inhalten, Formen und „Werkstattheimnissen“ aus Gegenwart und Geschichte der Kultur, die jeden Bereich sozialer Tätigkeit umfasst, von der Gentechnologie über Programmieren und Kochkunst bis zur Bildhauerei und, wie im vorliegenden Fall, dem Schreiben von Gedichten. Mit wenigen Worten, Kulturtransfer beschreibt den Weg und die Wirkung von Informationen, von denen ein hoher Nutz- oder Gebrauchswert erhofft wird.

Bekanntlich ist die Geschichte der verschieden Literaturen, vom Konstrukt der Nationalliteraturen im 19. Jahrhundert einmal abgesehen, im wesentlichen eine Geschichte gegenseitiger Beeinflussungen, eine Wirkungsgeschichte von Stoffen, Themen, Problemen, Formen, Dichtungstheorien, Stiltendenzen, Realitätsauffassungen, Fragen ihrer ästhetischen Funktion, Sprachbild-Konzepten usw. Wird jedoch versucht, die Wanderwege dieser Form- und Inhaltsmerkmale in bestimmten Textsituationen in benachbarten Literaturen konkret mit Beispielen zu beschreiben, ist der methodische, theoretische und analytische Aufwand hinsichtlich der Lösung dieser Aufgabe beachtlich. Der im Kontext postmoderner Kulturtheorie allgemein bekannte und scheinbar ja auch offensichtliche Tatbestand der universalen Vernetzung menschlicher Produktivitätsformen (hervorragend beschrieben in der Chaos Theorie) verweigert, wie die vorliegende Arbeit beispielhaft darstellt, jeden simplifizierten Zugang.

Agnes Muellers beschäftigt sich insofern mit dem Phänomen des Kulturtransfers, indem sie der Frage nachgeht, „aufgrund welcher Faktoren (literarisch, literaturgeschichtlich, politisch, gesellschaftlich) die zeitgenössische amerikanische Lyrik in Deutschland nach dem Krieg“ wahrgenommen wurde (3), und warum sie dem Underground angehört hatte und nicht der von den U.S.A. offiziell akzeptierten literarischen Richtung. Ein interessantes Problem, dem die Autorin den Hauptteil der 1997 an der Vanderbilt University als Dissertation eingereichten, später überarbeiteten Monographie widmet, und zwar im Rahmen der analytischen Perspektive, „ob und inwiefern die Bemühungen Gerhards, Höllers, Enzensbergers und Brinkmanns, sowie der zahlreichen Übersetzer und Herausgeber von Zeitschriften sich konkret auf das Leseverständnis einer breiteren deutschen Öffentlichkeit ausgewirkt haben“ (153). Bis sie im abschließenden vierten Kapitel die Wirkung der amerikanischen Dichtung auf die deutsche Gegenwartslyrik untersucht. Da

dieses Thema, wie in der kurzen Übersicht zur Forschung nachgewiesen wird (4-5), bisher weniger Beachtung gefunden hat, ist das gründliche informations- und materialreiche Buch unbedingt als ein willkommener Beitrag zur Forschung zu verstehen, allerdings gewissermaßen als ein polarisierter Beitrag, weil seine Schwächen wie auch die Vorzüge nicht zu übersehen sind. Doch zunächst einige Hinweise zum zweiten Punkt.

Auf sicherem Boden befindet sich die Autorin immer dann, wenn Spezifika und Realien der amerikanischen Seite der Rezeptionsanalyse angesprochen werden, also beispielsweise die das deutsche Lyrikverständnis beeinflussenden Form- und Sprachbildinhalte im Kontext der Namen und Begriffe *beat generation*, William Carlos Williams, Wallace Stevens, Gregory Corso, Ezra Pound, Charles Olson, Robert Creeley, die New York Poets u.a. In diesem Licht gesehen stehen dann auch die Ausführungen und Diskussionen in „Die andere Seite des Atlantiks: Literarische Kanonisierung und *subculture*“ (32-44) oder „Beispiele für die Wirkung amerikanischer Gedichte auf Schreibweisen deutscher Dichter“ (161-204), um nur zwei stellvertretende Exempel zu nennen, an hervorgehobener Stelle. Informiert, sicher im Netz kultureller Zusammenhänge, mit einem genauen Blick für das Detail ermittelt und beschreibt Mueller erstaunliche, bisher unbekannte und aufschlussreiche Kontakte zwischen beiden Literaturbereichen. Ein lesenswertes, interessantes Unternehmen.

Schwieriger jedoch wird das Terrain, wenn der analytische Blick der Autorin auf Momente und Situationen der deutschen Lyrik trifft. Denn nun sind eine ganze Reihe von Unsicherheiten, Ungenauigkeiten und kleineren Fehlern ausfindig zu machen, die das Buch in seiner Gesamtanlage zwar nicht dezimieren, die immehin aber störende Faktoren bilden, und zwar besonders hinsichtlich des Mangels an Proportion, kulturhistorischer Information, Kulturtheorie und Urteil. Hier einige stellvertretende Beispiele.

Auf S. 90 ist zu lesen, dass die Thesen zum langen Gedicht von Walter Höllerer, zu jener Zeit Literaturprofessor und Poet in Berlin, nach ihrer Publikation im Jahre 1964 „von der Forschung sowie der zeitgenössischen Kritik teilweise überschätzt“ worden sind. „Höllerer hatte sich damals für ein langes, in einzelnen Versen ausladendes, frei atmendes Versschema eingesetzt, für das ‚lange‘ Gedicht anstatt der, erzwungenen Preziosität und Chinoiserie des kurzen Gedichts.“ Höllerers Thesen aber wurden von der zeitgenössischen Kritik nicht nur nicht überschätzt, im Gegenteil, sie riefen, weil er nicht über die zum Thesen verkünden erforderliche poetische Statur verfügte, Belustigung und Spott hervor, eine Tatsache, die beispielsweise der in jenen Tagen in Berlin kursierende witzige Vers verdeutlicht, „Zur Hölle mit den kurzen Gedichten, zu Höllerer mit den langen.“

Nun, dieser Hinweis wäre unbedeutend, wäre er nicht ein Indiz für die Stilhaltung des Argumentierens, der in vielen Perspektiven einfach der

Durchblick fehlt, ein Umstand, der schon in der Einleitung zu beobachten ist. Da heißt es beispielsweise auf S. 2, dass 1960 „ein breites Interesse an amerikanischer Lyrik [...] noch nicht zu verzeichnen“ war. Aber eben, ein „breites“ Interesse an Lyrik, und zwar an der des einheimischen oder des amerikanischen Typs, war in der Bundesrepublik leider nie vorhanden. Bekanntlich lesen drei Prozent der Bevölkerung Literatur, und von dieser Zahl ein noch weit geringerer Prozentsatz Lyrik. Dementsprechend rechnete dann auch amerikanische Lyrik, im Original oder in der deutschsprachigen Vermittlung, zur Kategorie der exotischen Literatur und nicht zu den Bestsellern. So ein weiteres weniger wichtiges Versehen. Bedenklicher wird die Darstellung Muellers allerdings, wenn mit ernster Miene versichert wird, „Spätestens seit Brinkmanns Vermittlung ist die amerikanische Lyrik seitens des westdeutschen Lese-Publikums im Kanon der Weltliteratur etabliert, und die Möglichkeiten für einen regelmäßigen Lyrik-Transfer sind wiederhergestellt“ (6). Im Licht dieser Formulierung ist das Argument einfach falsch, oder aber es wird eine andere Möglichkeit angesprochen, und zwar die, dass es vor 1960 im deutschen Sprachraum keinen Diskurs über anglo-amerikanische Dichtung gegeben hat, was die Autorin sicherlich nicht meint. Die Gründe, warum in den sechziger Jahren das Interesse an anglo-amerikanischer Dichtung wächst, sind vielschichtig und kompliziert verwickelt. Auch lassen sie sich wohl nur im Rahmen der verzweigten kulturhistorischen Zusammenhänge, auf die die Autorin leider weitgehend verzichtet, angemessen erfassen.

Die Reihe der bedenklichen Beispiele lässt sich beliebig vermehren. Zwar versteht der Leser in den meisten Fällen das, was gemeint ist, nur wird eben das, was gemeint ist, nicht gesagt. Es stellt sich somit also die Frage, ob es sich bei diesen Schwächen um einen grundsätzlichen Mangel handelt? Wahrscheinlich nicht. Dennoch verraten diese Ungenauigkeiten oder, wenn man es so will, störend unpräzisen Textstellen, dem Leser, dass die Autorin keinen Fehler begangen hätte, sich im Rahmen der Vorarbeiten zur Dissertation in die deutsche Kulturgeschichte und die der deutschsprachigen Lyrik gründlicher, kritischer und distanzierter einzulesen. (HOLGER PAUSCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*UWE BAUMANN and REINHARD KLESCZEWSKI, eds. *Penser l'Europe? Europa denken*, Kultur und Erkenntnis 17. Tübingen, Basel: Francke, 1997. 228 pp.

Gibt es eine europäische Identität? Welchen Stellenwert hat der Nationalstaat, haben Geschichte, Kultur und Tradition für eine künftige Struktur, für Repräsentation und Selbstverständnis Europas? Gibt es überhaupt ein Europa,

das sich nicht nur über seine wechselvollen Grenzen, seine politische und wirtschaftliche Realität definiert? Oder ist dieses Europa ein erst noch zu schaffender geistig-kultureller Raum, an dessen Entstehung nicht allein Rationalität und Vision, sondern auch Ideologien und Mythen ihren Anteil haben müssen? Wenn ja, dann ist damit auch die Frage nach der Rolle des intellektuellen, und damit eben auch des wissenschaftlichen, Diskurses impliziert. Dies sind, kurz gefasst, die Kernfragen des Sammelbandes, der die Vorträge eines Kolloquiums enthält, das von den Philosophischen Fakultäten der Partneruniversitäten Nantes und Düsseldorf 1993 in internationaler Besetzung veranstaltet wurde.

Das Buch ist in drei Sektionen gegliedert: „Europa aus politischer, soziologischer und historischer Sicht“, „Europa: Geistesgeschichtliche Aspekte“ und „Der Europagedanke in der Literatur“. Statt dieser, die disziplinären Grenzen wahrenen Unterteilung zu folgen, werde ich im folgenden zentrale Aspekte der Beiträge aufgreifen und sie zueinander in Bezug setzen, um so auch einen Einblick in mögliche Lektüresynthesen zu geben.

Orientierungshilfen bei der Suche nach dem Ursprung einer europäischen Identität und nach Modellen für ihre gegenwärtige wie künftige Gestaltung vermögen sowohl die kulturelle und geistesgeschichtliche wie auch die realpolitische Vergangenheit zu geben. Daß es dabei grundsätzlich nicht um unmittelbare Ausrichtung an einem bestimmten, historischen, Typus, um die Übernahme von geschichtlich Überliefertem gehen kann – einen Abriss religiös, expansionspolitisch, natur- oder kulturwissenschaftlich geprägter Phasen europäischer Einheit bietet der Beitrag von Yves-Henri Nouailhat (*Civilisation et cultures européennes: Réflexions d'un historien*) –, machen Günter Krause (*Berichten wir eine europäische Identität?*) und Giuseppe Cacciariore (*Europa denken im Zeitalter des Universalismus der Menschenrechte*) deutlich. Beide reflektieren das Verhältnis von Nation und Demokratie im Kontext von Habermas' Konzept einer post-traditionalen Identität; dabei rücken mit dem Hinweis auf die Abstraktheit des Europagedankens (Krause) und auf das ethisch wie politisch zu praktizierende Recht des Anderen (Cacciariore) Kernbegriffe wie Differenz, Pluralität und das Andere ins Blickfeld. Sie scheinen uns direkt in das Deutungsreservoir von Mythos und literarischer Fiktion zu führen, um dort nach Leitbildern einer gemeinsamen Identität zu suchen. Dem widerspricht Jackie Pigeaud (*L'Europe et le mythe de la tempérance*): Indem er an Europabildern von Hippokrates bis Winckelmann deren mythologisches Organisationsprinzip aufdeckt, macht er deutlich, daß Mythen und ihren Sinnstrukturen heute keine identitätsstiftende Funktion mehr zukommen kann, da ihr Deutungs- und Erklärungspotential nur in Rückbindung an ihren entstehungsgeschichtlichen Kontext wirkt.

Doch auch der Rekurs auf die realpolitische Geschichte verfügt über lehrreiches Potential. Mit ihrem Wechsel von Phasen der Integration und

Separation – von „Einheits- und Pluralitätsstreben“ (14), so Michael Biddiss (*Einheit, Verschiedenheit und Demokratie im gegenwärtigen Europa*), der der Frage nach dem aktuellen Stellenwert des Nationalstaates nachgeht – kann vielleicht gerade die Geschichte die notwendige Einsicht in die Prozeßhaftigkeit des Europagedankens am besten vermitteln. So erinnert der Aufsatz von Uwe Baumann (*Konzepte kollektiver Sicherheit im Europa der Renaissance*) an das früheste Beispiel eines multilateralen Bündnisses auf europäischem Boden. Seine Aktualität liegt, so Baumanns Fazit, aber gerade in den Motiven seines Scheiterns, allem voran: dem nationalen Egoismus. Charles Suaud (*Penser l'Europe autrement: l'Europe comme processus d'intégration sociale et culturelle*), der Europa aus soziologischer Sicht als sozialen und kulturellen Integrationsprozess zu denken sucht, sieht eben in dessen Unabgeschlossenheit die Möglichkeit, eine historische Perspektive ohne teleologische Festschreibung zu entwickeln. Erst dadurch gäbe es eine Basis für den Europäer, sich selbst – im individuellen wie kollektiven Sinne –, anders zu denken (47). Daß dies in einem gemeinsamen Raum Europa notwendig ist, veranschaulicht Suaud anhand einer empirischen Umfragestudie zu persönlichen Erwartungen und Befürchtungen gegenüber der europäischen Einheit, bei deren Auswertung vor allem Selbstwahrnehmung und soziale Prägungen maßgeblich waren.

Dieser Zusammenhang von Selbstbild und Fremd-Begegnung interessiert aber nicht nur aus soziologischer Sicht. Am Beispiel der deutsch-französischen Beziehung untersucht Fritz Nies (*Les métaphysiciens face aux érotomanes: interactions entre échanges littéraires et stéréotypes nationaux*) den Einfluß nationaler Stereotypen auf den wechselseitigen Literaturtausch, der sich, beispielsweise, daran ablesen läßt, welche Gattungen und Epochen des fremdsprachigen Literaturkanons bevorzugt in die je eigene Sprache übersetzt werden. Entsprechend weist Gunter Volz (*Europäisches Bewußtsein in der Publizistik der Spätaufklärung*) zwar anhand der wachsenden Zahl von Übersetzungen, Rezensionen und Informationen über das internationale Kulturleben im 18. Jahrhundert ein zunehmendes Interesse an kulturellem Austausch nach, zeigt aber auch, in welchem Maße die publizistischen Vermittlungsorgane dieser Zeit die Rezeption, im Sinne eines aufklärerischen ‚prodesse‘ (104), vorprägten.

