

BOOK REVIEWS

- 242 KATRITZKY, M.A. *The Art of Commedia: A Study in the Commedia dell' Arte 1560-1620 with Special Reference to the Visual Records*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006. Pp. 625. US \$225.00 hardcover.

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M.A. Katritzky is one of the leading scholars of the iconography of *commedia dell' arte* with a slew of articles and book chapters on the subject. Katritzky's name is ubiquitous in publications on theatre iconography. Along with numerous articles, she contributed to three recent studies such as the excellent collection co-edited by her and Thomas Heck, Frank Peeters, A. William Smith and Lyckle de Vries, *Picturing Performance, The Iconography of the Performing Arts in Concept and Practice* (1999). She also contributed to a special issue in the journal *Theatre Research International* (1997) as well as to a publication by Christopher Balme, R.L. Erenstein and Cesare Molinari titled *European Theatre Iconography* (2002), based on the collaborative work of the European Science Foundation Theatre Iconography Network from 1998-2002. In *The Art of Commedia: A Study in the Commedia dell' Arte 1560-1620 with special Reference to the Visual Records* Katritzky culls from her years of research, unearths previously unacknowledged images bearing relevance to the *commedia dell' arte* and analyzes them with meticulous attention to visual detail. This is an excellent study that provides students and scholars with source material for future analysis. Not least of all, *The Art of Commedia* presents 340 plates, many of which are reproduced in a scholarly work for the first time.

Along with the presentation of previously unacknowledged iconography that has great relevance for *commedia dell' arte* studies, *The Art of Commedia* recognizes the

contribution of specific actors to the development of the art form rather than merely relating to the stock character types of commedia. In this way, *The Art of Commedia* reflects a more current approach in commedia dell'arte studies that recognizes the social and cultural world in which commedia evolved. In Katritzky's terms, traditional scholarship focuses mostly on iconographic materials depicting stock types in on-stage postures and situations. A major task of her study is to consider popular materials drawn from carnival and non-strictly performance oriented situations to learn more about the commedia dell'arte actors who are surely to be credited with the creation of the innovative art form of commedia, bolstered by support from wealthy patrons and responses from discerning plebian audiences.

Katritzky begins her study in the late 1560s with one of the most often-cited iconographic details of commedia dell'arte: a series of frescos at Castle Trausnitz in Landshut, Bavaria. She sets the record straight regarding frequent mis-identifications of the frescos in connection with a famous performance in 1568 chronicled by Massimo Troiano and credited as the earliest known description of an improvised comedy in the Italian style. She then moves on to study commedia-related images that hitherto had not been studied in the context of theatre. She introduces Flemish pictures and deciphers monograms, signatures and dates of often undated paintings in order to identify the possible connections of the images to the actors who performed in particular occasions. These identifications greatly increased the amount of materials we have for understanding the world in which the performers worked. Katritzky then turns to the interpretations of aspects of the pictures, identifying actors and also naming the locations of the subjects depicted in the images. She also summarily presents insights about scenery, costumes, props, gestures, poses and other performance-related information. Moving away from a stock-character based analysis in *The Art of Commedia* Katritzky emphasizes the emergence of the Magnifico-Zanni pair as well as the significant contribution made by women as performers and company leaders. Along with the well-known sources for commedia dell'arte iconography such as the *Recueil Fossard*, Katritzky presents fascinating new visual materials drawn from popular culture—notably previously unacknowledged game boards in which important images of commedia dell'arte are present. As Katritzky herself summarizes the aim of the book, it is the “first large-scale” organized attempt to fully collect all iconographic materials with respect to the commedia dell'arte in the 1560-1620 period. The fact that she provides the actual images within the array of plates that are reproduced insure that the analysis is easily comprehended by the reader for whom references to visual sources are provided. **243**

RUSO, ELENA. *Styles of Enlightenment: Taste, Politics, and Authorship in Eighteenth-Century France*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2007. Pp.346. US \$55.00 hardcover.

Graham Gargett, University of Ulster

244 Russo begins this wide-ranging and ambitious study with a striking contrast: on the one hand the *philosophes*, serious, earnest, enamoured of classical models and republican ideals, and their antitheses, the *beaux-esprits*, who—she claims—personified the transitory, the flippant, the playful and—by extension—symbolised the court and the decadence of the late *ancien régime* and its absolute monarchy. As Russo puts it, the *philosophes* had to fight not only against repressive authorities: they had “another kind of enemy, one that was more insidious, more difficult to pin down, and no less formidable for being less heavily armed [...] That vexing double of the philosophe was the *bel esprit*” (1). For Russo—and this is the theme underpinning the entire volume—the dichotomy just described was a continuation of the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century *querelle des anciens et des modernes*, the *modernes* being those writers who were ultimately classified dismissively as *beaux-esprits*, whereas—paradoxically—the *anciens* were those, like the *philosophes* and their ilk, who believed in progress but took their inspiration from the great writers of Greece and Rome. This notion is explored with great ingenuity, knowledge and persistence.

The values represented by the *modernes* were stigmatised as *le petit goût* or *le goût moderne*, in contrast to *le grand goût* beloved of the ultimately victorious *anciens*. Inevitably, some figures receive more attention than others. Several chapters (1, 2, and 4) are largely devoted to Marivaux and elsewhere he is never far away; indeed, in many respects this book could be regarded as (or even entitled) a rehabilitation of this much-criticised and undervalued writer, the archetypal *bel-esprit* for his eighteenth-century critics. The space devoted to him by Russo amply repays careful reading. She reveals with great clarity his constant struggle to illustrate to his reader the writer’s dilemma: how to pin down and express the infinitely changing and illusory nature of human feelings and emotions. Hence the neologisms and *marivaudage* so despised by many of Marivaux’s contemporaries, his refusal to be tied down by genre and *bienséance*, his rejection of the idea that direct mimesis is ever feasible or even desirable. For Marivaux, an author’s thought and his style are inseparable, and his own style is often awkward and hesitant because of the infinitely subtle and transitory nature of human motives, feelings and emotions, which conventional language was incapable of describing (102). Moreover, he was all too aware of the ambiguous relationship between author and reader, literature and reality. For Russo, “The core of Marivaux’s *oeuvre* and of the seduction of his poetics lies in the disjunction between the surrender to the lure of the fictional world and an attitude of distrust toward all manifestations of inauthenticity and fictionality. Well before Rousseau, Marivaux was the writer who devoted the most attention to analyzing the contamination of

reality by fiction” (113). Marivaux was fascinated by the complex and ultimately impossible task of anyone ever portraying their motives and actions in a completely honest way. We are always playing a part: “Like Marianne, all his characters are pursued by the threat of inauthenticity,” observes Russo (116), citing as one example *Le Paysan parvenu* and the discrepancy between Habert’s low sexual desire and the religious language in which she justifies it (117). Marivaux is fascinated by the figure of the *coquette*, “always eagerly trying to grab a reflection of her image in the eyes of others in order to buttress her fragile hold on herself and on her own experience, using that image as a bulwark against the threat of nonbeing” (119) (one is inevitably reminded of Sartre and *L’être et le néant*). In several illuminating pages, Russo discusses a famous passage in Marivaux’s *Spectateur français*, where “an old woman, once a coquette, recalls her dealings with a married man,” reaching the conclusion that even “while she believed that she was discouraging his attentions [...] she was confusedly aware that subtle signs in her behavior were sending him the opposite message and drawing him closer to her” (121). These ambiguities and the absence, in written language, of those many involuntary signs betraying fluster, hesitation, second thoughts, especially as regards burgeoning passion and sexual attraction, inevitably lead one to Marivaux and the theatre, a medium where the physical presence of actors can—at least to some extent—fill the gap between author and audience. As Russo puts it, “Marivaux’s prose writing—in the novels and in the journals—is unable to resolve the paradox of self-consciousness. Spontaneity cannot be *said* nor willed. It can only *happen* in the language of drama” (128). 245

The ambiguity and inadequacy of traditional literary language also explains Marivaux’s use, at least in the earlier stage of his career, of the parody, so beloved of those who attended the fairground theatres and the *marionettes*. Indeed, Russo argues that “A symbiotic relationship developed between the cultural categories of classicism, with its rationalization of forms and its cult of antiquity, and the subversions and parodies of the *goût moderne*” (252). She paints a fascinating picture of the interplay between the officially sanctioned Théâtre Français and its “lower” rivals, illustrating how audiences frequented both, how they loved the satirical demolitions of high art which multiplied throughout the eighteenth century. She argues powerfully for the influence of the *parterre*, showing how the theatre-going audiences (including lower-class elements) exercised a real political influence, even after the authorities tried to reduce outbreaks of disorder by stationing policemen in the theatres.