Als Antwort auf die Frage, wie unser Welt- und Selbstverständnis, und damit auch unser Verständnis des Anderen, erweitert oder korrigiert werden können, lassen sich die Beiträge von Jean-Paul Barbe (*Europa und kulturelle Mobilität*) und Jean Biou (*Emile voyage en Europe*) lesen, die gerade in ihrer Kombination zur Perspektiverweiterung beitragen. Beide widmen sich der Reisethematik in einem weiteren und auch pädagogischen Sinn: Während Biou an Rousseaus *Emile* et *Sophie* ou *les Solitaires* dessen kulturpessimistisch fundierte Bewertung des Reisens herausstellt, liegt der Schwerpunkt von Barbe

auf der Erweiterung des Mobilitätsgedankens um das Postulat einer dialogischen Grundhaltung – ein ‚Erziehungsziel‘, zu dem, so der Autor, gerade auch die Neuphilologie beizutragen vermag. Alain-Michel Boyers Beitrag (*Y a-t-il une image littéraire de l'Europe?*) zeichnet hier ein komplexeres, da dialektisches Bild: Ausgehend vom Europa-Mythos als einem poetischen Bild für das Vordringen und den Abgrenzungswillen des abendländischen Zivilisationsraums thematisiert er die Ambivalenz von Rivalitätsdenken und Dialogizität sowie den Einfluß außereuropäischer Kulturen bei der Entstehung sowohl des historischen wie auch eines künftigen europäischen Identitätsbewußtseins. Sein Fazit: Das intellektuelle Europa früherer Jahrhunderte wuchs gerade dann zusammen, als es sich politisch aufteilte. Daß sich Real- und Geistes- bzw. Kulturgeschichte in solch gegenläufiger Weise zueinander verhalten können, zeigt auch der Beitrag von Régis Antoine (*L'Europe des écrivains révolutionnaires français dans l'entre-deux-guerres*) am Beispiel des Surrealismus als einem länderübergreifenden, politisch-ästhetischen Konzept mit weltveränderndem Anspruch.

Heißt all das nun, daß Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte eine korrektive, wenn nicht gar leitende Funktion für ein geeintes Europa haben könnten? Die Antworten, die der Sammelband hierzu gibt, sind kontrovers. Für Alain-Michel Boyer (s.o.) sind es die Schriftsteller, die sich mit dem Europabegriff am profundesten auseinandergesetzt haben. Nicht allein im direkten Sinne – wie Victor Hugo, der das Wort von den „États-Unis d'Europe“ prägte (154) –, sondern auch in einem mittelbaren: Régis Mianney (*L'idée d'Europe: le renouveau artistique et littéraire après 1870 et la rencontre de l'extrême-Orient*) sieht in Epochen wie Symbolismus und Dekadenz, die ihren Wunsch, einer inadäquaten Realität zu entfliehen, in einen ästhetischen Traum übersetzten, der zugleich ein Spiegelbild der Beunruhigung der europäischen Seele war (180), nicht zuletzt auch eine kritische Zeitdiagnose. Daniel Briolet (*L'Europe des poètes*), dessen Gegenstand Europa in der Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts ist, erweitert dies um den Aspekt des innovativen Potentials poetischer Praxis, in dem sich u.a. der Wunsch artikuliere, nationale Sprachgrenzen zu brechen.

Mit der Sprache als Material befaßt sich auch Enrique Alcaraz Varó (*Le signifié à la lumière des courants linguistiques modernes européens*). Allerdings bleibt sein Überblick über linguistische Modelle der Bedeutungsanalyse – als einem dezidiert europäischen Forschungsschwerpunkt, aus dem er ein einheitliches europäisches Sprachverständnis ableitet – zu sehr bloßes Referat, um viel Erklärungswert zu besitzen. Und auch der Aufsatz von Alfred D. White (*Könige, Diktatoren, Päpste, Kommissare: Europäische Geschichte am Beispiel einiger englisch- und deutschsprachiger Bühnenstücke*) trägt von literaturwissenschaftlicher Seite nur wenig Erhellendes zum Europagedanken bei. Das gilt ebenso für die Studie von Klaus-Dieter Drissen (*Une certaine idée de l'Europe*), der von der Differenzierung zwischen einem „faire“ und einem

„penser l'Europe“ (219) ausgeht und mit der Untersuchung der Briefe von Maurice Druon einen Mann vorstellt, der sich aktiv um beides bemühte. Doch hier droht der eigene Denkanstoß in der Zitatenfülle unterzugehen.

Als besonders produktiv erweist sich dagegen der Beitrag von Vittoria Borsò (*Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Giacomo Leopardi, Charles Baudelaire. L'origine et l'autre dans la pensée moderne*), der wichtige Erkenntnisse zur bereits angesprochenen Kategorie des „Anderen“ liefert. Diese Analyse der Geschichte des modernen Denkens am Beispiel Rousseaus, Leopardis und Baudelaires zeigt, wie sowohl der Modernitätsgedanke als auch die Modernekritik in der europäischen Literatur mit dem Begriff der Herkunft und dem sich herausbildenden Bewußtsein vom Anderen verbunden sind. Vor dem geistesgeschichtlichen Hintergrund des 18. Jahrhunderts prägenden Fortschrittsglaubens entzündet Rousseau die Debatte um den Wert und die identitätsstiftende Funktion der „origine“. Dabei wird der durch das Historizitätsbewußtsein implizierte Begriff vom Anderen – im Sinne eines sowohl in der Vergangenheit liegenden, wie auch in der Zukunft einzuholenden Besseren – zum Instrument der Kritik am Eigenen, Gegenwärtigen. Über Leopardis Kritik am Rousseauschen Zukunftsmythos – die auf einer Zivilisationskritik basiert, bei der nun nicht mehr der Abfall von der Natur sondern Tempo und Relativität des Fortschritts im Vordergrund stehen – gelangt Borsò zu den Prosagedichten Baudelaires, um an ihnen aufzuzeigen, wie die Begegnung mit dem Anderen – hier zumeist von sozialen Randfiguren verkörpert – zur Destabilisierung des individuellen, wie sozialen Selbstvertrauens führt, zum Verlust einer Identitätsgewißheit, der zum Signum der Moderne wird. „La modernité a perdu l'origine, mais elle a le privilège d'avoir rencontré l'autre“ (142), lautet Borsòs Resümee – ein Gedanke, eine geistesgeschichtliche Bilanz, ohne die man die Diskussion um Nationen und europäische Identität nicht mehr führen sollte!

Die Lektüre des Sammelbandes hinterläßt den Gesamteindruck, daß vor allem die Vielzahl der gebotenen fachspezifischen Perspektiven auf das komplexe Thema „Europa“ dem Vorhaben der Herausgeber, einen „interdisziplinären Dialog“ (Vorwort, IX) anzuregen, gerecht werden kann. Denn gerade die Gegenüberstellung und Zusammenschau der divergierenden thematischen Akzentuierungen und Zugangsweisen regt den Leser dazu an, Europa selbst neu zu denken. Darin liegt das wesentliche Verdienst des vorliegenden Buches. Es zeigt allerdings auch, daß selbst transdisziplinäre Gegenstände nur wenige Autoren dazu bewegen können, die Grenzen disziplinärer Fragestellungen wirklich zu transzendieren. Der „interdisziplinäre Dialog“ bleibt so, letztlich, dem Leser aufgegeben. (DOROTHEA LAUTERBACH, FERNUNIVERSITÄT HAGEN)

*THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI. *The View From the Tower: Origins of an Antimodernist Image*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. xvi + 196 pp. US\$ 32.50, cloth. AURELIA GAILLARD, ed. *L'Imaginaire du souterrain*. Paris: L'Harmattan/Université de la Réunion, 1997. 206 pp. FF 130 / EUR 19.82, paper.

We all know what to expect from a „coffee-table book:“ something really hefty, full of gorgeous gigantic color photographs, with a text that may or may not matter very much. There ought to be a term for its opposite number: a small book (easy on the wrist!), a few black-and-white photographs, a text that definitely matters but is short enough to be read in an afternoon sitting at the terrace of a café, preferably in Paris – well, there's our needed neologism: a „café-terrace book“! Something stimulating, but unpretentious and unpedantic. A book that wears its leaning lightly. Reading it makes you feel that you came in at the most interesting part of the lecture and missed the boring preliminaries. When was the last time you read a book like that published by an academic press? Theodore Ziolkowski's *The View From the Tower* is such a book. It is a model study in thematics, although the author himself calls it a „*jeu d'esprit*“ (xiv).

Ziolkowski notes in his preface that the idea for the book came after he noticed that C.G. Jung and Rainer Maria Rilke „were both at the same time living in towers just across the Swiss Alps from each other“ (xii), and then went on to discover that William Butler Yeats and Robinson Jeffers were also turriphiles in the 1920s. Ziolkowski sees their towers – both the actual stone towers and their metaphorical resonances in the work – as retreats from modernism and from modern history.

While this interpretation does not work equally well in all cases, he lays out the pattern in fascinating detail. Yeats' restoration of a Norman castle and its tower („Thoor Ballylee“) in County Galway beginning in 1919 marked a turn towards Anglo-Irish conservatism and disengagement from what he saw as the vulgarity of Irish Republican politics. But Ziolkowski is careful to note that this was just a first step in what would prove to be a symbolic evolution of the tower's impingement on his poetic imagination. While at first the tower represented primarily a philosophical and poetic retreat (an „ivory tower“), and a safe haven for the aging poet and his family in the midst of civil war, eventually, thanks to its association with imagery of spiral staircases and „widening gyres,“ it became for him „the symbolic link between man and eternity“ (65).

Robinson Jeffers visited Yeats' tower in 1929, having already built his own tower (perhaps inspired by his wife's accounts of Thoor Ballylee) for his house on the California coast at Carmel. Hawk Tower was a material manifestation of Jeffers' „mysticism of stone,“ and Ziolkowski writes that,

during its five-year period of construction, "it became an increasingly obsessive image in his poetry" (p. 81). It became, as Thoor Ballylee's tower became for Yeats, "the perfect place in which Jeffers could isolate himself from the degenerating society that he saw around him" (p. 82). It also became the catalyst for the creation of "The Tower beyond Tragedy" (1925), in which the poet revisited the *Oresteia* as the drama of a gradual escape from the incestuous pull of history and the lust for power. The "tower beyond time" at the end represents, writes Ziolkowski, "the mythical ideal of a timeless state of detachment that may be achieved by those who have endured tragedy and thus passed beyond it" (90).

Up to this point in *The View from the Tower* one can readily accept the book as "another episode" in Ziolkowski's ongoing project to chart a cultural movement of "the turn to the past as a manifestation of cultural conservatism in Europe and the United States following World War I" (xi). But the chapters on Rilke and Jung seem to this reviewer less persuasively illustrative of this thesis. It may be true that Rilke's "political views became so conservative that he cast admiring eyes on Mussolini's accomplishments in Italy," but does this make his ecstatic retreat to Muzot, a thirteenth century tower in the Swiss canton of Valais, into a conservative cultural gesture, and if so, how? Was Rilke's "muzotisme" the symptom of a neurotic retreat from the world? Were the poems of that great month of February, 1922 (the *Sonnets to Orpheus*, and the completed *Duino Elegies*) political statements about the need to flee from modernity to myth? Ziolkowski, perhaps wisely, does not engage with the issue.

Reading the chapter on Jung, one begins to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of Ziolkowski's thematics. Jung's set of towers at Bollingen was memorialized in great detail in his autobiography *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, written in his old age with the help of Aniela Jaffé (no one knows with exactly how much help) in a chapter entitled "The Tower." Most of what Ziolkowski has to say about Jung's towers follows closely this autobiographical account. But he is obliged by his thesis to add shadows – subtle shadows, no doubt – that link Jung's turrismania and lapidary mysticism with Jeffers' desire to escape history (with which, in my opinion, Jung's psychological investigations have little in common) and with a presumably regressive desire on Jung's part to recapture "the dreams and visions that had gripped him since childhood" (136), after the shattering trauma of his break with Freud in 1913. The construction of the first tower at Bollingen in 1923 become for Ziolkowski "the realization in stone" (139) of Jung's new sense of self based on "a concrete link with the dead" (144). But this attempt to link up Jung with Jeffers' reactionary sense of history is shortlived, and unfortunately does not lead to an explanation of Jung's theory of the collective unconscious as an attempt to escape from history and society. What is it then? Ziolkowski

does not attempt to fit Jung too tightly into the earlier conceptual framework of *The View from the Tower*, and while this is a wise move, I think, it does leave the question of overall interpretation somewhat in limbo.

The final chapter ("The Broken Towers"), however, is an ambitious attempt to pull it all together. In addition to the earlier "fascinating parallels between individual figures" (151 – and they have indeed proved fascinating), Ziolkowski wishes to go further and make more general claims, such as, that "the spiritual detachment of the angel that Rilke finally came to acknowledge in Muzot resembles on the one hand the attitude of 'inhumanism' that Jeffers recommended and on the other the wisdom of Jung's Philemon" (152). For Ziolkowski the shock of World War I made all four figures into "spiritual refugees" and the towers into places of refuge from a world gone mad. There is surely some truth to this, and yet one wishes somehow for a bit more in the way of positive perspective, especially in the case of Rilke and Jung, where a sense of discovery and freshness of vision need highlighting. But in the general interpretative framework of *The View from the Tower* (although not in its fascinating detail), the heavy hidden hand of Spengler is often at work.

Irredeemably bound to their time, Yeats, Jeffers, Rilke and Jung cannot escape anachronism. They are seen as exemplifying what Ziolkowski, quoting Hugo von Hofmannsthal, calls "a conservative revolution," a turn away from the horror of history towards the timeless realm of the spirit. This judgment seems heavy handed in its reductive historicism to me, especially when Ziolkowski writes that "the era of poetic towers ended abruptly with World War II, which demonstrated with ruthless efficiency that even the sturdiest tower cannot provide a sanctuary against the weapons of technology" (171). So much for Yeats, Jeffers, Rilke and Jung: creators of "archetypal images that have outlived their day" (172). Ziolkowski's final paragraph on the prayer tower at Oral Roberts University in Tulsa, Oklahoma, leaves one with a bitter taste in the mouth, perhaps because the author's final gesture, a fashionable postmodern trashing of idols, does not harmonize with the spellbinding spirit of his earlier presentation of turriphilia. We are left stuck with Haine's theory of the whole in *Ulysses*: "It seems history is to blame." Is that it? Or is there more to (at least) Jung, Rilke and Yeats than dated irrelevancy? Ziolkowski's rigid conceptual framework becomes a strait jacket by the end of what is otherwise an intellectual entertainment of a high order.

L'imaginaire du souterrain, edited by Aurélie Gaillard, takes us from the tower to the cavern and other things underground. In this volume of *Cahiers CRLH*, unlike in Ziolkowski's book, there is little attempt to pull things together thematically. That can be a virtue at times; it does not require one to sacrifice variety of perspectives to some overarching theory. But the editor has perhaps gone a bit far in accommodating pieces that have little in

common at all. There is a wild profusion of topics, justified perhaps by the feeling, as Sophie Geoffroy-Menoux puts it in her essay, that "le tropisme des profondeurs est irrésistible" (186). Sixteen separate essays range from the Greco-Roman world (Colombe Couelle-Dezeuze), underground passages in the *Roman de Flamenca* (Patrice Uhl), and grottos and suchlike in seventeenth century pastoral (Aurélia Gaillard) to studies of Victor Hugo (Christian Chelebourg), Jules Verne (Nadia Minerva), Dostoevsky (Serge Meitinger), and Borges (Ricardo Romera Rozas). It would take a committee of experts from many fields to assess the value of these and other noteworthy articles, and I am not going to make the attempt by myself. Suffice it to say that the volume is a remarkable collection of articles on a theme that does indeed inspire an irresistible fascination on the part of its multiple authors. (STEVEN F. WALKER, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY)

*CHRIS BONGIE. *Islands and Exiles: The Creole Identities of Post/Colonial Literature*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. vi + 543 pp. Index. US\$ 24.95, Cloth.

Édouard Glissant's insight that we now live in a creolised world is in many ways the organizing principle of Chris Bongie's *Islands and Exiles: The Creole Identities of Post/Colonial Cultures*. Bongie's project here is not only to deal with Caribbean literature, as might be suggested by his title, but to re-interpret world literature (mostly written in French) through the lens of such concepts as métissage, creolisation and hybridity. The islands of the Francophone Caribbean, their history, geography and literatures, are ever-present in the arguments he puts forward, but the real reason Bongie uses this region as a starting place is because his arguments all advance the position that this history and geography, and these literatures, have been at the core of global culture for several centuries now. The erasure or misunderstanding of this presence is what he seeks to address here, and his effort constitutes a significant intervention in contemporary literary history. And yet, the book is marred by shortcomings that are all too common to scholarly writings: much of it is tediously written, and huge parts of it are cluttered with willfully awkward language and needlessly obscure jargon. These problems end up being more heart-breaking than maddening (although sometimes it's a close call) because there's no question how valuable this kind of methodology can be when it's applied with the kind of breadth that Bongie, impressively, has at his command. Perhaps, finally, it's unfair to blame Bongie for conforming to the tendencies of so much writing in contemporary American literary studies (although he notes at one point in the text that he's a Canadian, he is also a

professor in the literature program at the College of William and Mary). It's just that when critical work has ambitions towards intervening in political matters, matters that are not strictly academic (and *Islands and Exiles* certainly has such ambitions), it seems important to hold that work to a high standard of clarity and lucidity (an expectation less reasonably made of a book about, say, mediaeval philology). Despite its value to post-colonial studies and the study of world literature in general, this is an expectation of which *Islands and Exiles* falls well short.

In his introductory chapter, and indeed throughout the book, Bongie makes it clear that by discussing creolisation and related processes, he is addressing a *global* situation, one that literary scholars, if they are to be credible, must take account of. In trying to dispel all-too-common notions that the experience of the Caribbean is an aberration and so best left to specialists, he writes early in the text that

The Caribbean's abrupt and necessarily total encounter with modernity via a colonization process that wiped away virtually the entirety of its indigenous peoples and thereby created the grounds for the proliferation of creole cultures violently forged out of the coming together of the Old Worlds of Europe, Africa and Asia does not (as some might argue) make it an historical aberration to be contrasted with "healthier" cultures whose contact with the global(izing) forces of modernity has been more gradual and less traumatic. Rather, this foundational encounter makes it a site that has, from its very beginnings, borne witness to a relational way of life that no one, in the late twentieth-century world of the "new global economy" can now avoid confronting. (23)

This could be thought of as the book's rallying cry: following Glissant (and Bongie is clearly a serious, thoughtful follower of this renowned Martiniquan writer and critic), the argument put forward throughout the text is that the last two hundred years have wrought global cultural change with which students of Caribbean were entirely familiar.

Bongie's pantheon of writers is wide indeed; the book deals not only with the "usual suspects" such as Glissant, Patrick Chamoiseau, Daniel Maximin, Rafael Confiant, or Frantz Fanon (all authors whose work Bongie has important insights into), but also deals in great depth with Victor Hugo, William Faulkner, J.M. Coetzee, and Keri Hulme. He takes this condition that he describes in the introduction very seriously, and he manages to keep discussions that deal with all corners of the globe focussed on a few central insights, all the while without falling into traps of essentialism or oversimplification. This is no mean feat, and I certainly grant that Bongie has juggled diverse subjects in an admirably well-organised way.

That feat, though, doesn't make up for the way that the book reads; it is often very difficult to hack one's way through the overgrowth of rhetoric

and wordplay. Consider the following example:

The creolized subject finds her- or himself in a textual and geographical space that is at a definitive, and defining, re-move from any and all cultural points of departure or ideological points of arrival: the origin and the telos can be present only as insubstantial yet eroticized traces, in the Derridean sense of the word. In following up on, and upon, these traces, however, they take on a material reality of their own, becoming paths (a specifically Antillean meaning of the word *tracé*) that lead not back to but away from the obsession with origins and resolutions that characterizes both Euro- and Afrocentric thinking and toward a place in which such "biases" will, in Wilson Harris' words, be yet further "consumed," if never entirely disposed of for the simple reason that we cannot avoid talking (with)in the very terms that we have outlived. (358)

This passage strikes me as indicative of Bongie's fondness for incredibly long, winding sentences, for terminology that is not in any way explained (such as the meaning of a Derridean understanding of "trace") and, most annoyingly, for all-too-clever uses of parentheses and puns. This latter aspect becomes quite tiresome by the book's end; to list all the examples of such parenthetical joking would take up the entire review. Consider, though, the examples I can collect over two randomly selected pages:

...towards which they impossibly (re)turn...
 ...since, that is, its very beginning(s)...
 ... is one from which we have (never fully) awoken...
 ... ready to remodel (cure) his native land...
 Maximin's writing can never recover (from), nor catch up to, the apocalypse that it would envision. It is a writing that must (learn how to) settle for...
 ... a cross-culturalized landscape of yellowing leaves, of (un)exploded volcanoes...
 ...Maximin's Guadalupe is situated somewhere on this (cross)road...
 (376-377)

I hardly think it is too fussy to find this tick of Bongie's highly irritating. More importantly, though, it seriously compromises his arguments. What is clarified, or for that matter signified, by putting "never fully" or "learn how to" in parentheses, instead of just leaving those words in the sentence unadorned? Wouldn't it be simpler to just write "dormant and exploded volcanoes"? These little word games add little to the value of the argument, and coupled with the book's often difficult to follow prose, make *Islands and Exiles* feel somewhat pretentious.

What makes this sloppiness so upsetting, though, is that Bongie's book is, in the final analysis, a useful piece of scholarship for critics working in a wide variety of areas. Even the passage I just quoted in full, I am more than willing to admit, has valuable insights. Obsession with origin and resolution

has defined and continues to define too much thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. This book is filled with insights and arguments that seek to re-frame literary history in pluralist, fragmented and comparative ways. Too much of this essential work, though, ends up lost in dense clouds of ill-conceived prose. (JERRY WHITE, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*FRANK FINLAY. *On the Rationality of Poetry: Heinrich Böll's Aesthetic Thinking*. Amsterdamer Publikationen zur Sprache und Literatur. Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1996. 284 pp. HFL 90 / US\$ 50, paper.

Frank Finlay's book, refreshingly open about its status as a revised Ph.D. thesis, provides an extensive and useful summary of the Nobel laureate's views on literature and art. What Finlay terms the "theoretical writings" (2), consisting of "essays, speeches, book reviews, satirical and polemical articles, and a large number of interviews" (1), form a substantial part of Böll's *oeuvre*, but they have been relatively neglected in the secondary literature. It is indeed surprising, given Böll's status as one of postwar Germany's most eminent and also most controversial authors, that scholars have largely overlooked his contributions to aesthetic theory. Finlay suggests reasons for this critical neglect, and goes on to argue for the continued relevance of Böll's "Ästhetik des Humanen," making such a convincing case that I came away from my reading of his study with a renewed interest in Böll's work. Though the particular engagements of the man at one time widely regarded as "the conscience of the nation" (6) might appear to have had their day, Finlay contends that it would be a mistake to consign either Böll's aesthetic thinking or his fictional works "safely to the margins of literary history in a file marked *Nachkriegsliteratur*" (251).

According to Finlay, Böll's very identity as social activist, as moral authority, and as chronicler of West German history, together with the admittedly unsystematic nature of his theoretical endeavours, contributed to the lack of critical attention paid, throughout the writer's career, to his views on aesthetic matters. The internationally known public figure was repeatedly discussed in terms of his socio-political commitments, whether denounced by the political Right as an advocate of violence, a dangerous friend of the Baader-Meinhof terrorists, or praised by the mainstream as "the voice of decency," "his incorruptible character" seen as "dignity itself" (5). Furthermore, the prevailing "intrinsic" approach to literature, "werkimmanente Kritik," established as the dominant form of literary theoretical discourse in Germany after the war (24), only exacerbated the tendency to regard the politically active Böll as irrelevant to the interests of serious aesthetic reflection. One of the many strengths of Finlay's study lies

in its exposure of the false alternatives that structure this kind of thinking. Following Böll himself, who as early as 1960, in his essay "Bücher verändern die Welt," rejected as unproductive the debate between "committed" and "pure" writers, Finlay uncovers the value of Böll's work not only in terms of the author's social involvement, but also with regard to his "deep concern for matters of aesthetic form" (194).

In his illumination of Böll's linguistic thinking, Finlay reveals the inseparability of the author's critical attention to language from his relentless social critique. Böll regarded the reclamation of language as perhaps the most urgent task of the writer in an age witness to both its debasement by the Nazis and its ongoing exploitation by the mass media and other forces of postwar capitalist restoration. With the aim of creating "eine bewohnbare Sprache in einem bewohnbaren Land," Böll subjected various discourses of the dominant culture to a rigorous process of defamiliarization, thereby helping to subvert the ideological abuse of language. His critical energies were directed not solely toward the more obvious linguistic manipulations of the Third Reich (as in a 1959 speech, "Die Sprache als Hort der Freiheit"), but also toward the related "Sprachdiktatur" of the postwar republic; scrutinizing individual words such as "Minderbemittelte," "Wirtschaftswunder," and "Sachzwang," he revealed them to be constitutive of a materialistic and militaristic culture of oppression. In his 1965 review of Konrad Adenauer's memoirs, Böll exposes the antidemocratic tendencies of the former chancellor by focusing on the latter's particular terminology. In 1984, the year before his death, the author continues to elaborate such insights: *Bild-Bonn-Boenisch* juxtaposes the language of the tabloid press with the inaugural policy statement of the Kohl government in order to reveal "their obvious similarities" (91). Living in an oblivious age, in which a politician like Franz Josef Strauss could assert, "Ein Volk, das diese wirtschaftlichen Leistungen erbracht hat, hat ein Recht darauf, von Auschwitz nichts mehr hören zu wollen" (qtd. in Finlay 43), Böll looked to literature to "give things their name," to act as a force of resistance to a culture of forgetting and euphemistic evasion.

While Finlay situates Böll admirably in his historical context, a greater focus on the author's literary or aesthetic affinities would in my view have been helpful. The Nobel laureate was, as Finlay acknowledges, a most influential figure, and as such arguably deserves a more comparative critical approach. To situate him between Brecht and Bennis or between Adorno and Enzensberger is certainly illuminating, and attention to writers such as H.G. Adler and Theodor Haecker (and, through Haecker, to both Kierkegaard and Karl Kraus) will undoubtedly prove stimulating for further research. Equally thought-provoking is Finlay's discussion of Böll's thoughts on Büchner, who modelled a "concern for social realism with an awareness of

the importance of aesthetic form" (195); Büchner's "Materialgerechtigkeit," his particular form of realism, guided Böll in his efforts to steer a course between the Scylla and Charybdis of a classical idealist aesthetic and the false optimism of socialist realism. Given, however, that Böll was awarded "Germany's most prestigious literary honour, the Georg Büchner prize" (172), and that his acceptance speech dwells on Büchner's "aesthetic contemporaneity" (195), Finlay's study clearly would have been incomplete without some elucidation of the nineteenth-century author's relevance. Undeniably an ambitious undertaking, more extensive reference to writers with similar concerns would nevertheless have heightened the importance of Finlay's book.

Even without going beyond the boundaries of the German-speaking world, a number of significant literary figures come to mind in relation to Böll's aesthetic thinking. His remarkable concern for the literal meaning of words – the attention to "Wörtlichkeit" evident not only in his theoretical writings but also in his literary translations and in works of fiction such as *Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum*, where the eponymous heroine insists on the accurate recounting of her actions and her words – echoes Hugo von Hofmannsthal's search, thematized in *Der Schwierige*, for a language that would resist the inflationary drift of the times and provide the grounding connections necessary for a meaningful existence. Referring only to the early Hofmannsthal, the author of the sceptical *Chandos Brief* (117n52, 141), Finlay misses the opportunity to relate Böll's fundamental concept of "Gebundenheit" to Hofmannsthal's rejection of *l'art pour l'art* and his desire, manifest in the decisive turn to theatre, for a language of communicative engagement.

Similarly, although Finlay discusses Böll's friendship with the dissident writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whose manuscripts the German author smuggled out of the Soviet Union for publication in the West, his concern "to keep the speculative nature of the discussion to a minimum" (241) prevents him from suggesting connections between Böll and another important figure from the Soviet bloc: Christa Wolf. Following Böll as a recipient of the coveted Büchner prize, Wolf delivered an acceptance speech that might fruitfully be compared with her predecessor's writings, particularly in its rejection of instrumental thinking (Böll also, in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, warns of the arrogance and the limits of traditional Western rationality) and in its elaboration of the notion of literature as peace research. According to Finlay, Böll saw the destruction of "Heimat" as accounting for "one of the chief characteristics of literature after Kafka, namely 'daß kein Ort in lieblicher Selbstverständlichkeit als bewohnbar geschildert wird'" (137). Wolf, writing in postwar East Germany, clearly shares the desire, as Finlay says of Böll, to "reestablish *Heimat* as a positive signifier" (246). Although there is a passing

reference to *Kindheitsmuster*, "the focus of a perceptive radio essay" by Böll (246), further discussion of Wolf could have been profitable, since she too has taken up "a committed position as a writer" (127) and has claimed a very "public role" in German society (236); moreover, she, like Böll, "accredits the realm of the aesthetic emancipatory force," in the belief "that the imagination is a potential agent of enlightenment and change" (249). Both authors, who in different years delivered the Frankfurt Lectures on poetics, would ultimately refuse a neat division of their work "into fictional and non-fictional writings" (224), just as they would insist on the "congruence between morality and aesthetics" (133).

Finlay justifiably highlights Böll's commitment to the establishment of a "just and humane society based on a fusion of Christian and socialist principles" (31). His discussion of the writer's "Christian conservatism" (227), however, is somewhat misleading. Indeed, Finlay's repeated use of the term "conservative" to describe Böll's "Christian set of convictions" might productively be subjected to the same sort of critical scrutiny practiced by Böll in his discourse analyses. Although Finlay understandably wants to rescue Böll's reputation – "Viewed in the context of Böll's allegiance to the Christian conservative tradition, the defamations of him as a mentor of the terrorist movement appear to be nothing less than absurd" (228) – he misjudges the nature of Böll's Christianity, more accurately associated with liberation theology and its critique of structural violence than with a cautious conservatism. What Finlay rightly identifies as the "principle governing Böll's humour," the "inversion of society's evaluation of high and low" (230), is surely indebted not only to Jean Paul, but also to a biblical concept and a faith tradition shared with others such as the theologian identified as a supporter of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Dorothee Sölle (18), hardly best described as an adherent of Christian conservatism.