Styles of Enlightenment teams with thought-provoking passages: sections devoted to the way the term *esprit* developed (and its connection with *acumen*, *ingenium* and *conchetto*), and to its various rhetorical features: *éclats* (the ancients and their philosophic heirs did not want the dazzle of unconnected points of light but an even, rational glow: cf. 150-51); the *je ne sais quoi*, that “elusive and secret connection (*noeud secret*) that united grace and beauty, much like divine grace united body and spirit, mind and form” (156); *délicatesse* and *finesse* (164-65); the *saillie* (180-81), a

term which from positive became negative (see the 1694 and 1798 editions of the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie*). Generally, the neo-classical *anciens* (including the *philosophes* and their allies) stigmatised these sophisticated and brilliant stylistic practices, but Montesquieu is revealed as managing to chart his own, original course: “going against the grain of the neoclassical spirit, he never refrained from experiment with stylistic boundaries” (181). Standing against Marivaux in Russo’s study above all is Diderot. Unlike Marivaux, who was only too aware of the ambiguity of language and the nature of art, Diderot saw art as “the product of an intuitive knowledge that is akin to the scientific understanding of nature’s laws” (105). For him, art had degenerated into mannerism, a situation which occurs in a society after perfection of technique has been achieved (in French literature this had been Racine). Indeed, too much refinement is a clear sign of decadence: “A nation is old when it has acquired taste” (Diderot qtd. in Russo 107). And Diderot provides the link between the *bel-esprit*, literature and pre-revolutionary fervour in pictorial art. Just as the *philosophes* were inspired by the simple, virtuous, male, republican values of Antiquity and reacted against the effeminacy, decadence and (by implication) pro-absolutist taste of the *beaux-esprits* and their fellow-travellers, so artists like the evidently simple, male, republican David would oust the representatives of that most decadent of all tastes, the rococo. Once again following Diderot’s *salons*, Russo sums it up as follows: “As things stand in modern times, a civilized nation, much like an aging libertine in need of increasingly potent stimulation, has developed a taste for provocatively offered, alluring flesh, such as that provided by the paintings of Boucher, Lagrenée, Baudouin, and Fragonard” (107).

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There is even more in this erudite and wide-ranging volume. Chapter 3 suggests a parallel between Fénelon and Diderot, both believers in different ways in the possibility of direct mimesis. Chapter 6, “Montesquieu for the Masses, or Implanting False Memory,” explores the extraordinary way in which Montesquieu came to be viewed in some quarters towards the end of the *ancien régime*, judging by popular reaction to an apocryphal act of generosity supposedly made by him during a visit to Marseille; in particular Russo analyses a *drame* by one Joseph Pihles (*Le Bienfait anonyme*) and Mercier’s play *Montesquieu à Marseille*. But the overall thesis—if not simple—is clear. It suggests that the major changes that led up to the French Revolution were ultimately inspired by a literary quarrel and its fallout (cf. 25: from Corneille to Montesquieu, Rousseau and Mably, to David!). The *philosophes* reacted against and—by the 1730s—had largely defeated the *beaux-esprits (modernes)* represented above all by Fontenelle, Crébillon and Marivaux. In his *Considérations sur...les Romains* (1734), Montesquieu strove to define “the role and the significance of ‘antiquity’ for the moderns” and to make clear “the kernel of that elusive, fascinating, and notoriously controversial ideal that was very much alive in the Enlightenment, in the ongoing quarrel between the ancients and the moderns” (175). The cult of the great man, an offshoot of the *querelle* and the associated celebration of classical republican ideals inspired the *parlementaires* and their rhetoric (cf. 25). And the battle against

the neglect of simplicity and austerity inspired by republican antiquity went on; in the last decades of the *ancien régime* it flourished above all in the domain of painting and architecture. The rococo style of painting and architecture, a new manifestation of the effeminate, monarchical hydra of *bel-esprit*, drew down on itself further attacks, by Diderot, Rousseau, Mercier, and many others. Ultimately, the Revolution took their theories even further.

The merits of such an overarching and widely-drawn thesis are obvious. Above all, it makes one reflect hard, revisit *lieux communs*, rethink what one thought one knew. Yet, for all its excellent qualities, this book's thesis is just a little too wide for me. First of all, the necessary generalisations are not always framed precisely enough. In the first place, who were the *philosophes*? No definition is ever given at any stage, and the reader is reduced to guess-work based on the various figures who are mentioned from time to time. On page 6, we have Diderot, Marmontel, Duclos and d'Alembert. On page 29, we are told that Voltaire, Diderot, Grimm, Rousseau, Thomas, Marmontel, Mercier "distanced themselves from the spirit of modernity that had radiated in the early Enlightenment". But, despite this statement, there is nothing about a vital clash between different generations of *philosophes*, that which set the theist Voltaire against the atheist d'Holbach, Diderot and other late Enlightenment thinkers (including the prudent Buffon). And was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, often quoted by Russo to back up her statements about the *philosophes* (9, 10, 17, 19, 25, 43, etc.) really a philosophe at all except, perhaps, at the beginning of his career? If he was, he had a funny way of showing it after he fell out with the rest of the clan in the mid 1750s and lambasted them for the rest of his life. And can such a constant and coherent line really be traced from Bossuet to Voltaire, Diderot, and Mercier through to the Revolution, especially when Russo demonstrates so convincingly that the rebellious theatre audiences of the *ancien régime* delighted in parody and in precisely those values that the *philosophes* (portrayed by her as neo-classical purists) condemned and eschewed? Admittedly, she insists that Diderot and other wished to form and improve the taste of the people, but there still seems something missing here and one feels that the argument lacks a vital chain. Above all, one wonders, what exactly did this have to do with the overthrow of the *ancien régime*? One might surely have expected at least some discussion of Robert Darnton's controversial thesis that discontented writers played an important part in preparing public opinion and in somehow catalysing events (Darnton is referred to briefly on page 3, but no more is heard of him, even on page 63, especially note 20, when Russo is discussing precisely this point). Yet, it would seem, Russo's late philosophic writers are annoyed not so much by political injustice or intrigue, or by lack of opportunity and restrictive state patronage, as by questions of taste. To be fair, no one could deny that there was an obvious rejection, in the time leading up to the Revolution and during the Revolutionary epoch, of the taste which had characterised the reign of Louis XV. But was this connected by a secret chain to the *querelle des anciens et des modernes*?

One's confidence in every aspect of Russo's analysis is undermined a little more by some errors. She is certainly wrong, for example, about the abbé Trublet, whom she accuses of fabricating a portrait of Marivaux based not on his actual character but on those aspects of behaviour that he had criticised in others. She portrays Trublet as an acolyte of Voltaire (who detested Marivaux), implying that he was acting as a type of surrogate (51). This is quite inaccurate. The worst that can be said about Trublet is that he was a second-class and rather a boring writer. Above all, he was an inveterate gossip, in correspondence with most of the leading literary figures of his time. After foolishly criticising Voltaire's *Henriade* and—worse still—joining the editorial team of the anti-*philosophe* *Journal chrétien*, he temporarily became one of Voltaire's *bêtes noires*, lambasted in several satires. In 1761 there was indeed a reconciliation. However, far from being an enemy of the *modernes*, Trublet was the greatest living admirer of Fontenelle, after Marivaux the most prominent of the beaux-esprits, so much so that his memoirs of Fontenelle are still regarded as a trustworthy source.

248 Why should Trublet attack Marivaux and fabricate a portrait of him? Is it not conceivable that Marivaux, like many people, fell into the trap of behaving in ways that he disapproved of in others? Do as I say not do as I do? One also wonders why Russo constantly refers to the first Besterman edition of Voltaire's correspondence (1953-1965) when all Voltaire scholars use the second, "definitive" edition (1968-1977), though this is a rare lapse in her generally impeccable scholarship.

To be fair, Russo herself points out that reality was more complex than any single thesis can represent, since she concedes that "the boundaries were not clearly drawn between the two factions of moderns; there was much intermingling, trespassing, misunderstanding, and being at cross-purposes. The Enlightenment, far from being a coherent and unified doctrine, was the result of such tensions and strains" (260). She admits that Voltaire (not a favourite of hers, one feels) was inconsistent, committing sins and practising *genres* that he had condemned. There were two Diderots also, not just the high-minded, arguably rather sermonising and prescriptive Diderot of the *Salons* but also the chaotic, undisciplined, protean Diderot of *Le Neveu de Rameau* and *Jacques le fataliste*. So, in the last analysis, one wonders, does Russo's thesis stand up? I am rather sceptical, but others must make up their own minds. What is certain is that Elena Russo has produced a fascinating, challenging and erudite study. This is not to say that *Styles of Enlightenment* is beyond criticism. Indeed, as we have seen, Russo's very ambition and the breadth of her scope tend to raise many questions. But they are good questions and any *dix-huitiémiste* who reads this book will be enriched by its contents and impressed by the breadth of Russo's knowledge and the originality of her perspective.

KIMBALL, JEAN. *Joyce and the Early Freudians: A Synchronic Dialogue of Texts*. Gainesville: UP of Florida, 2003. Pp. 240. US \$59.95 hardcover.

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Jean Kimball has become a specialist in arguing for the transaction between Joyce and psychoanalytic ideas, challenging those (including Joyce himself) who have downplayed their role in his creative output. Her latest study is considerably more than just a “prequel” to her 1997 *Odyssey of the Psyche: Jungian Patterns in Joyce’s “Ulysses,”* which hypothesised consonances between the lives and writings of Joyce and Freud’s erstwhile collaborator and bitter rival after 1915. Her *Joyce and the Early Freudians: A Synchronic Dialogue of Texts* is based on painstaking archival research and close reading. Its critical mass establishes a convincing “parallel development” between Joyce and the psychoanalytic movement. Kimball focuses on both Joyce’s known and likely encounters with psychoanalytic texts were available to him before *Ulysses* was published in 1922 and their impact on his intellectual and stylistic development. As such, Kimball redresses the surprising dearth of work tracing psychoanalytic influence in Joyce back to specific sources. 249

Kimball’s project is emphatically not an orthodox psychoanalytic reading of *Ulysses*, nor the presumed imprint of Joyce’s own psyche on it. Neither is it an attempt to prove *Ulysses’* representation of its characters’ subjectivity was prescribed by those few psychoanalytic texts to which Joyce was unquestionably exposed. However, Kimball details many intriguing parallels between their theories and Joyce’s own subjects and techniques, as they “grew up together” within the parameters of the same historical moment. She stresses that anticipation of, and receptivity to, the emerging notion of a human unconscious (whether regarded as psychically inherent or socially produced) was rife in late nineteenth-century culture before Freud’s became the principal discursive model. Modern fiction’s own stylistic transition between psychological naturalism and symbolism is symptomatic of this. In Joyce’s case, as Kimball points out, reflective awareness of hidden psychic workings can be traced back to his juvenile notion of “epiphany” as (self)revelation. Joyce kept notebooks recording diverse manifestations of what Freud would call “parapraxis,” where repressed thoughts and symptoms show through everyday language and actions. Thus though Joyce bought *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* long after its publication in 1905, this confirms not so much belatedness, as his precocious literary deployment of many of the mundane slips and omissions Freud categorises. Similarly, *Dubliners’* final story, “The Dead” (1908), was composed virtually a decade before Freud’s paper on the death drive. Evidence for both Joyce’s insights and those of early psychoanalysis (when clinically unobtainable) was coincidentally rooted in readings and, effectively, rewritings of classic cultural texts. *Ulysses’* key intertextuality with the plot and themes of Homer’s *Odyssey* is matched by Freudianism’s with Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*, from Freud’s cryptic footnote in *Traumdeutung* (1900) onwards.

What Kimball encapsulates of Freud's typology—that the plot of *Oedipus* became the model “for the course of a psychoanalysis, in which a current crisis leads backwards to its cause in the past, and the gradual unfolding of that past becomes the plot of the drama” (179)—undeniably overlaps with *Ulysses*' representation of the interiority of its characters and its complex interplay between narrative present and psychic histories. However, Kimball doesn't commit the error of proposing psychoanalysis as *the* Ariadne's thread through *Ulysses*' labyrinth. She sees it as one among the many dialogic layerings making up Joyce's intertextual collage. She shows Joyce (even if we accept her “maximal” hypothesis about his exposure to its early texts) by no means in thrall to it, rather as selecting ideas, situations and motifs which served to “buttress” and extend aspects of his own evolving project, stylistically and psychically. Early psychonanalysis was itself a disseminal, many-branched and evolving discourse, as yet uncodified into dogma. This helps explain the apparent contradiction that we can trace its fermentation in Joyce's creative processes, while at the same time accounting for his post-Ulyssean disavowals of its influence (in both public statements and numerous gibes in *Finnegans Wake* conflating it as “Jungfraud”). In this sense, Joyce's becomes not so much a case of “denial” (one of psychoanalysis's “no win” catches he was rightly suspicious of), as refusal to capitulate to hermeneutic orthodoxies and foreclose free play of meaning in what is Modernism's least exhaustible work.

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Both of Joyce's bases of exile in the period—Trieste (with its intellectual links with Vienna) and Zürich (Jung trained at its Burghölzi public psychiatric ward)—were centres of psychoanalytic discussion. Kimball's case opens with the three psychoanalytic texts Joyce obtained in Trieste. Freud's own “psychobiography,” *Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci* (1910), she argues, “buttressed” Joyce's insight into the origins and dynamics of creative genius. Freud's analysis of da Vinci's infant memories and repressions has much in common with the famous “overture” to *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1914-15). The parallelisms are very specific—not least the traumatic and recurrent bird imagery. This overture, Kimball contests, remained the symbolic template for Stephen's agon (both sexual and artistic), centred on the demands of the mother/land in his interior monologues in *Ulysses*. (The displacements and guises of the loving/terrible mother which haunt Stephen's memory, put his life on hold and paralyse his gift were further shaped by Joyce's encounter with Jung's *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* (1912) in Zürich.) From da Vinci's complex duality, as artist and scientist investigator, Kimball also extrapolates *Ulysses*' psychic and epistemological complementarity between Stephen and Bloom. Conflict with the patriarch (personal and ideological) is pre-inscribed in *A Portrait*, but Kimball considers the wider theme of biological and cultural paternity in its mature form in *Ulysses* through the lens of Jung's essay on the significance of the father(-figure) in the course of an individual's life (*Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen* (1909). (What Joyce took from Jung, on this score, may have eventually led him to Otto Rank's *The Artist and the Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (1915).)

The German translation of Ernest Jones's essay "Hamlet and Oedipus" (*Das Problem des Hamlet und des Ödipus-Komplex* (1911)) is almost certainly a crucial intertext with Stephen's lecture on the play in "Scylla and Charybdis" (we can only speculate about the part it played in Joyce's own lost lecture series on *Hamlet* at Trieste's Università Popolare). Understandably, Kimball focuses on this chapter most of all, taking her cue from Stephen's reference to 'the new Viennese school' and its views on incest. In her account, Joyce deliberately makes his character speak anachronistically (in 1904, when *Ulysses* is set, Freud's coterie could hardly be considered 'a school'), using a kind of dual timeframe to invite consideration of the significance of his own further reading. Thus Stephen's interpretation of *Hamlet* as a product of the playwright's own family-fixated psychodrama appears to mix in "proleptic" allusions to Rank's *Inzest Motif in Dichtung and Sage* (1912). Similarly, Rank's 1915 essay on the play-within-the-play—especially its scenario that Hamlet's meta-theatrical interlude simultaneously acts out and censors his own parricidal "primal fantasy"—may also be an intertext, highlighting the equivocal relationship between the tragedy and the novel which restages it at yet another remove. 251

Kimball then gives a tantalising overview of the cornucopia of psychoanalytic texts available at Zürich's Zentralbibliothek (often admittedly only in journal form at the time) after Joyce moved there in 1915, suggesting wider thematic patterns and verbal echoes. She cites Joyce's concept of "chords," i.e. scattered references which can be concatenated into significant threads, as part of her system of demonstration. The bizarre crabs, dragons and hyena-women in H.Bertschinger's 1911 case study, "Illustrated Hallucinations," may have suggested particular motifs and associations for "Circe's" metamorphic bestiary. Kimball also examines hitherto untranslated journal articles particularly relevant to the Blooms' emotionally close though sexually dysfunctional marriage. Those relating to perversions suggest varying degrees of psychoanalytic underpinning for the implications of Bloom's sexual preferences in particular (e.g., Karl Abraham's 1912 case study of foot and lingerie fetishism, or Isidore Sadger's *Über Gesässerotik* (1913)). Similarly, Molly's ambivalent adultery could be partly motivated by Rank's 1913 interpretation of the iconoclastic story of the Widow of Ephesus (alluded to in "Oxen of the Sun"). This casts her as an ironic Penelope, but also accounts for the persistent connection between hanging and sexual im/potency in *Ulysses*.

Kimball takes great care to show how Joyce's characteristically hybrid method often meshes psychoanalytic allusions with classical or popular references to add interpretative multivalence. She demonstrates that, although psychoanalysis cannot be considered any totalizing master code (as hubristically claimed by some Freudians in the past), in common with other major currents of thought in Joyce's time, it was important grist to his voracious mill.