If the unnecessary repetition in Finlay's study were eradicated, there would be ample room for more extensive comparative discussion. Too much space is devoted to preparatory statements – "In order to be able to clarify this aspect, attention will now be paid in the first part of the next section of this chapter to Böll's critical rejection of traditional Marxist aesthetics . . ." (177) – and to recapitulations: "In the foregoing, it has been demonstrated . . ." (160). This style becomes tedious, particularly as it is accompanied by an outdated use of the first person plural ("we maintain") and some stilted phrasing. Completely unacceptable are the long passages repeated verbatim: pages 69-72 ("The important role in Böll's aesthetic thinking . . . Böll's conviction that reality is also fantastical") are reproduced, with only a few changes, on pages 217-19.

Despite the stylistic lapses, however, Finlay's study offers a clear and frequently stimulating overview of Böll's major theoretical preoccupations.

Although quotations from German sources are not accompanied by English translations, the rich commentary Finlay provides is sufficient to make this an accessible and valuable book even for readers without an extensive knowledge of German. In an age that indeed appears, as Böll predicted, to be seeking new forms of realism, the postwar author's "humane aesthetic" merits renewed and serious critical attention. (JEAN WILSON, MCMASTER UNIVERSITY)

*DARKO SUVIN. *Lessons of Japan: Assayings of Some Intercultural Stances*. Montréal: Ciadest, 1996. 247 pp. CDN\$ 23.95.

For a collection of pieces not originally intended to be a book, the essays in Darko Suvin's *Lessons of Japan: Assayings of Some Intercultural Stances* hang together surprisingly well. In its clearest moments, *Lessons of Japan* offers a series of views about the difficulties that obtain in translating Far Eastern artistic forms for Anglo-Euroamerican literary analysis. The book is composed of six parts, each, through varying methodologies, giving a different take on the production of Japan in Western readings of Japanese literary forms.

One of the central premises of the book is that "the West" suffers from a "very sick cultural tradition" (13) and that the East, to be plain, offers remedial cultural alternatives. Among the important questions the book implicitly raises are methodological ones: how are we to speak about Japan without being complicit in gestures that erase particularities, without mapping Japan under a template of generalizations, without totalizing? Equally important, how possible is it to resist these kinds of things in the kind of intercultural project in which Suvin is engaged? Such questions are only implicit in the book, and there are some rather large generalizations and binaristic modes of thought that Suvin commits himself to: for instance, about Japan being a "shame and honor culture" in contrast to Western "guilt and duty cultures" (13); about Western individualism and Eastern holism; and about the concepts of reaffirmation and defamiliarization, each of which could use substantially more discussion and certainly are not the givens that Suvin, a comparatist, takes them to be. It is certainly surprising, for instance, to find so little discussion about the relevance of Edward Said's *Orientalism* in this book. Apart from a few brief comments about this obviously important book, there is no discussion of Said at all in *Lessons of Japan*.

Of course, it is patently impossible to avoid some degree of necessary generalizing in comparative studies (or anywhere else, for that matter). We may be grateful that Suvin does not see this necessity for generalizing as a license to commit logical fallacies and paste hasty generalizations on every second page of his writing; however, we may also recognize that there *are*

times when he might have been a bit more explicit in his reasoning, careful in his generalizing, and informed in his discussions.

In spite of such criticisms, we must note that many of the numerous self-reflexive gestures in the book are particularly useful, both theoretically and pedagogically. Suvin seems acutely aware of the problems he faces. In his discussion of Barthes, for instance, he argues for both sides, one starting from "such cultural monads as 'Japan' and 'Europe'" (32); the other "positing that the 'cultural monad' approach is insufficient" (33). Suvin is not offering a grand set of answers so much as a recognition of some problems *en route* to provisional readings: "binary dichotomization," he acknowledges, "not only shares in but probably exacerbates certain cognitive limitations inherent in Aristotelian two-term logic, and it should be read more as a particular argument than as a full account" (33).

There are times, then, when two-term logic is useful, if only as a strategic maneuver. One of the two-term theoretical systems Suvin is careful to describe is what he terms the "horizontal" versus the "vertical" modes of establishing the veracity of propositions. He defines

"horizontal" [as] the concept-driven reliance on the syntagmatic chain of formalized, presumably literal, univocal, and non-contradictory, propositions; and [he calls] "vertical" verification a frequent experience-driven interruption of such a chain in favour of confrontation with other (not only conceptual, e.g. topological) derivations from material empirical evidence. (18)

He goes on to add new terms to this schema: "coherence," by which he means "horizontal consistency of conceptual cognitions with each other" (19); and "fit," which he uses to refer to "the vertical recourse to experiential beliefs consistent with practical tryout" (*ibid.*).

Lessons of Japan flings theoretical implications far and wide yet resists offering totalizing terms of reference. The very title of the book clearly announces that it is not Suvin's intention to offer a grand system of terms with which to read the Far East; rather, Suvin, when he is on his surest footing, offers "assayings" that analyze the failings of Western critics to deal adequately with the spatial and cultural dislocations involved in reading, for instance, Japanese drama. While it is a relatively old and uncontested claim that cultural biases are built into language and that translations are a very tricky business, Suvin plies the argument well in his reading of Barthes reading Japan. In addition, among the relatively few definitions Suvin dares to give, his embellishments about what he means by terms such as *variants*, *adaptations*, and *rewrites* are especially useful. Suvin defines a *variant* as "a translation preserving the central structural features (invariants) of the text being translated" (66). Any translation, in this model, is a variant. An *adaptation* he defines "as a translation which uses only some central invariants of a text, but

such as are sufficient to establish its 'family likeness' to other members of that family" (67). Suvin goes on to argue that "the intention of an adaptation is as a rule significantly different from that of a text being adapted, because the ideal audience has significantly changed" (*ibid.*). A *rewrite*, on the other hand, is "something which is no longer, strictly speaking, an interpretation but a use of some elements from the anterior structure as a semi-finished product" (*ibid.*). With these kinds of working terms in hand, Suvin's discussions *against translation* and about what are the limits of allowable translation make good sense.

One of the general problems of the book, at least for those among us who are not Japanologists, is that there are too few defining terms, especially for Japanese words. There are times when the book is simply incomprehensible for those unfamiliar with Japanese, if only because terms such as *gaijin* (roughly, "Westerner") are used without definition until relatively late in the book, and, indeed, many of the Japanese words receive no gloss at all. If the failure to gloss is part of the whole point of the book, it is a point that gets very lost very early, leaving the average professional reader more befuddled, discomposed, and irritated than interested. (It was my good luck to have been in the countryside around Osaka while reading the book and to have had the opportunity and *chutzpah* to ask curious farmers and monks I sat smoking or chatting with for various definitions.) Yet, the unglossed Japanese words work on the reader to engender a sense of dislocation, which, in some sense, is an effective strategy that points toward a close relationship between theories about space and subjectivity and that opens out onto questions about what links are yet to be made between the two.

What seems, perhaps, a bit more of a problem in the book, a problem that might make it more inaccessible for some people at numerous points, is the language, the very complexity of the writing. One is tempted, however, to argue that Suvin, like Homi Bhabha (as Gillian Rose recently argued), is, in his writing, *performing* a subject position symptomatic of the conflicts and contradictions of postcolonial discourse, but whether this is so or not, the fact remains that the mangled syntax and impossibly obtuse writing at times, combined with the frequent flip appositives, distract more than direct. And some of the metaphors Suvin uses carry across some very ugly meanings. When he mixes the metaphor of a "dumbbell mode of nomination" with "a radically polluted Love Canal" (17), we can forgive the mixing, perhaps, but the potentially misogynistic implications of the filthy Love Canal are more disturbing and less forgivable. One last point about language is that the various uses of "unto," "nay," and "alas" add a pretentiously archaic air to the writing. Again, this detracts from the general effectiveness of the book. Language, then, ironically, appears to be a bit of a problem at times in this book.

Another irritating tick in the book is its authorial self-indulgence and

self-aggrandizement: one has to wonder why the author feels it necessary to explain in parenthetical asides and footnotes (well outside of the "Acknowledgments") about "people [Suvin] personally knew" (21), for instance. I have to wonder how it furthers the arguments of the book for Suvin to tell us that he knows luminaries such as Fredric Jameson.

Such criticisms aside, there is much to love about this book. The peppering of theoretical discussions with various selections of translated tankas, haiku, and NDÜ excerpts, along with some truly impressive intercultural comparative approaches, the *tour de force* discussion ranging "from medieval Japan to modern Europe" (200) in the fifth chapter and the careful but "necessarily simplified" (221) discussion of Japanese reactions to European forms in the final chapter, for instance, make this book an effective participant in intercultural assaying.

Japanologists and Nipponologists will want to read this book for the insights it offers on the various selections under discussion. Perhaps few readers outside of the field will be disposed to traversing the book from cover to cover; nonetheless, postcolonial scholars, new historicists, translation theorists, and comparatists will all find valuable morsels in this truly inestimable contribution to the theory and practice of intercultural readings of Japanese literary and dramatic art. (SIMON C. ESTOK, CHONGWOON UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA)

*WILLI ERZGRÄBER, *James Joyce: Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im Spiegel experimenteller Erzählkunst*. Tübingen: Narr, 1998. 397 pp.

Inmitten der sprichwörtlichen Publikationsflut der „Joyce industry“ lässt der Name Willi Erzgräber seit vielen Jahren immer wieder aufhorchen. Auch mit seinem jüngsten Buch hat der namhafte Anglist wieder einen interessanten Beitrag zur deutschsprachigen Joyce-Forschung vorgelegt. Erwachsen ist die Monografie aus der wissenschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit der joyceschen Erzählprosa im Rahmen eines Sonderforschungsprojektes der Universität Freiburg i. Br. mit dem Titel „Übergänge und Spannungsfelder zwischen Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit“, doch greift Erzgräber in hohem Maße auch auf eine ganze Reihe früherer Aufsätze zurück.

In der Einleitung (pp. 3-13) formuliert Willi Erzgräber es als wesentliches Anliegen aufzuzeigen, in welcher Form Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit in das narrative Werk von James Joyce einflossen, ja schließlich dessen Kompositionstechnik nachhaltig bestimmten. Deziert bezieht Erzgräber sich u.a. auf die vielbeachteten literaturtheoretischen Schriften des Russen Michael Bachtin (1895-1975). Erzgräber betrachtet die Darstellungsformen mündlicher und schriftlicher Sprache bei Joyce als geradezu paradigmatische

Illustrationen der „Dialogizität“ im Sinne Bachtins, am deutlichsten ablesbar am Prinzip der *hybridization* als Verschmelzung verschiedener Wort- und Stilarten in den *portmanteau words* von *Finnegans Wake*.

Erzgräbers Untersuchung schlägt einen chronologischen Bogen von den Epiphaniesammlungen bis hin zu den großen Romanen. Im ersten Kapitel wird die Darstellung von Mündlichkeit in den *short stories* der *Dubliners* sowie in den sogenannten *epiphanies* untersucht. Nach einer Einführung zum poetologischen Hintergrund der Epiphanien verdeutlicht der Verfasser die besondere Bedeutung des Kontextes für eine adäquate Textrezeption anhand von Beispielen aus *Stephen Hero*, dem *Portrait of the Artist*, aber auch aus Textpassagen, die keinen Eingang in die längeren Prosawerke fanden.

Die vielzitierte auktoriale Intention des James Joyce, mit der *Dubliners*-Sammlung ein soziologisches Porträt der „paralysis“ zu schaffen, manifestiert sich deutlich in den Dialogen, denn diese spiegeln – wie Erzgräber mit großer Detailliertheit aufweist – die linguistische Vielfalt des gesellschaftlichen Lebens im Dublin der Jahrhundertwende wider. Erzgräber analysiert Dialoge in Gesprächen mit hohem Konfliktpotential, in denen Tabubereiche wie Tod und Sexualität tangiert, aber auch kontroverse Positionen zu Politik und Religion bezogen werden. Die größte linguistische Diversifizierung entdeckt der Verfasser in den Dialogen von „The Dead.“ In Joyce umfangreichster *short story* stellt Erzgräber eine Art „Schichtenmodell beim Aufbau der Dialoge“ (48) fest, eine Verknüpfung von ritualisierten Formeln, geselliger und vertraulicher Konversation, Festrede und polemischer Herausforderung, ergänzt durch Passagen erlebter Rede und des Erzählberichts, wodurch ein differenziertes Bild der Dubliner Mündlichkeit bei gesellschaftlichen Anlässen entsteht.

Von besonderem Interesse für die an Bedeutung zunehmende Erforschung des *Hiberno-English* in der anglo-irischen Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts erscheint der das Kapitel abschließende Exkurs zum Forschungsstand des Niederschlags dieser Varietät bei Joyce. Erzgräber verdeutlicht, dass Joyce keine allumfassende Reproduktion hiberno-englischer Elemente anstrebte, sondern die bewusste Auswahl syntaktischer bzw. lexikalisch-idiomatischer Merkmale zur Veranschaulichung charakteristischer dialektaler Züge nutzte.

Im zweiten Kapitel zeigt Erzgräber, wie Joyce in seinem extrem autobiografisch geprägten Künstler- und Entwicklungsroman *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* sein *alter ego*, den Protagonisten Stephen Dedalus, das akustische und semiotische Phänomen der Sprache als polyvalenten Bedeutungsträger erleben und ihn im Romanverlauf immer stärker in die verschiedenen linguistischen Dimensionen der Alltagssprache Dublins eindringen lässt. Zunächst wird auf Aspekte mündlicher Sprache in den Anfangskapiteln eingegangen, wie sie sich v.a. in denjenigen Dialogszenen

darbieten, an denen Stephens Tante Mrs. Riordan (Dante) beteiligt ist; dann wird dargelegt, wie sich Stephens sprachliches Empfinden durch die Konfrontation mit Klang, Rhythmus, Aussprachevarianten und Wortschatzunterschieden immer stärker differenziert. In einem nächsten Schritt befasst Erzgräber sich mit den Übergängen von Schriftlichkeit zu Mündlichkeit in den Predigten, die Stephen hört und den akademischen Disputationen, an denen er teilnimmt. Ähnliche Spannungsfelder sieht Erzgräber auch im umgekehrten Prozess, dem Übergang von Mündlichkeit zu Schriftlichkeit, wie sie sich etwa in Stephens emotional aufgeladenen Versuchen Gedichte zu schreiben oder der Tagebuchpassage am Ende des Romans aufzun.

Das dritte Kapitel, das vom Umfang mehr als die Hälfte der gesamten Studie einnimmt, ist der ausführlichen Analyse von Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit in *Ulysses* gewidmet, in der Erzgräber grundsätzlich diachrone und synchrone Aspekte unterscheidet. Zwar beginnt er das erste Unterkapitel zum inneren Monolog mit einer Einführung zu typischen Wesenszügen dieser modernistischen Darstellungsform, doch geht es ihm im Weiteren weniger um die gemeinsamen Merkmale als vielmehr um die individuellen Stützpunkte der drei zentralen *interior monologues*. Prägnant etikettiert er den Strömungsmonolog des Stephen Dedalus im Proteus-Kapitel als "Monolog der Intellektualität" (92), den Molly Blooms – der berühmteste innere Monolog der literarischen Moderne überhaupt – als "Monolog weiblicher Sensualität und Sexualität" (111), sowie schließlich den Leopold Blooms in der Nausicaa-Episode als "Monolog der Androgynie" (124).