However, there remains a potentially unanswered question in Kimball's title, which could read as a misnomer. Dialogue, even in the special sense in which Bahktin employed it, on which Kimball justifies her approach, implies *two way* exchange.

Such a title would seem to demand some discussion of the possible influence of Joycean discourse on emergent psychoanalysis, as well as (less controversially) what Joyce creatively digested from these early texts into his own? Bakhtin's dialogics also include the suggestion of active, dynamic and ongoing engagement between discourses with competitive claims to authority and existential truth. So, again, this implies that Joyce's fiction might have dissented from or "written back" to Freudian theories. Small wonder Joyce was irked by attempts to foist psychoanalytic allegiance on him, when some professional readings of his fictions appropriated their subtexts as confirmation of the universal validity of a model of the unconscious (in an unreflective way), or as unmediated expressions of the author's own symptoms (climaxing in Jung's notorious conclusion *Finnegans Wake* was "schizophrenic").

252 Kimball concludes that Joyce drawing "on his own hidden life as well as the subterranean layer of the lives examined by the early psychoanalysts...produced in Bloom one of the great figures of world literature". Paradoxically, he did more "in his dual portrait of the artist, to transfuse Freud's new perspective into the mainstream of Western literature than many a declared disciple" (189). But Joyce was, arguably, not so easily Freudened. What remains beyond the scope of Kimball's compelling but lopsided case is the question of whether his texts may not only have transmitted, but also critiqued some the premises and procedures on which that new perspective rested. If we can use the Freudians to "dialogically" re-interpret Joyce, may we not also reverse the conversation?

MARVICK, LOUIS. *Waking the Face that No One Is: A Study in the Musical Context of Symbolist Poetics*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. Pp. 154. US \$51.00 paperback.

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This volume shares in the best traits of recent works on Literature and Music, and it also shares the worst. The former outweighs the latter, and Marvick's exegesis of Symbolist works is exciting, but there are frustrations for the reader hoping for a detailed examination of musical thought as it relates to literary studies.

Insofar as Marvick develops nuanced readings and traces interactions between literature and music, his book succeeds. He contributes to a growing body of works, most notably by Linda Hutcheon, Brad Bucknell, and Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dolar. These works are Marvick's contemporaries, and in comparison, he is convincing and clear. The greatest difficulty in *Waking the Face That No One Is* is shared among these works as well—slippage in terminology between musical, literary, and popular discourse. This is not surprising given the difficulty of reading literary criticism as a literary scholar while reading musical theory as a musician. There are endless

revisions of common terms and new jargon to facilitate scholarship. Such cross-disciplinary criticism's challenge is defining terms that mean different things in different discourses.

Marvick retraces the Symbolists' references to musical matters, such as Mallarmé's thoughts on Wagner, and he does this well. He also succinctly outlines the tensions surrounding musical meaning: *how* music may "mean" and how this influenced Symbolist poetics. In section 2.3 (the book is usefully divided into sections not chapters), Marvick states:

the broadest designations of emotional states are roughly apposite to the music, so far as they go—that a given piece or passage is "sad" or "joyous," for example—but they recognize that such labels are inadequate to convey the specific emotional texture of a complicated score. (46)

Basically, music and texts mean in different ways, such as designating an emotion. For Marvick, this relates to point of view, such that "if the music is said to 'depict' a brook, for example, the observant student finds it impossible (and important) to say whether the brook is depicted from upstream or down" (46). These are mainstays of discussions of the "language" of music or musical "meaning". While his discussion of these issues are overly compressed, Marvick demonstrates how these concerns informed such works as Villiers de l'Isle-Adam's *Axël* and Maeterlinck's *Pelléas et Mélisande* (61).

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The difficulty is the slippage between the disciplines, and at points it is challenging to determine if Marvick was unsure of the distinctions or simplified matters for his audience, presumably literary scholars neither familiar with nor interested in the intricacies of musical theory. I assume the latter, especially since Marvick's attention to musical details suggests familiarity.

For instance, for Ghil, Marvick notes that musical timbre, the unique sound of an instrument, is comprised of "harmony measured in tiny gradations." His footnote clarifies this: "Tout instrument de musique a ses harmoniques propres: d'où son timbre"... 'Every instrument has its own harmonics, whence its timbre'" (91). Since harmony and harmonics are elided (Ghil's error), confusion arises. This occurs again when homophony (in contrast to contrapuntal polyphony) is defined as melody without harmony, which makes sense etymologically but *not* within musical theory. Polyphony is multiple musical voices sounding at the same time, but each with a distinct melody. Homophony, however, is not the absence of harmony, but rather the absence of the independence of the other voices, which are subsumed under the single melody (think of a singing voice over a strummed guitar versus a six voice choir singing a canon). Again, the distinction is small for literary scholars, but the implications for Marvick's argument are significant. The distinctions between terms used in both fields require greater clarity.

Similar difficulties arise in the discussion of melody in its analogy to sequence and determinate referents in Maeterlinck's drama. To suggest that melody has a sequence,

an order, seems reasonable, yet harmonic progressions, through rising tension and resolution, also demonstrate sequence. This leads directly into further slippage of terms, such that the recited textual materials in Maeterlinck are not “subordinate to some melody” even though they are performed with harmony. Moreover, the reader is told “like a musical instrument with only one string, it [the ‘glose musicale’] limits the scope for melodic invention... and consecutiveness” (70). This does not work. A musical instrument with one string functions very much like a flute, oboe, or human voice—its melodic scope of possibility is extensive. For a string instrument, such as a violin or cello, one string would, in reality, only limit *harmony*. To make this matter messier, in musical discourse, “invention” carries further meanings specific to structure and form related to polyphony.

254 When Marvick discusses synaesthesia, he finds firmer ground. Synaesthetics relate pitch to colour: the frequency of the sound wave relates to the light wave associated with a particular colour. Synaesthetics typically “see” sound, though other combinations of senses are possible. This leads Marvick, however, to some other common misconceptions, again perhaps in order to simplify matters. For instance, the discussion of perfect pitch, or the ability to recognize a specific pitch just as most of the population can recognize a colour, is blurred with synaesthesia. In fact, not all those with perfect pitch associate sounds with colours. Likewise, the discussion of pitch assumes that pitch does not and has not changed over time (ie: A = 440 Hz), which is also false. Most of those with “perfect pitch” can recognize a given pitch based on its frequency, but to say that this is universally associated with absolute pitches does not make sense. ‘A’ has varied over time: A = 415 Hz or even A = 398 Hz were common. If my colour wheel could turn against a backdrop of colour names, moving this wheel slightly over time does not change the colours themselves, only the assigned titles. Our “pitch wheel” has turned.

This problem continues with ‘tempered’ tuning, which leads Marvick back to musical meaning. A ‘tempered’ tuning is one in which harmonic intervals are all ever so slightly ‘out of tune’ in order to allow a keyboard to be in tune with itself in any key—hence, Bach’s *Well-Tempered Klavier*. Yet, if pitch and harmony are both no longer fixed (the absolute or relational value of notes are subject to change), then musical meaning is impossible in the terms Marvick gives. The real problem, however, is that pitch has never been absolute. For the reader, this simply means Symbolists used false analogies, which does not diminish the literary work nor Marvick’s reading, but the unformed reader needs to know this.

This general problem is not nearly so dire as I present it, and Marvick’s work succeeds when he turns these confused notions to his readings of the Symbolists. For synaesthetics, associating colour with pitch is sensible, while it is metaphoric for nearly all of the population. This disjunctions between genuine parallels, metaphors, and allegories plagues discussions of literature and music. Marvick’s work is largely of the metaphorical variety, and on this level he succeeds. In literature one does not read “polyphonically,” or at least I do not, and learning to do so is one of the great

challenges in music. That Marvick is a musician seems clear from the text, so I can only account for these slippages based on his sense of his audience. However, if a non-musician reads this monograph to understand the relationship between music and literature, rather than analogies drawn from music for literary purposes, the absence of clearly defined terms will create much confusion. Since the non-musician would seem a very likely audience, this trouble persists.

MEYEROWITZ, JOANNE. *How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002. Pp. 363, index, illustrations. US \$29.95.

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As the new millennium begins, it is a commonplace that sex, gender, and sexuality are, if not complete social constructions, then at least heavily influenced by the cultural context in which these concepts are deployed and acquire meaning. A century ago, a man was a man and a woman was a woman, and biology allowed no category confusion between the two; the rare hermaphrodite was a physical freak, the exception that proved the natural law. This uncomplicated binary opposition of male/female has evolved and splintered into different ideas significantly over time, and what used to be simple is now much more complex; biology has been complicated by its conjunction with social and cultural norms, with roles and behavior, and with feelings and notions of identity. This wonderful volume explores these changes through a focus on the role that transsexuals and transsexuality played in the transformation of notions of what is currently glossed as sex, gender, and sexuality. Joanne Meyerowitz has written a detailed, deeply researched, and very perceptive history of transsexuality in the United States and in doing so has illuminated an area of continuing change and contestation.

The first significant shift in the meaning of sex came early in this century, especially in continental Europe, when the opposing categories female/male began to be replaced with a continuum of bisexuality. Rather than being one or the other, each person had differing amounts of each, and hormonal and anatomical evidence confirmed it; thus, "masculine" women had more of the "male" than ordinary women, and "feminine" men more of the "female." Biology remained the defining parameter, but all individuals existed somewhere on the continuum.

Meyerowitz appropriately evokes Christine Jorgensen as the central figure in the debates about this continuum, for it was she who returned to the United States from Denmark in 1953 claiming no longer to be a man but now to be a woman following sex reassignment surgery and hormonal treatments. In the media storm that followed her announcement the previous year, a variety of questions swirled around her

and the issues her assertions raised, including these three central ones: just what is a “man”, a “woman?” what is—or more significantly *are*—the defining criteria? and just as importantly, who has the authority to identify and evaluate these standards? Definitions were contested within the medical community, between the medical establishment and transsexuals and their allies, within the legal system, and in the pages of both the mainstream and more marginal press.

256 The issues were far from simple ones. Even before notions such as “gender” (social construction) and “sexual identity” (internal sense of self) were brought forward to complicate things, just deciding which *biological* criteria determined sex was disputed. What had appeared to be a unitary and relatively obvious phenomenon (sex) now seemed to have fractured into several different components that, although related, could vary partially independently from one another. Which of these, or combinations thereof, were the decisive, determining factors: chromosomes, hormones, gonads, genitals, reproductive organs and capacities, and/or secondary sexual characteristics? If a person had the genitals of a woman, the secondary sexual characteristics of a woman, and the endocrine balance of a woman, was he/she a woman? Furthermore, some of these criteria were subject to purposeful change and manipulation: could “sex” be mutable? Was it possible to *change* sex during a lifetime? Even for those resolutely focused on a biological basis for the assignment of sex, the problem of definition was multifaceted. Advocates for sexual reassignment surgery as well as those who opposed it found substantiation for their positions in biology.

Earlier researchers had occasionally called on the concept of “psychological sex” to refer to non-biological aspects of sex and its associated behaviors and feelings. Some began to differentiate biological sex from sex roles and expected conduct, things that were learned in a social or environmental context. These learned things were the precursors of gender, a concept first used definitively by John Money and his colleagues Joan Hampson and John Hampson at Johns Hopkins University in the 1950s. They wrote articles on the topic of intersexuality and in the process “introduced the new vocabulary of gender” (114). Using learning theory rather than biology or psychoanalysis, the other prevalent theories in the field at the time, they argued that “...the sense of being a man or a woman resulted not from hormones, gonads, chromosomes, or other physical variables...but from the sex to which the infant was assigned and in which the child was subsequently reared. After early childhood, when the sense of sex was established, any attempt to change it resulted in psychological harm” (114).

Thus was gender born, and once non-biological aspects of sex were introduced into the problem of sex assignment, the difficulties of definition worsened. Not only was biology involved but also what was *learned* and what was *felt* were also relevant. Transsexuality was the arena in which many of these issues and disputes were debated and contested. If Christine Jorgensen looked like a woman, had the genitalia, hormonal composition, and secondary sexual characteristics of a woman, acted like a woman, and felt like a woman, wasn't she a woman? And who was to say she wasn't?

Meyerowitz carefully and vividly details the history of transsexuality in the United States and the role it had in helping to sort out these issues.

Two aspects of Meyerowitz' analysis deserve special mention. The first is the way in which she incorporates multiple perspectives and gives voice to the variety of participants in the debate over what constitutes sex. Transsexuals themselves, not just the celebrities like Christine Jorgensen, are active agents in the debate, and their voices are heard clearly in this text. The doctors who treated them are heard, but so also is the medical establishment, which at first strongly opposed surgical and medical treatment and advocated psychological or psychoanalytic "cures" for the illness of transsexuality. Legal institutions and courts are included, both the liberal judges who acquiesced when an individual petitioned to change his/her sex on a birth certificate, but also the conservative jurists who refused such requests. The role of the media is clearly described by Meyerowitz, and the force of public opinion is outlined as well. The heart of the text is the analysis of the ways in which these various voices and forces negotiate their positions synergistically in relation to one another.

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The second outstanding aspect of this volume is the way in which Meyerowitz places the debate within the social and cultural history of the United States. It is clear that 20th century liberal individualism bolstered the claims of the transsexuals that they had the right to change sex. The assertion fit in with cultural trends that emphasized the individual and the possibility of changing the self: self-fulfillment, self-determination, self-expression, and self-transformation. Faith that science, including medical science, could solve a whole host of personal and social problems intensified during this period, and the belief that if science could accomplish something, it was clearly a form of "progress" surely applied here. Meyerowitz is particularly careful to delineate the fascinating ways in which the relationships transsexuals had with other groups and social movements especially during the 1960s and 1970s were ambivalent, complex, and delicate. For example, some male-to-female transsexuals subscribed to narrow 1950s gender roles for women and came into direct conflict with the women's movement, while others easily adopted feminist positions. Some feminists applauded the male-to-female transsexuals' agency and demands for self-fulfillment while others saw them as just another example of "masculine invasiveness" (260). On the whole, gays and lesbians may have been more sympathetic, but even here there was suspicion and conflict. Some, for example, saw transsexuals as simply avoiding their own homosexuality: if a man wants to have sex with a man, why does he need to change into a woman to do it?

Meyerowitz' history of transsexuals in the United States is a fascinating volume of social and cultural history that illuminates contested debates that continue into the 21st century. It is a rare treat in intellectual and academic volumes today: it is substantive, informative, and analytically incisive, but it is also wonderfully written and a pleasure to read. It should find a wide and deep audience.

BERTACCO, SIMONA. *Out of Place: The Writings of Robert Kroetsch*. Bern: Peter Lang, 2002. Pp. 280. US \$41.95 paperback.

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258 To try and (re)locate one of Canada's most critically acclaimed and most influential writers is anything but an easy task—especially in light of the fact that at least five monographs and numerous critical essays on Robert Kroetsch (1927) have already appeared. As part of the essayistic approaches, two proceedings have been issued, both based on conferences dedicated entirely to his works: *Kroetsch at Niederbronn*, a special issue of *Open Letter* 9th ser. 5-6 (Spring-Summer 1996) edited by Frank Davey and originating in the first-ever symposium held for a living Canadian writer outside of Canada near Strasbourg, France; and *A Likely Story: The Writing of Robert Kroetsch*, a special issue of *New Quarterly: New Directions in Canadian Writing* 18:1 (Spring 1998), edited by Charlene Diehl-Jones and based on a celebration of Kroetsch's seventieth birthday at St. Jesus College, Waterloo, ON. The previous monographs appeared over a period of fifteen years: Both Peter Thomas and Robert Lecker titled their substantial studies *Robert Kroetsch* (published in 1980 and 1986 respectively), while Ann Munton opted for *Robert Kroetsch and His Works* (1992); Susan Rudy Dorscht called her feminist analysis *Women, Reading, Kroetsch: Telling the Difference* (1991), while Diane Tiefensee also made her title, *The Old Dualities: Deconstructing Robert Kroetsch and His Critics* (1994), reveal the essence of her approach. Italian teacher and critic Simona Bertacco is the first to access the literary icon Kroetsch with a full-length study from Europe. That position(ing) in itself has a number of benefits.

Has Bertacco chosen her main title as a reference and homage to Jewish Canadian writer Eli Mandel (1922-92) and his prairie long poem *Out of Place* (1977)? Mandel was something of a spiritual brother and a kind of *doppelgänger* for Kroetsch—which is reflected, for instance, in the prefaces they wrote for their poetry collections in 1981 (Kroetsch for Mandel's *Dreaming Backwards*, Mandel for Kroetsch's *Field Notes*), prefaces in which they both highlight the concern for the particulars of place and the figure of the double in the other's work respectively. The title, of course, also signals Bertacco's own position as a Kroetsch critic, for as a European, she is out of place in relation to the Canadian prairies and the way they are re-created through literary means. Thus writing rather from the margin, she inhabits a stance Kroetsch not only approves of, but has himself also tried to sustain in his career, e.g., while teaching at the State University of New York in Binghamton (1961-1978).