Im zweiten Unterkapitel befasst sich Erzgräber mit den prominentesten Dialogvarianten in *Ulysses*. Neben den Alltagsdialogen Leopold Blooms in Calypso-, Lotophagen- und Hades-Episode, werden historische Bezugspunkte und stilistische Fragen wie die Modellhaftigkeit von scholastischer Disputation im kunstkritischen Dialog in der Scylla und Charybdis-Episode erörtert. Der Analyse der oft mit dem Begriff der "hallucination" assoziierten Circe-Episode, die neben inneren Monologen mit stilistisch vielgestaltigen realen wie surrealen Dialogen und einem "Polylog" (p. 174) aus zahlenmäßig stetig zunehmenden Gesprächspartnern durchsetzt ist, folgt schließlich eine Untersuchung katechetischer Dialoge zwischen Schüler und Lehrer in der Nestor-Episode und in der Ithaka-Episode.

Da sich gesprochene und schriftlich fixierter Sprache in *Ulysses* stellenweise kaum auseinanderhalten lassen, gibt der Verfasser den Wechselbeziehungen und Übergängen zwischen schriftlichen und mündlichen Ausdrucksweisen im dritten und bei weitem umfangreichsten Unterkapitel breiten Raum. Einen für die sprachliche Synchronie paradigmatischen Status schreibt er der in einer Zeitungsredaktion spielenden Aeolus-Episode zu, in der insbesondere die akustische Dimension der Sprache zum Tragen kommt,

was ähnlich auch auf die Sirenen-Episode zutrifft. In der Oxen of the Sun-Episode hingegen entdeckt Erzgräber einen Extremfall diachroner Schriftlichkeit, augenscheinlich an der Verwendung von 40 verschiedenen Silbarten sowie intertextuellen Bezügen zur Literaturgeschichte von Aelfric bis Pater. Weitere Überlappungen zwischen Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit konstatiert er in der Zyklopen-Episode sowie der Charakterisierung der Gerty MacDowell-Figur. Den höchsten Grad an stilistischer Uneindeutigkeit weist schließlich der Dialog des Eumaeus-Kapitels auf, von Erzgräber treffend "elaborierte Unschärfe" (293) genannt.

Dem chronologischen Aufbau seiner Studie entsprechend kommt Erzgräber im Schlusskapitel auf die polyglotte Kunstsprache in James Joyce's letztem Roman *Finnegans Wake* zu sprechen. Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit fließen in *Finnegans Wake* in einer universalistischen Traumsprache ineinander, die zwar das Englische als lexikalisch-syntaktisches Grundgerüst aufweist, sich jedoch aus 68 weiteren Sprachen speist und sich als Strukturprinzip der Differenzierung "mündlich" vs "schriftlich" beharrlich widersetzt. Die Darstellung der Sprache ist der mimetischen Funktion entbunden und dient zuvörderst der Illusionserzeugung, der Leser erlebe eine Art visionären Traum mit, in dem sich die gesamte Menschheitsgeschichte erschleife.

Wie Erzgräber an ausgewählten Beispielen zeigt, ist der auditive und visuelle Appellcharakter im Vergleich zu seinem Vorgänger *Ulysses* um ein Vielfaches gesteigert; so finden sich bspw. in *Ulysses* Anspielungen auf 400 Lieder, während sich in *Finnegans Wake* mehr als 1000 nachweisen lassen. Als morphologisches Hauptmerkmal bezeichnet Erzgräber die *portmanteau words* und *puns*, mit denen Joyce das Prinzip der Polyspektivität auf die Spitze treibt und dem Leser in höchstmöglicher formaler Konzentration eine Vielzahl von Sinnangeboten macht.

Einen weiteren kompositorischen Schwerpunkt sieht Erzgräber in der erzählerischen Darstellung ehemals mündlich tradierten Wissens. In keinem anderen Werk brachte Joyce sein enzyklopädisches Weltwissen derart zur Geltung wie in *Finnegans Wake*, wo er u.a. auf irische Geschichte, die Geschichte Dublins und Roms, das universalgeschichtliche Modell Giambattista Vicos, Sprichwörter und Balladen wie "The Ballad of Persse O'Reilly" und natürlich "Finnegan's Wake" rekurrierte.

Dem grundsätzlichen Problem schriftlicher Darstellungsformen geht Erzgräber im letzten Unterkapitel nach, im welchem er die beiden Briefe von "ALP" untersucht. Erzgräber zeigt, wie Joyce durch den stark parodistisch-metafunktionalen Duktus dieser Briefe Möglichkeiten und Grenzen von Schrift und Schriftlichkeit, Lesen und Schreiben, Verstehen und Interpretieren auslotet. Diese Textteile können als Exempel für die letztlich nicht vollständig auflösbare Verbindung von Schriftlichkeit und Mündlichkeit dienen, durch die, so Erzgräber, Joyce in seinem letzten Roman einen Zustand

darstellt, "in dem die babylonische Sprachenverwirrung künstlerisch ihren angemessenen Ausdruck gefunden hat?" (366).

Festzuhalten bleibt, dass Willi Erzgräber ein überaus lesenswerter Beitrag zur Joyce-Forschung gelungen ist. Auf beeindruckende Weise hat Erzgräber relevante Forschungsergebnisse mehrerer Jahrzehnte bis hin zur jüngsten Gegenwart zusammengetragen und in eine Matrix der verschiedenen Ausdrucksformen von Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im narrativen *œuvre* des James Joyce eingearbeitet. Die Monografie erörtert nicht nur die Grenzbereiche zwischen schriftlicher und mündlicher Sprache bei Joyce, sondern sie bewegt sich selbst auf dem Grenzgebiet zwischen anglistischer Literatur- und Sprachwissenschaft und vermag somit Lesern aus beiden Disziplinen wertvolle Impulse zu bieten. Speziell für die Exegese von *Ulysses* und *Finnegans Wake* wird man in Zukunft nicht an diesem Buch vorbeikommen. (C.J. GANTER, UNIVERSITY OF WÜRZBURG)

*CHARLES J. STIVALE. *The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1998. 360pp. US\$ 39.95, cloth.

At the turn of millennia one may notice a growing interest in such issues as the decline of metaphysics, the birth of new subjectivity and the influence of technologies on our existence. The fears and hopes for the future have been expressed in numerous books by eminent French philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists, for instance by Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida, Paul Virilio or finally, Gilles Deleuze, whose concepts have generated particular interest in recent years. All his crucial works, for example, have been translated into English, not to mention nearly 20 books and dissertations by other authors dealing with various aspects of his philosophy.

In his recent book Charles J. Stivale concentrates primarily on the late works of Deleuze and his co-operation with Félix Guattari, a psychiatrist and a Lacan's pupil. The title of the book is significant – *The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari* – as it points to one of the key aspects of Deleuze's philosophy, namely, a fold (*pli*), an internal fracture of the text which determines its undecidability.

On the face of it, it seems that Stivale's text tries to reconstruct Deleuze and Guattari's views expressed in two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (*L'Anti-Œdipe* published in 1972 [the first book written together] and in *Mille plateaux* [1980]); as the author explains their basic notions: schizoanalysis, rhizomatics, nomad thought, "body without organs," *heccécités*, deterritorialization, etc; however, the context in which he places these concepts seems quite unusual as Stivale aims to combine Deleuze and Guattari's ideas

with such issues as audio-visuality, cyberspace, postmodern literature (Michel Tournier) or even ethnology (*heccécités* explained in the context of *Cajun dances*).

From the very beginning Stivale tries to surprise us with the unusual character of the context: he starts with Deleuze and Guattari's crucial problem, namely, with "body without organs" and seeks its origins not in Artaud's or Bataille's works, but in Carlos Castaneda's *The Teachings of Don Juan* which explicates the process of "becoming of subject" and the issue of "deterritorialization" evading a simple logical and rational classification – the ideas crucial for understanding Deleuze's writings. However, the main point of reference, and at the same time, an example of schizoanalysis becomes Francis Ford Coppola's *Apocalypse Now* which enables Stivale to link the issues of madness, decline of identity, the process of art creation with key operations presented in *Anti-Œdipe*: assemblage, desiring-machine, war machine, and machinic nature of the work of art.

One of the objectives of Deleuze and Guattari's book was to evade Oedipal trap (set by Freud), to undermine the system of repression, cast a new light on the mechanisms of unconsciousness which Stivale tries to prove on the basis of particular scenes from Coppola's film: the character of Captain Willard illustrates the process of becoming a deterritorialized and nomad subject; his gradual identification with Colonel Kurtz explicates the process of subjective production, machinic nature of desire and the process of creative synthesis/production whose final effect is the exchange of identities, reconstitution of subjectivity, while Kurtz's madness, deprived of any references to Oedipal logic, becomes the example of "body without organs" – a partial body. Unfortunately, the text lacks any psychoanalytic background which might be nonetheless significant for understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy (Lacanian concept of partial subject is particularly important in this context). Nor does the text provide explanation for the notion of desiring-machine (the starting point in *Anti-Œdipe*) which opposes "body without organs," and provides the source for machinic dimension of all the processes discussed (again, Lacan's theory might be useful as desiring-machines belong to the sphere of the Imaginary and as Lacanian *significant* represent nothing, signify nothing, mean nothing [Deleuze, Guattari 288]).

Deleuze and Guattari's concept is not merely aimed at challenging Freudian psychoanalysis, hence the point of reference is the whole philosophic tradition. It is a characteristic feature of post-structural meta-philosophy to undermine a binary style of thinking, the arrangement of hierarchic oppositions which used to make the foundations for metaphysics and shaped social relations (based on injustice). Such attitude the reader may find in Derrida's, Foucault's and Baudrillard's writings – these philosophers also suggest abandoning unity, entity, homogeneity and replacing them with

multitude and heterogeneity. Deleuze's crucial metaphor illustrating a new approach to philosophy is rhizome, the concept which points to the relations of man and machine, activating a technological dimension of anthropology. Thus, vol. II of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* fosters a new science – rhizomatics which is a logical consequence of schizoanalysis. Presenting Deleuze and Guattari's concepts Stivale draws particular attention to their consequences for the analysis of information society: the notion of rhizome, which refers to hyperconnectivity, is linked with the Internet, while machinic desire is grasped as virtual activity of an individual submerged in cyberspace. A rhizome is defined in a way that resembles the concept of cyberspace typical of William Gibson or Michael Benedikt (Benedikt 2), or rather a particular function of the Internet understood as assemblage of texts, links, voices, images, etc.

The interest in new means of communication is noticeable also in the way Stivale analyses individual phenomena – he makes use of Internet discussion lists, e-mail correspondence, which enables him to compose a mosaic of texts similar to that of early books by McLuhan. The author of *Two-Fold Thought* claims that our identity is machine-mediated and this re-shapes people's relationships. Man has lost an illusive sense of homogeneity, unity, continuity and self-consciousness, becoming instead a nomad subject, discontinuous, made of numerous criss-crossing lines, lacking any privileged centre that might constitute a point of reference – in this way we come back to the phenomenon of deterritorialization. Body becomes partial, fragmented, extended with mechanical prostheses, attached to other bodies.

An individual loses his identity, becomes a "body without organs" or a cyborg. Stivale refers Deleuze's notion of "becoming" to the philosophy of cyberpunk, a dystopian vision of a future society based on "collective assemblages" with relationships shaped by the Net. Famous cyberpunk novels *Neuromancer*, *Mona Lisa Overdrive*, *Turbo*, *Count Zero* (William Gibson), or *Software, Wetware, Freeware* (Rudy Rucker) provide Stivale with rich material for the analysis as he claims they illustrate a thesis of becoming a machine, liberating of cyber forms, realisation of Dana Haraway's manifestos. The result of these processes is a new man endowed with identity of a cyborg whose subjectivity is mediated through his uniting with machine. Becoming of subject means becoming of cyborg. In this way, a man becomes a new "war machine" – nomadic pursuit of identity results in losing humanity in a traditional sense of the term. This also denotes the decline of logocentric era – the end of continuity, linearity, completeness; – we enter a fragmented world in which single particles never become connected (though later Deleuze and Guattari will write about the process of "re-embodiment").

However, considering the nature of man's relation with machine one should remember of the distinction made by Deleuze and Guattari between machine and machinic: body is never a simple machine, it always reminds of

machinic assemblage. Man is, first of all, a social machine, then a sociological or psychological one and this is the context in which its function should be analysed. The authors of *Anti-Oedipus* draw our attention to bodily evolution connected with the development of social systems (which is the aspect Stivale unfortunately does not mention, though it might be valuable for the analysis of *Apocalypse Now* [Kroker 104-135]): from primitive territorial machine through barbarian despot machine to civilised capitalist machine in which an individual becomes schizophrenic and deterritorialized subject. In his book entitled *Chaosology* (which is a unique supplement to works written together with Deleuze) Guattari emphasises that *Anti-Oedipus* was primarily a theory of society and the reflection upon the way "unconscious desire is an investment in social, economical and political fields" (Guattari 115). Thus, on the one hand, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy may be regarded as continuation of Nietzschean challenge of all values; rejection of logic and metaphysics that makes multitude, discontinuity, variety and heterogeneity privileged; however, their concepts also aim at diagnosing contemporary bourgeois society, analysing the mechanics of power, influence of economical and political domain upon the way individual identity is shaped. (KRZYSZTOF LOSKA, JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY)

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*EDWARD DUDLEY. *The Endless Text: Don Quixote and the Hermeneutics of Romance*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. 384 pp. US\$ 65.50, cloth.

In *The Endless Text*, Edward Dudley performs what he calls a "double genre reading" (206) of Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, discerning the "obscured outline of Romance" (154) beneath the realistic veneer of the novel. The work is divided into three sections of which the first establishes hermeneutics or the

question of interpretation as a constitutive feature of Romance. The second chapter surveys the hermeneutic enigmas posed by Celtic myths and their adaptation in Medieval literature. The third and by far the longest chapter deals with *Don Quixote's* assimilation of Romance hermeneutics. Relying on a thorough familiarity with Celtic tales and Arthurian tradition, Dudley proposes an ingenious series of analogies between the exploits of Romance heroes and the experiences of Don Quixote in the first part of the novel. He focuses especially on the inns, mills, and other border regions of the novel which reveal the tenacious vitality of an ancient Romance tradition. At the same time, Dudley examines Don Quixote's madness, which he regards as a hermeneutic condition that allows the hero to recognize the Romance aspects and antecedents of his experiences which the narrator and other characters ignore. Like Perceval in Chrétien de Troyes' *Conte du Graal* or Arthur himself in the Welsh Medieval tale *Culhwch and Olwen*, Don Quixote "seems to possess powers of interpretation that are the mark of a divine hero" (152), and these powers confer on him a "double profile" (98), both noble and comic, that only the Romantics properly appreciated.

For Dudley, Don Quixote is a hermeneutic hero capable of deciphering the latent meaning of his environment despite the myopic irony of his many antagonists, including the narrator Cide Hamete Benengeli. Where Cide Hamete sees an inn, Don Quixote sees a castle and where Cide Hamete sees windmills, Don Quixote sees giants, and throughout the novel the narrator's prosaic reading must compete for our sympathies with the hero's more penetrating and more entertaining interpretation. In effect, while Cide Hamete sees only the mundane landscape of late 16th-century Spain, Don Quixote reads the heroic past in the present, and it is this anachronism which Dudley celebrates and emulates above all. Dudley is a student and a partisan of anachronism, and he hails Don Quixote as a "throwback" in a "belated world" (163). The purpose of this study seems to be precisely to valorize anachronism as a way of understanding life and literature.