Bertacco contextualizes her subject around the nexus of post-modern, post-colonial, poststructuralist and decidedly regional as well as national(ist) movements. She outlines her approach in the preface:

My basic argument is that Kroetsch's work reveals the ultimate dismissal of the thematic quest for identity—a quest undertaken by Frye, Atwood, and others in the late 1960s and early 1970s—and that, in so doing, he has empowered subsequent generations of English-Canadian writers to look at their own literature from a disinhibited and liberated perspective. His question “How do you write in a new country?” voices many of the issues that have preoccupied critics and writers in Canada in the last decades. Still, Kroetsch does not ask how to define a Canadian identity. Instead, he asks which forms and which rhetoric might infuse the inherited word with a new energy. Kroetsch's own artistic answer to the question is contained in his polymorphous idea of writing: it entails subverting the “old” words and the ‘old’ forms by repeating local stories over and over again in new and exploratory narrative modes.

Along this process, I see Kroetsch reasserting the Canadian sense of place as the starting point of his reflection on the experience of writing today. (Bertacco viii)

Based on these thematic guidelines, Bertacco has structured her book into an introduction and four main parts (which are themselves prefaced by a short introduction each), followed by a twenty-five-page-long bibliography and an index of names. 259 Already the main introduction reflects the double nature of her study: If the reference to popular culture (discussing the Coen Brothers' 1999 movie *The Big Lebowski*, in which a tall-tale-spinning cowboy figures as framing narrator) widens the context within which Western Canadian writing, as a reflection of New World literature, is considered, the book is also characterised by many reiterations and repetitions (e.g., from the above quoted passage, which reappears, partly in identical words/sentences, as early as page 15 of the introduction). Progressive and mostly convincing reinterpretations thus stand side by side with occasionally unnecessary redundancies. One might wonder why Kroetsch's latest novel, *The Man from the Creeks* (1998), is not discussed here, whereas his anti-autobiographical and subversively lyrical poetics, *The Hornbooks of Rita K* (2001), simply appeared too late to find its way into Bertacco's study.

Out of Place undoubtedly presents new and challenging readings of Kroetsch's works as well as foregroundings of his critical thinking. Following the main introduction with its first sweep through his *œuvre* and the major critical responses it has elicited, “Part I—A Literary Manifesto” proceeds to debate his theoretical framework in light of “a crucial moment in Canada's cultural history” (30). This part is one of the book's highlights by chronicling an aspect of Kroetsch's career that hitherto had not been given sufficient attention—namely, the story of his formative involvement with *Boundary 2: a journal of postmodern literature*. As co-founder (in 1972) and co-editor of the journal with William Spanos, an “ideologically compatible” colleague of different interests and a specialist in Heidegger, Kroetsch could discover, test, discard, and reformulate many of his assertions. One of the ensuing arguments would provocatively state that Canadian literature had jumped straight from the Victorian stage to the postmodern era, leaving out the modern period for lack, in Bertacco's words, “of big cities and of a highly urban civilization”; hence, Modernism in Canada “marked,

at best, a phase of transition” (52; 53). This assertion was originally voiced in the editor’s foreword to the 1973 “Canadian Issue” of *Boundary 2*, which as the first-ever issue of its kind mapped a new literary territory in US-American eyes. While Mandel helped select the criticism for this issue that sparked off many things, Margaret Atwood and Warren Tallman figured as guest editors, and Marshall MacLuhan and Northrop Frye contributed to the section titled “Context.” It is this context of the 1970s, Bertacco maintains, in which Kroetsch came to a heightened productivity as a novelist (*Gone Indian*, 1973; *Badlands*, 1975; *What the Crow Said*, 1978), as a writer of groundbreaking essays, and as a poet who sounded the possibilities of the long poem to explode its form into a multiplicity of voices and structures (e.g., *Seed Catalogue*, 1977). Charting a writer’s evolution, the bases for his explorations as well as transgressions of the boundaries of narrative and genre, Bertacco’s Part I further discusses the impact of Derrida’s deconstruction, Foucault’s concept of archaeology, and Bakhtin’s notion of carnival on Kroetsch. The generally thorough differentiations of theoretical stances are infused with occasional imprecisions, though. For instance, it is implicitly argued that Kroetsch only turned to carnival as a concept after the 1960s, when “his later essays [began to show] an increasing interest in the relationship between the individual and the collectivity” (62f); however, already his first two prairie novels—*The Words of My Roaring* (1966) and *The Studhorse Man* (1969)—rely heavily on the carnivalesque as a comic and structuring principle. With her final focus in this part, Bertacco examines how the readings offered by Kroetsch’s essays not only extract a poetics, but also amount to a “valuable record of works by other writers” (73-75).

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With her own theoretical groundwork on Kroetsch’s theory and practise thus laid out, Bertacco can tackle closer analyses. “Part II—Topographies of the Self” reads, in three individual chapters, a novel each against a (long) poem. “Self-presentation and irony work in tandem in Kroetsch’s works,” she comments on this section and points to the reader’s central position in the process of tracing autobiography, multiple masquerades, and other problematizations of identity politics in these texts (80-82). But in her related examination of the character Hazard in *The Studhorse Man*, she confuses the terminology by speaking of the “acts of transvestism he performs so frequently” (131): While desperately searching for the perfect mare for his stallion, Hazard in fact engages in the same-sex disguises of a priest and Mountie—and therefore does not perform any transvestism at all. “Part III—Flowing Borders: Explorations in Literary Form” approaches four different texts in four chapters. The interpretation of *Badlands* (Chapter 8), in which two females reappropriate a traditionally male story, gives credit to the under-appreciated nature of this pioneering book as an alternative “feminist” novel that “turns its revisionist tactics toward the whole of the text” (187). Based on the fact that archaeology as a concept metaphor also operates in Kroetsch’s poetry, Bertacco presents some of her finest analyses in Chapter 9, where she reads the collected long poems in Kroetsch’s *Field Notes* (expanded into *Completed Field Notes* in 1989) as explorative variations in form, genre, self-expression and language

in which “voice, once again, emerges as the distinctive feature of [his] writing” (208). In the concluding “Part IV—A Conversation with Robert Kroetsch,” writer and critic “turn the tables,” as Kroetsch says, and exchange the roles of interviewer and interviewee in the second section, “On Theory” (243). “Part IV” functions as a meta-literary commentary on the previous chapters and as a tentative prediction as to what schools of interpretations might be dominating soon.

In sum, Bertacco’s *Out of Place: The Writings of Robert Kroetsch* does more than just fill a niche with regard to the previous monographs. The book is a valuable addition, offering many new insights *into* and often challenging interpretations of Kroetsch’s almost entire *œuvre*. What is unfortunately *out of place* in this work is the annoyingly high amount of typos—the erroneous spelling of bpNichol’s life-long poem *Martirology* [sic] and of March for Grove’s prairie novel *Settlers of the Marsh* are only two examples; similarly, it is misleading that the table of contents does not give (all) the main titles which are discussed in the respective chapters. But the overall structure of Bertacco’s study is well thought through and functions nicely in its foregrounding of the theoretical basics and their subsequent applications to individual texts from different perspectives. What emerges, then, is an up-to-date reflection of Kroetsch’s experimental writing that crosses the boundaries of genre, narrative, and individual as well as national identity, a re-positioning of the history and self-definition of (Western) Canadian literature in the fluctuating cultural contexts of both North American and European critical thinking.

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GUNNARS, KRISTJANA, ED. *Transient Questions: New Essays on Mavis Gallant*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. Pp. 221. US \$67.50 hardcover.

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If the test of literary longevity is an appeal to diverse, in some cases even contradictory, critical positions, then Mavis Gallant is a lasting writer. Collected in this volume by editor Kristjana Gunnars are essays on a myriad of topics relating to the work of Mavis Gallant: the short story cycle, fascism, closure, genre hybridity, the socio-economics of hotel residency, dreamscapes, the use and mis-use and undermining of traditional epiphany, the unbearable truth, and, in an almost summary gesture, on incoherence.

Which is not to say that this collection is incoherent. The articles, all by noted contributors, present thoughtful and closely argued takes on their subject matter (frequently and unfortunately marred by spelling mistakes, punctuation errors, and other line-editing lapses). As Gunnars explains in her introduction, Gallant’s texts are hard to “fix” (viii) in anything like a consistent or polemical critical framework, and so, perhaps more than many writers, her work tends to diffract into individ-

ualistic critical angles. The variety of responses to Gallant are conditioned by the “discoherence” (204) (as contributor Simone Vauthier puts it) of the writing itself. Like Vauthier, Gunnars has set herself the unstated task of trying to figure out what this discoherence teaches us by presenting us with varying critical viewpoints.