While Dudley is quite adept at finding Romance analogies to Don Quixote's adventures, his attempts at situating literary texts in their historical and intellectual contexts are often specious and superficial. Dudley accounts for the rise of Arthurian Romance in 12th-century France as a compensation for the "new logocentric concept of reality" (34) fostered by the "new male-dominant culture of court, church, and university" (36). In this oppressive atmosphere of Aristotelian rationalism, Romance satisfied "neglected emotional needs" (56) by recuperating feminine cultural forces such as "the power of love, intuition, and human relations" (37). This pseudo-psychological emphasis on the "darkly attractive powers" (85) of Romance wholly neglects the more pertinent socio-political factors discussed by Erich Köhler in his classic study of courtly Romance, *Ideal und Wirklichkeit*. In the Renaissance,

according to Dudley, logocentrism again stalked the land in the form of neo-Aristotelian literary criticism, which forced Don Quixote to take refuge in the counter-rationalism of Celtic Romance, misinterpreted by the narrator as madness. In this schema, Don Quixote plays for the Celts while Cide Hamete suits up for the Aristotelians, who are sort of like the Lakers without a fast break. While the challenge to Aristotelian notions of unity and order certainly does inform Cervantes' novel, as Alban Forcione has abundantly demonstrated in his *Cervantes, Aristotle, and the Persiles*, it is possible to understand the resistance to Aristotle's *Poetics* as the expression of a new vision of time and history rather than simply a return to "older irrational modes" (185). Cervantes' novel does not share the exclusively retrospective orientation of Dudley's study, which cannot be disguised by the author's frequent appeals to "postmodernism."

Dudley observes the influence of Romance not only in the characters and events of *Don Quixote* but also and primarily in the composition of the novel, which he explains in terms of the Romance technique of *entrelacement*. Unfortunately, Dudley takes *entrelacement* to be a synonym of interpolation or "interpolative structure" (198), which leads him to focus his attention on the sequence of interpolated stories told by the refugees in the Sierra Morena and the guests at the inn of Juan Palomeque in chapters 23 to 45 of part one of the novel. For Dudley, interpolation and *entrelacement*, because they defy the logocentric vice of chronological order, define the essence of Romance, and their absence from part two of *Don Quixote* signals a passage or more properly a degeneration from Romance to realism or from postmodernism to modernism (229-32). This may be a convenient excuse for neglecting part two, but it involves a serious misunderstanding of terminology and narrative technique. *Entrelacement*, in its traditional sense, only begins in part two, where it functions explicitly as a substitute for interpolation. At the beginning of chapter 44 of part two, Cide Hamete officially forswears interpolated tales or "novelas sueltas," and at the end of the same chapter he leaves Don Quixote at the castle of the Duke and Duchess in order to follow Sancho Panza's exploits as governor of the island of Barataria. For the next ten chapters, he skillfully interweaves the separate adventures of knight and squire until they are reunited in chapter 55. This is the classic technique of *entrelacement* as defined by Ferdinand Lot, Eugene Vinaver, Daniela Delcorno Branca and other specialists of Medieval narrative, and Cervantes models his technique specifically on Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*, as Maxime Chevalier and others have remarked. Thus part two of *Don Quixote* does not constitute an "aberration" (229) in Cervantes' work, as Dudley would have it, but rather it makes full use of those narrative techniques that most incensed the adherents of Aristotelian literary norms. The relevance of any of those techniques to the undefined notion of postmodernism remains highly dubious.

The last phase of Dudley's argument is devoted to the "problematics of language" (278) highlighted by the role of Dorotea, who first appears as a wild woman in the Sierra Morena and later impersonates Princess Micomicona at the inn of Juan Palomeque. For Dudley, Dorotea is the heroine of the story since she champions the "feminist hermeneutic" against the malevolent forces of logocentrism and humanism. In essence, Dorotea's speech is unstable and duplicitous, although the author would prefer to call it chiasmic, and this duplicity promotes *Don Quixote* to the rank of postmodern novel by exposing the failure of logocentric language. No doubt Cervantes would have been sensitive to the honor of inclusion among the precursors of Derrida, but his opposition to humanism, which figures here as the counterconcept of Mannerism, postmodernism, and even "post-logocentrism" (224), cannot so easily be inferred from the mendacity of his characters. It is curious to note that the Picaresque figure of Ginés de Pasamonte represents for Dudley the logocentric concept of language because he insists that his life story is true, even though this insistence is no less duplicitous than anything which Dorotea says.

In sum, *The Endless Text*, whose title evokes the tedium of its arguments, succeeds at retrieving the Romance antecedents to Cervantes' novel while it fails to situate the novel in its historical context and merely confuses the orientation of the novel toward the future. We are left with a *Don Quixote* generously endowed with hindsight but devoid of foresight. This may be an apt assessment of the hero, but it is not an adequate account of the novel. (ERIC MACPHAIL, INDIANA UNIVERSITY)

*CHRISTOPH LOREY and JOHN L. PLEWS, eds. *Queering the Canon: Defying Sights in German Literature and Culture*. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1998. 534 pp. US\$ 60, cloth.

Scholarly writing that calls itself "queer" is too disparate to be defined categorically, and only a brave soul would attempt to do so. Yet there are certain tendencies that one encounters frequently in such writing and that one expects to find in an academic book with "queer" in its title. Queer scholarship tends to be suspicious of the familiar categories of sexuality and gender and likes to show that they are not as natural nor as stable nor as universal as they are often made out to be. It is drawn to those unruly, excessive, contradictory, dissonant, or simply unfamiliar desires and identifications that do not fit neatly into the official categories and that therefore challenge the norm that these categories have come to represent. *Queering the Canon: Defying Sights in German Literature and Culture*, a collection of essays edited by Christoph Lorey and John L. Pews, contains

some fine examples of this sort of queer scholarship. It contains somewhat more examples of a slightly older, but still vigorous lesbian/gay scholarship. And it contains a surprising number of essays that, no matter what their critical allegiance, should never have been published in the first place.

Some of the queer essays are extremely good. Robert Tobin contributes an elegant essay on "Thomas Mann's Queer Schiller." Beginning and ending with the queer significance that Schiller had for Thomas Mann, Tobin demonstrates in rich detail the constitutive role that male-male desire plays in Schiller's notions of friendship, democracy, and writing. Tobin draws widely on letters and other texts but focuses primarily on *Don Carlos*. In an exhilarating essay linking sexuality and music, Martin Scherzinger and Neville Hoad argue that the nineteenth-century notion of symmetrical inversion promised to undo the hierarchical oppositions masculine/feminine and natural/unnatural that were attached to majority and minority sexualities as well as to major and minor tonalities. This utopian promise was forfeited in sexology when medical experts abandoned the notion of inversion for that of homosexuality but was realized in music, partially by late romantic composers like Brahms and more fully with the advent of atonality. Sunka Simon deftly excavates the complicated relations between sexuality, nationality, and race in Monika Treut's *Virgin Machine* and Percy Adlon's *Bagdad Café*—although, strangely, she doesn't bother to connect her analysis of one film with that of the other or to offer any general conclusions. Martin Blum has written a more predictable—a cross-dressing character "deconstructs the notion of masculinity as a stable signifier" (117), the text "generates the very queerness [the narrator] seeks to suppress" (120)—but nevertheless worthy queer reading of a nineteenth-century tale, Dietrich von der Glezze's *Der Borte*.

Just because queer scholarship has enjoyed a certain cachet of late does not mean it is necessarily better than a slightly older lesbian and gay scholarship. But it is different. Whereas queer scholarship tends to dismantle notions of identity, lesbian and gay scholarship tends to consolidate them. It studies lesbian and gay communities and political movements, seeks out lesbians and gay men in history, analyzes the lesbian and gay characters one finds in fiction and in so doing it elaborates the categories "lesbian" and "gay," giving them more weight and nuance and enlarging the historical terrain they can occupy. Surprisingly, given its title, *Queering the Canon* contains somewhat more of this sort of scholarship than it does of the queer variety. Some of it is excellent. Angela Taeger illuminates the history of Paragraph 175, the portion of the German Criminal Code that punished sex between men, by placing it in relation to a changing public discussion of population growth and nationhood. Harry Oosterhuis traces the changes that the rise of Nazism effected in the attitudes of Thomas and Klaus Mann towards

homosexuality, and shows thereby that the attitudes of father and son are not so different as one might at first think. In an essay that stands out both for its crisp style and the acuity of its literary analysis, Denis M. Sweet discusses four gay texts that appeared in the GDR between the fall of the wall and reunification. Although Karen Bauer and, especially, Les Wright invoke a host of queer theorists, the theory has little bearing on their arguments. Bauer offers a clear and convincing discussion of Ingeborg Bachmann's "A Step Towards Gomorrah" – although one grows tired of hearing the main point, that "the patriarchal structure" of the protagonist's "fantasy undermines its own utopian ambition and emancipatory potential" (229), repeated over and over. Wright provides rich historical contextualization for the New German Cinema and its aftermath in an ambitious piece on "German Gay Coming-Out Films, 1970-1994," in which he reads four films with gay themes as representatives of four stages in the development of genre films in general.

Unfortunately, at least half the essays in *Queering the Canon* should never have been published, some because they are woefully misinformed, others because they are so badly written. The very first essay sets the stage by discussing the "History, Status, Trends, and Problems" of queer theory. Surprisingly, Holger Pausch feels he can do so without a single reference to Foucault, with only passing reference to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and a discussion of Judith Butler that pays less attention to her own words than to those penned as an introduction to one of her essays by the editors of the *Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader* (17). That he advances John Boswell's *Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality* as a "brilliant" example (11) of specifically queer scholarship while ignoring Foucault and Sedgwick will strike anyone familiar with the brief history of "queer theory" as ludicrous. Judith Butler is, ostensibly, the focus of Evelyn Annuß's essay on "The Butler Boom." Yet Annuß never bothers to quote Butler, preferring simply to assert what she thinks Butler says, and she ignores entirely Butler's immensely influential notion of gender performativity. Cathrin Winkelmänn feels she must introduce us to Adrienne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) – surely one of the best known texts in women's and lesbian/gay studies (235-36). But it is apparently unknown to Nancy P. Nenno, who thinks that Rich's famous "lesbian continuum" was coined in 1991 by Blakey Vermeule (209) – then a graduate student at Berkeley. David G. John believes that, according to Foucault, "the relationship between sex and power is characterized by repression," thus attributing "Foucault's 'repressive hypothesis'" to Foucault himself when, as nearly everyone else has figured out by now, Foucault was challenging that hypothesis (128). That mistakes of this sort were not caught by the editors of the volume suggests either that they did not read the essays in their collection or that they are unfamiliar with the basic texts in queer studies.

Some of the essays are so amateurish they would embarrass students in a graduate seminar. Cathrin Winkelmänn thinks she is doing her author a favor when she praises Christa Reining for constructing "characters that are multidimensional, exposing their strengths, as well as their weaknesses" (283). Ralph J. Poole seems not to realize that the "Christian mystic (Johannes vom Kreuz)" is St. John of the Cross and that it is absurd to refer to him as "the author (vom Kreuz)" (250-51). Amanda L. Mitchell has no idea what to make of Regina Nössler's *Straße muß sein*, a 1994 novel that contains scenes of lesbian bondage and aggressive, exhibitionistic masturbation. Mitchell is surprised to discover that the protagonist's relationship fails to conform to the 70s lesbian-feminist ideal, considers dutifully whether it might nevertheless be ok as "a mature sadomasochistic relationship between two consenting adults" (286), and finally agonizes over whether or not the text should be classed as pornography or erotica. Unlike the theoretically barren essays of John, Winkelmänn, and Mitchell, those by Poole and Caryl Flinn are decked out with citations from all the best shops. And yet their long essays are woefully unfocused. Flinn is so eager to invoke authorities that she drags in those whose opinions, as she herself admits, do not apply in this case: "The character shows little of the 'self-protective suspicions' that Leo Bersani describes in *paranoia*" (377). Her ostensible theme, "Camp, Music, and the Production of History" in Rosa von Praunheim's *Anita*, surfaces only occasionally amidst the crashing waves of theory.

One of the most irritating features of the volume is the failure of some of the authors to write intelligible English. Much of Ute Lischke-McNab's essay is hard going. Translators have not done well by Evelyn Annuß and have rendered parts of Helmut Brall's essay practically incomprehensible (98-99, for instance). But the worst offenders are the editors themselves. "As a margin among parallel margins," they inform us, "a segment of a continuum of possibilities, chosen both as a result of and as a reaction to the ideologies of the day, the canon is an insecure centerfold" (xv). Like many sentences in the introduction, this one leaves the reader wondering what it could possibly mean – although, in this case at least, one is compensated by the pleasure of imagining Goethe as bashful playmate of the month. Not even the title makes sense. I have asked half-a-dozen academics what they think *Defying Sights in German Literature and Culture* might mean. No one knows.

Lorey and Plews should be ashamed for having performed their editorial duties so irresponsibly. Camden House should be ashamed for having published a collection that is deficient in so many ways. It is a shame that the excellent essays that one can find in *Queering the Canon* are buried amongst so much rubble. (JAMES A. SCHULTZ, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES)

*ZYGUMUNT G. BARANSKI and LINO PERTILE, eds. *The New Italian Novel*. (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 261 pp. US\$ 19.95, paper; \$US 60, cloth; JOSEPHFRANCESE. *Narrating Postmodern Time and Space*. Albany: State of New York University Press, 1997. 203 pp. US\$ 17.95, paper; US\$ 53.50, cloth.

The modern Italian Novel which at the turn of the century boasted the likes of Verga, Pirandello and Svevo was also very well represented after the last war with authors like Pavese, Calvino, Vittorini and Gadda. The late critic Gregory Lucente, *Beautiful Fables. Self-consciousness in Italian Narrative from Manzoni to Calvino* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), surveying the literature of this period from Manzoni to Eco not only provided a critical analysis of the major works (beside those mentioned Lucente also discussed Dossi, D'Annunzio, Silone, Lampedusa, Morante, Samonà and Manganelli) but his aim was also to raise the profile of Italian literature beyond national barriers which, in his view, lacked serious critical discussion beyond the occasional commentary. Concerned with a discussion of self-consciousness in Italian narrative, Lucente wanted to fill this "perplexing lacuna in Italian criticism and to right a wrong in sore need of redress" (21) and provide a "critical vocabulary of its own" (21) to deal with this issue. Lucente's book does precisely that and his perceptive analyses constitute a seminal contribution to the critical study of modern and contemporary Italian literature. (My review of this work appeared in the March-June 1989 issue of this journal.)

The essays edited by Barànski and Pertile, *The Italian Novel Today. Politics, Language, Literature*, continue the tradition of presenting a collection of critical essays on major contemporary Italian writers to the English speaking world. In the introduction, Lino Pertile explains the project by explaining the nature of the contemporary Italian novel in terms of its tradition and present and future directions. This useful survey concludes by pointing out that wherever the Italian novel may be headed, what is important is the "how" of this process, the manner in which it proposes itself. Freed from ideological or traditional constraints, the modern writer owes "allegiance and responsibility" to literature alone. The writers discussed do not belong to any literary school or movement but have in common "a belief in literature" not as a means to changing the world but "as a still valid means of knowing it" (18).

The essays in the volume are informative, situating the writer in his or her cultural and literary milieu, but also critical providing the reader with an account of the writer's main works and major themes. Every essay is accompanied by a bibliography of the author's works and a list of critical

works for further reading. Though biographical information is available dispersed in the essays, a brief biography of each author would have been useful.

Beside essays on already well-known writers such as Vincenzo Consolo, Gianni Celati, Antonio Tabucchi and Sebastiano Vassalli, there are essays on Gesualdo Bufalino, Aldo Busi, Andrea De Carlo, Daniele Del Giudice, Francesca Duranti, Rosetta Loy, Giuliana Morandini, Roberto Pazzi, Fabrizia Ramondino, Francesca Sanvitale and Pier Vittorio Tondelli. The volume fills a big lacuna in modern Italian studies as no other work is available in English that provides a similar thorough account of what is going on in Italian narrative today. The work will also serve as a useful guide to the study of the single authors and as a valuable point of reference and departure for further critical studies on the subject.

A summary account of the essays in this volume would not be very practical as they are in large part expository in nature. I want to mention only a remark made by Barànski in his essay on Vassalli which coincides with a similar point quoted earlier by Pertile, and which is important for this review. Whatever issues Vassalli may be addressing, political or literary, writes Barànski, his view of literature need not be reduced to these (255). For Vassalli literature fulfills a deep human need and it is immoral to exploit literature for one's own selfish ends (255-56). "Literature, as Vassalli reminds us time and again, is part of our lives, and as such, we should show it due respect" (256).

Joseph Francese's *Narrating Postmodern Time and Space* is a radically different type of work. It is a comparative study of postmodern narrative in terms of time and space based on the works of Calvino, John Barth, Morrison, Doctorow and Tabucchi. Francese's main purpose is to differentiate between two types of narratives in terms of their reaction to present-day or postmodern conceptions of time and space. For him postmodernity is characterised by "the dramatic acceleration of the reshaping of structures of experience precipitated by the extremely rapid advances in information technologies during the past twenty-five years" (1-2). An important aspect of postmodernity is exemplified by differing notions of time and space, by a "shortening of commonsense perceptions of time," (3) a loss of temporal bearings which forces the individual to "live more intensively in the present" (3).

The present is all there is together with an added sense of disempowerment, a feeling of being out of place and without direction. When translated in terms of literature, this amounts to a distinction that, according to Francese, can no longer be made in aesthetic terms but has to take into account the social, political and economic factors that condition both writer and work. In his view, one must take into account the historicist notion that a work is a "zone of transgression" between writer, text, critic and society (6).

Francese's analysis and distinction between late or high modern and postmodern narratives is stacked against this definition of postmodernity. And against this definition the narratives of Calvino and Barth are viewed as purely aesthetic and formalistic, as an "evolution of structures of lived realities, such as subjectivity and identity" (1). Their narratives are "socially passive" and cannot be considered postmodern. In fact, the self-reflexivity, irony and parody which have been claimed for their works and which do not decenter the subject at all but only confirm the status of the self at the center "of a Ptolemaic universe" (7).

True postmodern narratives do not use the writing subject as the "organizing center of consciousness," as modernist narratives do. The novels of Morrison, Doctorow and Tabucchi, which Francese defines as "oppositional postmodern narratives," are characterized by a refusal of the formalism that typifies former modernist narratives while arguing "for the return of the writer to the social arena" (11), to the "interactive mediation of other individuals" (12). The postmodern writer "strives to overcome the fragmentation or schizophrenia of its present-day counterpart" not by reverting into itself, as in modernist literature, "but by seeking out objectifying points of reference in what is other" (12).

The oppositional postmodern narratives of Morrison, Doctorow and Tabucchi move beyond the isolationism of high or late modernism and "break out of the continuous present or compression of temporal horizons installed in postmodernity" (107-08). Their narratives give a voice to the historically marginalized and escape the trappings of reducing everything to literary history. They recuperate and valorize *in the present* those "untaxIALIZED traces of past reality that survive in conscious and unconscious memory and in orally transmitted knowledge" (108). These oppositional narratives "move outward from the subject to acknowledge the interdependence of the self and the other, deprivileging and undermining the authorial voice through the multiplication of the narrative center.... They work to reestablish social bonds and strengthen the temporal and spatial points of orientation debilitated by postmodernity" (109-10).

Morrison's *Beloved*, for instance, can be seen as a very concrete example of how and why a temporal perspective can be used for guidance in a move toward the future. Doctorow's *Waterworks* denounces "the inverted premises on which the specifically American 'concordance of wealth, government, and science' are founded" (110). In Tabucchi's *L'angelo nero* the narrating self is "discombobulated" into multiple, heteronymic others (110). Through his surrealistic recovery of the repressed, Tabucchi interrogates the social, political and intellectual contexts that determine and condition to this day at least one generation of Italians.

Francese's view is predicated on a definition of the literary text as not

only a "storehouse of individual memory, but a source of collective remembrance" (160) which allows us to draw on the reservoir of collective memory, confront our experiences with those of others, and embed them imaginatively in our own. This is made possible by a concept of the text as absence, of authorial absence, which makes possible a strengthened historical perspective and critical thinking. In high and modern narratives the concept of the absent author is a self-serving concept in function of the autotelic concern for its own procedures: "authors do not die, they hide inside their texts" (158). In postmodern oppositional narratives a similar concept allows for the acquisition of "objectifying points of reference external to the self" (156) making possible the reappropriation of the past and, as a result, the "re-orientation in time of the subject" (156). Whereas high and late modernist narrative offer only a ludic and aesthetic response to postmodernity with the aim of replacing life with literature, in contestational narratives the absence of the author is liberating making possible for the reader "the alternative memory of another" (160). In modernist metafiction the world is not questioned but accepted as it is, in oppositional literature there is ample room for the "interrogation of and new insight into the structures of reality" (158). In the last instance high and late modernist narrative strategies are "disoriented" and subject-centered, whereas oppositional narratives allow for a measure of unity in their synthesis of heterogeneities, "suggesting forms of dialogic resistance to both the homologating tensions of massified resistance and the dispersive political particularism that occlude the common interests shared by diverse oppressed groups" (162). In Calvino and John Barth the act of writing and living are synonymous, in oppositional postmodern writers like Morrison, Doctorow and Tabucchi, the individual is not severed from the social context, but is confronted with it, where the writer and reader are an active, participatory agent in the world. Francese's distinction, in the last instance, is between purely aesthetic narratives and socially committed ones. The former are self-centered and self-serving, and socially regressive, while the latter are oppositional and contestational allowing for the multiplicity of otherness and are forward looking.

Although Francese's analysis of the various works is interesting and insightful, it is easy to see the shortcomings of a work that sets up premises, however informed, to which narratives that have evolved independently of those premises have to conform. Whether Francese is correct or not in his views of postmodernity, it does not follow that these can be employed as standards for how narratives should be written whether of the high modernist or oppositional type. One is reminded of Pertile's definition of the modern novel as owing allegiance and responsibility to nothing else but to literature. Pertile is also alluding to the work of Tabucchi who is one of the authors studied in his anthology and which Francese views, instead, as belonging to

anything but literature. In referring to Tabucchi's *L'angelo nero* Francese comments that "metaliterature is by no means the main concern of this work" (146).

Is the work of the late Calvino and of Barth solely escapist literature that tries to replace life with art and provide a reassuring, unifying version of reality? Are the novels of Morrison, Doctorow and Tabucchi solely instances of narratives that invite the reader's social participation and comment? Is not the social as well as the aesthetic a preoccupation in both narratives? Is not what defines literature precisely what distinguishes it from a sociological document? It would seem that for Francese only the latter type of narrative contributes to knowing, contesting and transforming the postmodern world, to open up "ever larger spaces for informed democracy and emancipation" (162). That the work of Morrison, Doctorow and Tabucchi also achieve these ends, well and good, but to what extent these results conform to the intention of the authors themselves, is another question. That the novels of Calvino and Barth do not achieve these goals does not constitute a shortcoming since these writers never set out to write anything but literature, even though in their own way they may very well have thought that they were contributing to a view of the world as outlined by Francese, though not in the same terms expected by him. What worries one about the approach suggested by Francese is precisely the fact that the zeal to serve the common good ends up by misrepresenting those writers that do not fit within his scheme, as well as those that apparently do.

For these reasons, one would rather prefer critical essays of the type we find in the collection of papers by Barański and Pertile in *The New Italian Novel* which provide a balanced critical and explanatory account of writers and works and are ideology free, rather than a critical narrowing, in time and space, of modern and postmodern narratives. (MASSIMO VERDICCHIO, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*JAMES BRUSSEAU. *Isolated Experiences: Gilles Deleuze and the Solitudes of Reversed Platonism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. 223 pp. US\$ 19.95, paper.

James Brusseau's *Isolated Experiences* deals with Deleuze's vigorous attempt to reverse "history's most inclusive and imperializing thought" (2) – Platonism. But what exactly does it mean to talk about reversed Platonism? The reversal in question is not to be taken literally; it is not a matter of opposing Plato's philosophy (with its emphasis on representation, recollection, and innate correspondence), but probing for another truth that is curled inside Platonism: "Reversed Platonism is not the opposite of Platonism, and it is not another

version of Platonism. It is a different philosophy that twists out of Platonism" (3). Deleuze's discussion of the simulacrum in *The Logic of Sense* and its companion piece *Difference and Repetition* can elucidate the deceptive simplicity of this reversal. Much like Plato and Socrates ("Platonism's principle mouthpiece," to use Brusseau's own words), Deleuze thinks that the simulacrum is deceitful. Unlike them, however, he resists the temptation to dismiss it categorically. What he does, instead, is draw our attention to the power of affirmation that accompanies the simulacrum. There where Socrates saw an ethereal and transient deception, a noble lie so to speak, Deleuze discovers a differential being – i.e., a being who is defined through difference, so much so that identity becomes inconceivable outside the work of difference. In order to go beyond the limits of ontological distinctions and to preserve the irregularities of the subject while seeking to explain it, Deleuze proposes a revised semiotics in which the whole is generated rather than given, in which experience substitutes theory, in which limits are internally produced rather than externally imposed, in which pure events take eminence over *a priori* metaphysical things, and in which original unity gives way to spontaneity.

While rehearsing many of Deleuze's concept words (desire, need, partial objects, heterogeneity, being, and becoming) and surveying some of the key issues in his writings (the eternal return in Nietzsche, the virtual versus the actual in Bergson, and the subject's circumvention of singular body-centered identity and claim to multiple identities in *Anti-Oedipus*), Brusseau addresses problems that characterize some compelling work on subjectivity. Thus, Nietzsche's eternal return and Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus* provide a case study for difference as production, while Foucault's philosophic theory of transgression and Baraille's perversion offer the opportunity to examine forms of production that impose their own limitation (i.e., difference as limitation). In doing so, Brusseau weaves out philosophical inquiries and literary excursions; he brings together significant themes in Deleuze's thought, but also tests, extends, and refines his philosophy through diverse literary tracts.

While such an endeavor might widen and sharpen the reversal which, as Brusseau puts it, Deleuze "gestured toward, but never wrote it all the way through" (3), it is nonetheless meager and modest to say the least. Brusseau uses Deleuze's theories as "a tool for reading" (112) selected literary writings by authors that range from Camus, Hemingway, and Borges to Fitzgerald, Duras, and Eberhardt. Although such a "reading via Deleuze" (113) does not amount to a mere cookie cutter approach, it is not void of problems either. Brusseau claims to elaborate a limited philosophical position, but the philosophy he offers is inchoate at best and begs for more substantiation. By consciously developing a philosophical narrative that favors the local and the particular over the universal and the eternal, the author refuses broadening

generalizations only to fall pray to a fragmented narrative. What we get indeed is an unsystematic account of Deleuze and a sporadic analysis of some literary texts (although to be fair to Brusseau, the title of the book – *Isolated Experiences* – does not promise to achieve more than that). Of course, one may object to this criticism on account that the book is in tune with Deleuze's spirit; after all Deleuze is the philosopher of the anti-system, and to systematize his thought is to impose a certain cohesive model on what may be described as a proliferation of rhizomatic thinking. This line of analysis could go to Brusseau's credit rather than his detraction were it not for a second and even more insistent problem. In many ways, the book lacks a center, a blemish which is due partly to the fact that the author is insufficiently critical of Deleuze. Brusseau neither challenges Deleuze's thought nor takes it to its limit. At times, Brusseau even comes out as an apologist for Deleuze. For example, in his discussion of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Brusseau vigorously defends Deleuze. While he admits that some critics are right to judge Deleuze's reading as coarse, distorted, and even pessimistic, he quickly dismisses these critical endeavors on grounds that they bury philosophy within itself rather than push it forward. Such an argument strikes the reader as skewed; it means, among other things, that questioning Deleuze is itself a questionable endeavor: "In agreement with his ontology, Deleuze wants philosophic discussion to be more than simply reactive; at each stage it should be generative" (24). As it is, this line of analysis immunizes Deleuze – immaturely and unduly – against criticism. Simply put, criticism becomes irrelevant – the war is lost before it even starts.

Nowhere is this problem more insistent, perhaps, than in Brusseau's discussion of the role that difference plays as a limit: "For Deleuze, production and limitation collapse. They collapse into a mechanical operation of production imposing its own limitation" (7). Such is the paradox of production. Being internally produced, the limit is not an restriction or a shed, it is itself an active energy which generates rather than imposes; it is not a condition but a mutating process in which difference is continuously reproduced. However, to content oneself with the assertion that Deleuze's philosophy is a philosophy of affirmation – the affirmation of the unbridled production of difference – is to give in to an immanent axiomatic in which the limit is accepted on the sole condition that it is an impassable one. A system in which the limit is acknowledged only to be exorcised, a system which continuously seeks to avoid reaching a limit while simultaneously tending towards it, as Deleuze would have it, is a system that risks to devolve into a closed system.

Seen from another perspective, the book is highly idiosyncratic. It is written in a style that is reminiscent, to a certain extent, of Michel Serres' *The Parasite*: an argument that is patiently labored within an influx of examples

from various sways of literature with often bold statements and dropped assertions but minimal support. Overall, some of the statements and assertions that are made in the book are vague and beg for both clarity and precision. Without undermining the ease, the intelligence, the energy, and the enthusiasm with which the author discusses Deleuze's entangled writings, one should note nonetheless that, at times, Brusseau lets himself be carried away with what may be described, for lack of a better term, as an anecdotal style. Take for instance his description of Deleuze's approach to the subject – "Deleuze's laissez-faire rule of ontology drops relations between people into free fall" (152) – or his conception of the machine –

Deleuze sometimes designates partiality's maniac process with the word "machine." He wants machine to carry the connotation of perpetual motion, of self-sufficiency. Even more: over-production. Machines perpetuate themselves while churning out. True engine machines need something: they need gasoline, maintenance, and oil. But Deleuze's machine is not exactly an engine. Deleuze's machine is a weight lifter arriving at the gym each day at noon, doing ten reps five times on the primary muscle group equipment, then running three miles. It does that and tomorrow will manage ten reps six times and run three and one eighth miles. Or, a machine is the historical novelist researching a past decade to write one book. Through the study, other connections and leads perk up. Finally, the original manuscript lies finished, but three new ones have already started: a writing machine. (109)

In other instances, Brusseau gives the impression of indulging in an *exercice de style* pure and simple: "Simulacra do socially useful work. They do so shamelessly. Like Plato's noble lie, the simulacrum marches through experience without contrition and without repenting its deceit. Its confidence, teamed with its salutary social effects, inure it against all but the most skeptical and cynical" (161). (MOHAMED ZAYANI, UNIVERSITY OF BAHRAIN)

*JIMRE SALUSINSZKY, ed. *The Oxford Book of Australian Essays*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997. vii + 295 pp. US\$ 39.95, cloth.