262 What emerges from this is what I’ve always considered one of the most important aspects of Gallant’s pedagogy—though in this sense the terms pedagogy and teaching, at least in the western sense, are problematic—which, as Gunnars herself puts it, is “flux” (viii) itself. In other words, the fiction asks us to consider our impulse toward arriving at a conclusive content, when the stories are everywhere marked by an insistence on observing our inability to arrive, or to at least abide for very long, in any given “residence” (spatial, national, epistemic). What is always in question, then, is a Gallantian recipe we might distil from the stories, novels and non-fiction, and, from that point on, substitute in place of them. Instead, criticism on Gallant is continually brought back around to its inability to come to an end of the experience of the writing itself, the process of our investigation of it, an action whose meaning resides in itself rather than what might emerge, in its place, with the permanence of truth or explanation. The fiction is, as Gunnars says, the witnessing of the “transitory” (viii), so difficult to enact in the concreteness of text, which is surely one of the technologies Gunnars laments: “It is that which is unfixed that interests me now, because as the world has grown more and more refined in its ability to fix us, to find us, with all the technologies at its disposal put to the use of a science of the individual, Mavis Gallant writes about people who are in many ways—spiritually, physically, psychologically, emotionally—nomadic. I have the sense we need to keep our nomadicism alive, or we might get too fixed” (x). This, then, sets the volume a formidable task: How to represent the “nomadicism” of Gallant, a nomadicism that is as much an internal or existential condition as it is geo-spatial.

One of the ways to do this—one of the ways this book *does* do this—is to enact the transitory by refusing to settle in one place, in other words to raise a series of voices not necessarily in harmony so as to prevent the adoption of one critical pose. This, too, is in keeping with Gallant’s fiction, which, as Vauthier notes, grants “each character ... her own perspectives” (202), and which “cannot rest in certainties” or “claim ... mastery” (204). This lack of “resting,” this foregoing of “mastery,” in favor of an experience of another kind—the disorientation and difficult freedom that comes with relinquishing the definitive—seems to me where the potency of Gallant’s stories lies, where the aesthetic and the political meet, and also where the text turns on itself, on its own power to freeze and to know and to master its subject, observing the otherness of otherness by not arresting it in meaning. Di Brandt’s article engages this notion by calling attention to the way in which *The Pegnitz Junction*, and its treatment of the white noise of consciousness, opens on an understanding of self/other relations in the vein of Levinas’s “ethics” (33). Here, the other is not the subject of a conquering and totalizing knowledge, but an “infinity” that escapes the jurisdiction of the perceiving self, which ultimately reduces the other to definitions, meanings,

and a world view present in that self prior to the encounter with otherness. It is this disposition that prevents the emergence of the fascism *The Pegnitz Junction* explores in its treatment of post-War Europe.

Articles by Gerald Lynch, Nicole Coté, Per Winther and Neil Besner tackle this dis coherence directly. Lynch argues that the Linnet Muir cycle exhibits the “defining feature” of the Canadian short story cycle, in which “the concluding return movement to a home ... is always paradoxically constitutive and delimiting” (2). Lynch argues that Gallant’s work is observant of the “ongoing process” (4), whether of self- or nationhood, thereby drawing attention to Gallant’s processual emphasis, her unwillingness to settle into summaries or conclusions. Coté remarks on “Gallant’s kaleidoscopic point of view” (113), regarding the work as fraught with the tensions between perceiving reality and the need to shut it out in favor of mythical, dreamlike, oneiric structures. In this interplay is revealed, as in Brandt’s analysis, the boundaries erected to establish and police the precincts of self and other (128). Winther’s article reports on a neglected “operative ingredient” in Gallant’s fiction, which is **263** “narratorial compassion and sympathy” (132) by “reduc[ing] the distance between character and reader” (139). For Winther, the desire to peer beyond the boundary of separation, what he (echoing critics Mary Rohrberger and Charles May) calls the short story’s “fascination with ‘the beyond’” (157), is part and parcel of an attempt to regain a “world” obscured or tainted or put out of reach by social forces, especially history (160). By contrast, Besner, critically reconsidering his “first reading” (163) of “The Moslem Wife,” asks “whether anyone—character, reader, or writer—can see [the world] so clearly, and then act on such a terribly clear perception,” suggesting the necessity of perceptual frameworks in the face of naked reality (172). These articles remark on Gallant’s fascination with the difference between the concrete and the aesthetic, the way in which these are not separate experiences, but interdependent, and how much of the drama of life involves our attempt to separate what cannot be easily or at all separated. As in Gunnar’s introduction, what comes to the forefront here is the endlessness of this operation, and our need to regard in it the process itself, the value of witnessing it, rather than the impulse to arrive at a conclusive position.

But this by no means the only insight offered by this text. Commenting on Gallant’s aesthetic choices, and the politics they occasion (or don’t occasion), is fairly well trodden ground in Gallant criticism. This text also points us toward readings of Gallant that are well overdue, most particularly the historical and materialist implications of her work. In terms of the latter, Maria Noëlle Ng offers what I hope will be the start of a look at the historical, sociological, and political particulars that Gallant’s work engages. Ng’s treatment of the “negotiated space of the hotel” departs from much of the criticism surrounding Gallant by approaching the stories less as art-objects, sealed within their own idiosyncratic sensibility, than as manifestations of material practices. Thus, Ng takes as her starting point the function of hotels, and their effects, often deterministic, on the female subject, and then moves to the ways in which the stories do and do not corroborate the structuring power of such places. Ng is sensitive

enough a reader to unpack this connection not in a straightforward causal manner, but to think through the variety of ways in which characters might inhabit, make use of, even foil the “machinery” of the hotel, with its economic, gendered, and psychological “imperatives” (97). In this way, Ng remarks on how Gallant holds out the hope of agency despite the tremendous pressure exerted on the individual by social forces, to the point (and it is an ably defended point) where some of her female characters are, at the very least, able to demonstrate their separateness from the “indexes” that place women in “stable social categories” (104). Most importantly, this kind of criticism enables a view of Gallant as someone other than “a writer’s writer” (as she was recently called in a *Walrus* article), and provide for her work a horizon of engagement outside that of the aesthetic, or politically abstract.

264 There are also articles here that take on Gallant’s work in a more instrumental fashion. John Lent, for example, discusses Gallant’s work not as a literary scholar but as a creative writing instructor, and his insights into the ways in which Gallant’s work contributes to and participates in the “shift from temporal to spatial narrative” (52) that characterizes twentieth century realism, and its use of the epiphany to both inform and obstruct perception. Like Gunnars, he finds that Gallant’s work more often than not engages in a “becom[ing]” (61) that “is an emptying of surety” (65), paradoxically a “closure that opens up rather than closes down” (65). Lent’s article is helpful for writers struggling with the legacy of the epiphany, and how it might be adapted to non-traditional ends. Similarly enlightening is Peter Stevens’s observation on genre hybridity in Gallant, her use of the essay and expository writing in the Linnet Muir cycle. Like Lent, Stevens’ argument is more instrumental than scholarly, carefully parsing these stories to demonstrate Gallant’s technique of creating narrative momentum via a genre that is generally contemplative or given to “musing” (90).

Thus, while the various articles collected by Gunnars are not necessarily contradictory—as suggested in my opening statement—they do provide an example of the diversity of critical opinion emerging from Gallant, and also why it is important to observe this diversity. They also open on new possibilities for thinking about Gallant, and are thus part of a movement that will, I hope, continue to observe itself “in transit.”

YANO, CHRISTINE R. *Tears of Longing: Nostalgia and the Nation in Japanese Popular Song*. Harvard: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003. Pp. 280. US \$19.95.

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Christine Yano's *Tears of Longing: Nostalgia and the nation in Japanese Popular Song* is the first comprehensive monograph in the western academic world dedicated to a detailed study of Japanese *enka* music. Further, while many extended journalistic, and for the most part impressionistic writings on *enka* have been indited by Japanese critics, Yano's work may be the first solid academic study of this musical genre, both in the West *and* in Japan. This work thus constitutes a monumental contribution to the disciplines of ethnomusicology and Japanese cultural studies.

Considering the extent to which *enka* pervades the Japanese cultural landscape, it is surprising that it has received such little attention within the academic sphere thus far. Although ethnomusicologists typically focus their research on traditional Japanese musical genres, the modern, hybrid nature of *enka* renders it somewhere beyond the traditional focus of ethnomusicological inquiry. To borrow Yano's apt definition, *enka* "is a popular Japanese ballad genre that originated in the early twentieth century, combin[ing] Western instruments with Japanese scales, rhythms, vocal techniques, and poetic conventions in melodramatic songs of love, loss, and yearning" (3). *Enka* is thus a culturally hybrid Japanese song form that is conventionally linked to a cultural sentiment of "yearning," which in turn is tied to a nationalistic yearning, and Yano's investigation into *enka* centers on the ways in which *enka* produces this cultural affect amongst the listening public.