In the 1990's, many academics, having plumbed the reaches of High Theory to their exhaustion, have primed themselves to appeal to a "general audience" and have set about contributing to relatively high-circulation periodicals, evidently hoping to gain not only clarity but fame in the process. This has led to a lot of talk about the rebirth of the essay, but the fact remains that many of these "crossover" books have really not done very well in terms of any overall gauge of sales, and, one suspects, have largely been read by the writers' fellow academics, as are most books by academics, no matter how

meritorious. Imre Salusinszky's provocative preface to his collection of Australian essays sheds light on why "recent talk of the renaissance of the essay" (4) has been characterized more by hypocrisy and opportunism than by sweetness and light. Academics cannot write essays in their leisure time as a watered-down version of their former theoretical work; as Salusinszky maintains, "Genuinely informal writing requires as much skill and application as formal prose" (4).

So the familiar essay, in its idiosyncrasy, may not be a flawless vehicle for elite intellectuals preaching great truths to the public. Smaller truths may be more apt to do the job, as transpires in the several essays in this book on Australian Rules Football, a phenomenon partially reminiscent of Voltaire's famous joke about the Holy Roman Empire in that, though indubitably Australian, it does not resemble what this reviewer knows as football and does not seem to have any rules. Sport, as a sphere at once momentous yet lacking in practical consequence is, if hardly a traditional theme for the essay genre (and we should remember that professional sports is as purely a modern cultural phenomenon as anything), a suitable haunt for its combination of high stakes and levity.

Yet the essay genre does not exclude theory, although theory in this book is found in the less likely places. Frederick Sinnett's "The Fiction Fields of Australia" sounds like a deconstructive tome from the late 1980's, but the title is startlingly proleptic, as the piece hails from 1856. Sinnett sketches the theoretical preconditions for the study of Australian literature at a time when there was little Australian literature – "all these rude amorphous materials" (23) – and even less literary theory (troped by Sinnett as "the capable eye"). Sinnett laudably avoids a hortatory tone, almost inevitable for an Australian writing in the 1850s. Rather than jingoistically pounding the drums for an absent national literature, Sinnett merely trusts in "the mathematical doctrine of probabilities" (23) to bring forth literature of more note once the country was more populated. Actually, Robert Frost's stance towards the United States in his poem "The Gift Outright" is not too far from this; both writers renounce any idea of national allegory.

This note of modesty is echoed by the contemporary writer Barry Oakley when he writes of his encounters with various "famous" authors, among them Margaret Atwood. Oakley ruefully records not only the inferiority-complex of Australia when respect to more culturally established nations, but the uneasy coexistence of fame and the literary enterprise. In between entertaining anecdotes (such as Alain Robbe-Grillet sketching a map of Australia on a saucer at a Toronto literary gathering) Oakley situates a contemporary essay, as opposed to the Greco-Roman modes of lyric and epic poetry, on the other side of fame. Far from being a vehicle for previously obscure academics to gain fame in the eyes of a general audience, the essay

needs to avoid fame and famousness, to maintain its independence in relative obscurity.

Despite this cautionary note, though, Salusinszky includes two writers, famous in their native country, who deserve to be more famous outside it. Manning Clark was Australia's greatest twentieth-century historian, with one of the finest prose styles of any historian in the English language. Revisionary in his refusal to hail Australian settlement as a seamless triumph for European colonial ideals, Clark is, however, staunchly meliorist in his belief that history "to be great as history, must have a point of view on the direction of society. It must also have something to say, some great theme to lighten our darkness..." (138). If the search for a point of view led Clark into a misplaced romance with Soviet totalitarianism, this should not detract from the integrity of Clark's vision or from his skill as a writer. Gerald Murnane is far more the postmodern skeptic, aware that it is possible to stare "at the spine of *Don Quixote*" (211) and yet remember nothing of its content or of his own experience of reading the book. Yet this severance between signifier and signified, and his general lack of faith in all existing absolutes, does not interfere with Murnane's intense romanticism, which guides him in an endlessly deferred yet still adamant quest to build new absolutes on the other side of reading. Murnane's contribution to the Salusinszky book takes the essay beyond any bounds of familiarity as it haunts the reader with the pathos of its images.

This collection's humility, its lack of any arrogant pretension to use the essay in order to stitch together some sort of cultural common weal, mark it out as a distinctive contribution to the study of the essay genre. For instance, the Aboriginal writer Archie Weller makes the common authenticity-claim that only Aborigines can write about Aborigines, yet also admits that he likes Agatha Christie (272), a disclosure often shied away from by many an Anglo literary snob. Once again, the essay deflates cultural pretensions and empowers ordinary readers, all the while reminding us that to write such a piece is never easy. (NICHOLAS BIRNS, THE NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH)

*SARA MILES and ERIC ROFES, eds. *Opposite Sex: Gay Men on Lesbians, Lesbians on Gay Men*. New York and London: New York University Press, 1998. vii + 276 pp. US\$ 17, paper.

This is a fine anthology. It is also very utterly queer, less limited in its conception of sex and gender, and less compartmentalized, than its title might imply. Linnea Due, for instance, contributes two pieces: "Blackbeard Lost" is about fisting in relation both to lesbians and to gay men, and pirates; "Crossing Over" is about the desires and identifications of persons who

transition from butch dyke to gay man. Both pieces are excellent; both, differently, call into question the very notion of categorical opposition in sex and sexual practice.

On the other hand, there is plenty of opposition and difference contained within the book as a whole. Robert Jensen's assessment of anonymous gay sex, anal sex, and gay porn, in "Getting It Up for Politics," as things which "serve mainly to reinforce patriarchal notions about sex" (156), is one that I find wrong-headed, reactionary, and even homophobic, but certainly provocative. Jensen explicitly echoes a call by some lesbian feminists for a "radical celibacy" (166), but this call is at odds with the many, highly varied sex-positive arguments, images, and narratives elsewhere in this collection; this juxtaposition of views allows – or even forces – a reader to think deeply about a whole range of issues. Even those who find Jensen's views disturbing might find themselves equally disturbed by the very striking piece, "Los Angeles at Night," in which Susan Stryker, who describes herself as a "male-to-female transsexual lesbian fag hag femme top" (257), describes in explicit, even bloody, but always theoretically-informed detail her erotic encounter with "a female bodied faggot who suggested economies of pleasure that existed nowhere else in sight" (257). So much for "patriarchal notions of sex."

Useful opposition is also contained within individual pieces such as "Another Place to Breathe," in which Jewelle Gomez, Amber Hollibaugh, and Gayle Rubin together discuss the relevance of gay male sexuality to their own lives and work, and the companion discussion by Roberto Bedoya, Robert Reid-Pharr and anthology co-editor Eric Rofes, "If Two Men Are Having Lesbian Sex Together...." The first-person plural voice of "In Goldilock's Footsteps," a meditation on gay "bear" culture by Elizabeth A. Kelly and Kate Kane, occasionally breaks into direct dialogue, or into third-person singular. In "Through the Looking Glass: A Folsom Street Story," Mimi McGurl and Richard Schimpf, in dialogue, narrate their attempts to allow Mimi a glimpse into all-male sexual environments; "Slips" juxtaposes a polyerotic poem by Roberto Bedoya with visual representations of gay sexuality by Monica Majoli and Kaucyila Brooke. And two first-person narratives, by Sandra Lee Golvin and by Lawrence Schimel, take on the inner conflicts of cross-gendered identifications.

Still other contributors apparently find the boundary between male and female all but insurmountable: several mention, or exhibit, what Eric Rofes writes about at length in his essay "The Ick Factor: Flesh, Fluids, and Cross-Gender Revulsion." But even in these cases, as in Rofes' essay, the implications of a refusal to cross that boundary in various senses, to dissolve or at least understand the opposition between sexes and sexual desires, remain central. Other issues, other kinds of relevant boundaries and oppositions, do get an occasional nod here: Kelly and Kane, for example, praise "bear" mazines

for allowing men to "look like they're aging, and still have their tits played with" (91), but note that these men are almost exclusively light-skinned and able-bodied, and query, "what does it mean when lawyers masquerade as automobile mechanics or assembly-line workers" (92). However, the only piece here that engages with such topics more directly or at any length is Lawrence Chua's "Recognizing the Real: Labor and the Economy of Banjee Desire;" at least this essay does it well. As with everything else here, issues that remain mostly implicit elsewhere in the volume are brought to the fore, perhaps too briefly but effectively nonetheless, keeping them visible, and thus available to the thinking reader.

Few of the pieces included here, even on their own, allow for anything less than a thinking reader. And few readers could read through the volume without finding a real challenge to their own thinking on gender and sexuality. If you, dear reader, do not think that this is a good thing, you may want to avoid this book. But you shouldn't. (GARRET EPP, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*WINIFRED WOODHULL. *Transfigurations of the Maghreb: Feminism, Decolonization, and Literatures*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. xxiv + 233 pp. US\$ 47.95, cloth, US\$ 18.95 paper.

Winifred Woodhull's *Transfigurations of the Maghreb: Feminism, Decolonization, and Literatures* sets out to challenge what she believes to be the troubling influence of apolitical poststructuralist thought upon the writings and readings of recent fiction from or about the Maghreb. She establishes her critique very clearly in the introduction in which the writing of the Moroccan writer Abdelkébir Khatibi is considered in the context of that of Jean-François Lyotard to illustrate her point that "a subversive poetics has gradually replaced work for change in the political field" (x, emphasis in original). Unfortunately, Woodhull attempts to do far too much; she sets out to analyze a number of Algerian texts, focusing on seven writers in just two chapters, the work of Leïla Sebbar as an example of "exilic" literature in another, and finally the work of five French writers whose recent fiction has been either situated in the Maghreb or within an immigrant Maghrebi community. In addition, she wants to situate all of these various writings within their specific historical and social settings. This is a tall order indeed and each chapter could have been, and in most cases should have been, a book in its own right.

Her strongest work is by far her chapter on the writings of Leïla Sebbar precisely because she devotes at least a whole chapter to her work but also because her analysis relies on very close readings of Sebbar's texts, something Woodhull does very well. Here her observations are insightful and her

conclusions convincing. Woodhull's careful and subtle reading relates the tensions at work in Sebbar's novels to issues of exile, immigration, and Sebbar's culturally hybrid condition: born of a French mother and Algerian father, Sebbar was raised in Algeria but has lived in France for over twenty years. Curiously, although Woodhull prefaces the chapter with a critical overview of recent French theorizations — in particular Kristeva's *Etrangers à nous-mêmes* (1988), as well as work produced by Baudrillard, Foucault and Deleuze in the 1980s, all of whom she accuses of turning their backs on genuine political engagement, resorting to what amounts to a reactionary "there is no more politics, there is no more representation possible" position — the relationship between that preface and her analysis of Sebbar's texts is a tenuous one. Sadly, this is a fortunate thing because her readings of these French theorists is awkward to say the least. Whatever one may think of Baudrillard's work in the 80s, reducing it to "desperate assertions that political movements have been replaced by 'panic' and 'chain reactions,' which merely express, 'his own reaction to the successes of women and minority groups in widening and deepening democratic struggles in the seventies and eighties'" (96), as Woodhull does, is a gross distortion and reduction of his work, as well as a very particular reading of recent history. Nevertheless, this third chapter on Sebbar's work remains a fine example of what insights an intelligent and thoughtful reading of a text can bring. Furthermore, Woodhull links these insights in a challenging and stimulating manner to the material conditions of immigration and the cultures of exile which they produce.

Much weaker are the two chapters she devotes to Algerian writing, specifically that of Kateb Yacine, Frantz Fanon and Malek Alloula in chapter one and Muhammed Dib, Nabile Farès, Rachid Boudjedra and Assia Djebar in chapter two. Here, not only is the material spread far too thinly but there is a peculiar lack of energy about them, which is a shame because the goal she sets for herself in these two chapters is an important one:

It is obvious that in the texts of widely read Maghrebian writers such as Abdelkébir Khatibi, Tahar Ben Jelloun, Nabile Farès, Mohammed Dib, and Assia Djebar, women's negotiation of these [national and cultural] identities in both the Maghrebian and French contexts is a crucial issue, yet critics, when they have not ignored the matter altogether, have often taken a postfeminist approach to it, analyzing "woman" as a textual marker of intractable difference without considering its relation to women's historical and material reality. Alternatively, critics have taken a feminist approach devoted mainly to studying images of women (as mothers, militants, and so on), leaving aside the problem of the text's staging of the social processes by which human subjects are constituted as women in particular cultural and historical circumstances. (1)

Whilst this is indeed true, Woodhull is unable to redress that critical imbalance. This is not only because she attempts to discuss too many writers and too

many works, but because a number of crucial terms — most notably "feminism" and "political" — lack definition.

For a book wishing to challenge "Western" feminists (amongst others) for a certain blindness with regards to the specificities of women's conditions elsewhere, Woodhull's is disturbingly quiet on what the term "feminism" then means in a context such as Algeria. When she writes, for example, that "Ever since independence, feminists [in Algeria] have deplored the cynicism of political regimes" (13), it is very hard to know of whom she speaks: does the term "feminists" refer to women organized along "Western" feminist lines calling for typically "Western feminist" demands or to women organized under a "religious" Islamic banner seeking a voice for women within that social movement, or to neither of these, but to a third, or a fourth configuration? The point here is not to dismiss the use of the term "feminist," nor to suggest that the term is inappropriate in an Algerian or Maghrebian context, nor to contest the fact that women *are* protesting, and in diverse ways, in Algeria; however, this criticism is not a nit-picky one. A central aspect of Woodhull's book is a desired correction of the distorted representation of women in contemporary Maghrebian literature, a representation which fails to acknowledge the active political role and voice women *do* have in social struggles and which too consistently presents the dominant order as a monolithic unchallengeable patriarchal block. With such a focus, the term "feminist," which is here being transported out of a North-American context where its meaning is already heavily contested, *must* be qualified for us, however loosely.

Chapter four is rather thin as, once again, Woodhull attempts too much in too little space, nevertheless, her readings and arguments are more convincing than those of her first two chapters. In chapter four, Woodhull examines "the critical staging of ravishment in French novels of the 1980s that attempt to confront colonial and postcolonial violence and establish solidarity between France and the Maghreb" (135), and she does so by considering five works of fiction by five French authors: Evelyne Sullerot, Marie Cardinal, J.M.G. Le Clézio, Michel Tournier and Guy Hocquenghem. Whilst it is obviously necessary for Woodhull to consider a number of texts if she is to convince us of her argument that contemporary French fiction reflects and perpetuates a continuing "interconnection, still potent in the French imagination, between the experience of ravishment and that of conquest by the orient" (134), such an argument merits much more than a chapter and we are rushed through the proceedings as though on a time-pressed tour.

Transfigurations of the Maghreb is a frustrating book because so much of it falls short of what the chapter on Sebbar tells us Woodhull *can* do when she sets aside righteous theorizing and works from the text out. (CHRISTOPHER GIBBINS, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)