In her examination of the affective processes that underlie the production of *enka*, Yano provides extensive accounts of her field work in Japan. Recounting her interviews with record company executives, performers, and aspiring performers, amongst other figures in the *enka* world, Yano gives a fascinating, holistic picture of *enka* as a cultural industry. As a particular brand of 'industry', Yano demonstrates that *enka* is in the business of producing not only a certain type of musical product, but a uniquely Japanese cultural affect of nostalgic longing.

Aside from the extensive well-documented field work presented in Yano's *Tears of Longing*, the most estimable aspect of this work is the cultural sensitivity that she displays in her treatment of *enka* as a conduit for Japanese nationalistic sentiment. Adopting a truly novel approach, Yano draws upon the Japanese philosophical notion of *kata*, or patterned form, as a means of analyzing the production and consumption of *enka*. According to Yano, each aspect of the *enka* industry is patterned by various sets of aesthetic *kata*; and this gives rise to a highly repetitive, if not formulaic genre. Yano demonstrates, however, that as in the case of all Japanese traditional art forms, the beauty of *enka* lies in its detailed observance of said *kata*. Whereas within a western cultural context music may be praised for its innovation, it would thus be

inappropriate to judge a patterned art form such as *enka* according to such a western perspective.

266 While Yano's theoretical approach to the study of *enka* is commendable in that it marks a move to adapt western cultural anthropology to a uniquely Japanese context, in my reading of her work, her approach becomes slightly problematic when she applies the notion of *kata*, or patterning, to the way in which affect is realized in *enka* song. As a cultural anthropologist, Yano's work focuses on an examination of the social processes involved in the production of *enka*, and thereby tends to ignore the question of *how enka* operates on an artistic, that is, musico-poetic level. While I believe that a strong case can be made for the position that *enka* songs are patterned by affective *kata*, it is difficult to explicate such *kata* without examining the interplay of poetry and music within the *enka* songs in question. Although Yano quotes extensively from *enka* songs lyrics, she tends to extract one or two lines from each song, without ever analyzing a complete song as a cohesive poetic unit. Further, within her extensive text, she fails to discuss the *enka* lyrics in relation to their accompanying music. It seems that before one can construct a solid argument concerning the way in which the affect of nostalgia is realized within *enka*, one must first provide close 'readings' and 'hearings' of these songs to demonstrate *how* such an affect is evoked. My critique of Yano's work, however, is perhaps not so much a reflection of any shortcoming on the part of her anthropological analysis, but more a reflection of my own expectations arising from my disciplinary leanings as a student of literature and music. All the same, I find it disconcerting that within her extensive work on *enka*, Yano avoids providing close examinations of *enka* songs as cultural texts.

Aside from such a minor quibble on my part, it must be recognized that the anthropological data Yano presents in this work is novel, and her findings are framed in a way that ingeniously guides the reader through the "ins and outs" of the *enka* world. As an ethnographic study, this book is indeed an invaluable asset to Japanese Cultural Studies. Despite the cultural sensitivity and care in organizing her research according to *kata*, however, her critical analysis of *enka* songs may be criticized for a certain lack of sophistication. From a literary perspective, I would perhaps like to have been presented with more rigorous analysis of *enka* songs to demonstrate how, exactly, cultural affect is produced in *enka*. Although her critical approach may thus be critiqued for being somewhat ingenuous, the information garnered in this study is truly a valuable contribution. The findings of her fieldwork provide germinal ground for future critical inquiry—that is, the pattern laid out by Yano unfolds to reveal illimitable kaleidoscopic potential.

GONZÁLEZ, ANXO ABUÍN. *Escenarios del caos: entre la hipertextualidad y la performance en la era electrónica*. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2006. Pp. 237. EU €21.00 paperback.

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An insistent challenge comparatists face when navigating liminal regions is to find firm footing from which to explain their understanding of the texts they encounter. Faithful to a postmodern standpoint, Anxo Abuín González opts to expose rather than explain new artistic scenarios opened by the media of the electronic age. *Escenarios del caos* or *Scenarios of Chaos* (all translations are mine) rejects critical interpretation based on chronological linearity and cause-effect relationships in favour of explanation, in the etymological sense, and of reflecting or “dis-playing” intricate and unpredictable spaces of entropic interaction. One of this text’s most attractive features is its playful structure and its overt demand for interaction with its reader. From the outset, Abuín González assumes absolute responsibility for what he has written but under condition that the reader respects his central idea of fragmentation and chaos. Although he leaves the task of constructing relationships in the hands of his reader, this metaphoric, if not synecdochic task is understandably frustrated by the ironic nature of his subject matter (15). 267

An impressive feature of *Escenarios del caos* is how widely the author has cast his net. Following a brief introduction that looks to Diego Rives, Stanley Cavell and Heidegger, Abuín González offers fifty-two unnumbered fragments or snapshots of chaos, hypertext and performance at work through art in cinema, theatre, literature, video and computer games, television, literary and cultural theory, radical texts, carnival, storytelling, and mythology not to mention a “parenthesis” to which I will return briefly below. Many of these fragments are supplemented by detailed footnotes, some of which playfully overtake the fragment that they elucidate (177-80). His bibliography is equally impressive in that it brings together some three hundred and forty two reference texts to support his web of fragments. In spite of its intricate topic and its ambitious scope, Abuín González’s clear and succinct writing makes complex issues and attitudes accessible without oversimplification. *Escenarios del Caos* is a text that will be valued by a wide range of readers. For younger readers, it will be a refreshing opening within the traditional field of literary and cultural studies to a familiar world of electronic media. For scholars who still remember carbon paper and the ditto machine, it will do much to mediate a technological generation gap by elucidating the often incomprehensible interaction of hypertextuality, computer images and the arts.

It would be beyond the scope of this brief review to engage *Escenarios del caos* in each of its fifty-two fragments. However a random selection of scenes can be entertained while obeying Abuín González’s injunction to respect his central theme. The fragment “Chaos and Literature” turns to N. Katherine Hayes in order to show that

chaos stories depend on the “global denaturalization of experience” while “Chaos and Irony” draws on Friedrich Schlegel to demonstrate that, for the artist, irony “is the very essence of her or his creative activity” (41, 45). The concept of “chaosmos” focuses on Harriett Hawkins’ argument that complex, non-linear art forms often prompt “dialectically opposite critical interpretations” (48). “Chaos and Contemporary Theory” points out that chaos does not necessarily oppose order but may obey a cyclical rather than linear order in which destiny often plays havoc with free will. A fragment dedicated to electronic hypertextuality invokes Carlos Moreno to explain that a hypertext abandons a “temporal narrative paradigm in favour of a spatial one” (71). This rejection of temporal criteria in favour of spatial points of interaction is a constant throughout the text. The text also offers several tables of binary oppositions such as one between printed and electronic texts in “Postmodernism and Rhizomatic Language” and one between monologism and dialogism in “Carnival and Dialogism” (74, 204). Drawing on Janet Murray, “Postmodernism and Rhizomatic Language” also argues that a “hypertext promises its readers absolute autonomy” while simultaneously offering authors a degree of control unavailable to writers of typographic texts. It also recognizes the presence of a “will” that determines possible relationships behind the structure of its nodes (76-77). The work of Mary-Laure Ryan, whose ideas surface throughout *Escenarios del caos*, plays an important role in the fragment “Videogames: Problems of Control”. The question of whether it is the player or the machine, the programmer or the user who runs the game might recall the reflective experience felt by chess players who lose sight of whether they play the game or the game plays them.

Escenarios del caos presents drama as an interactive art that rejects mimetic representation in favour of what might be described as entertainment understood in the etymological sense, that is, where *entre-tenimiento* consists of “holding” spectators and performers in a liminal present located “between” past and future. It is here that performance deconstructs authorial Presence and substitutes it with “a fountain of energy, of hypothetical and deferred power and creates renewed levels of significant complexity” (152). The six pages dedicated to the concept of remediation point out that new media refashion and remedy old media. As Abuín González notes, the etymology of remediation prompts the belief that new media is superior to old media because it remedies its imperfections. In note forty nine, a subtle sense of historical progress creeps into his display through statements like “hypertextual narrative is superior to the novel due to its addition of interactivity”. Paul McCarthy’s obsession with the processes of human degradation finds a place in a fragment entitled “Poetics of the Abject”. Here performance is free to offer scenes of “masturbation, sodomy and bestiality, food, blood, semen and shit” (161). This concept of performance, that finds an antecedent in the works of Richard Kostelanetz and constitutes a major filament throughout *Escenarios del caos*, is best understood as a “provocation” that always plays with artistic, cultural or political limits (171). If *Escenarios del caos* is read in keeping with its numerical pagination, readers will find an occasional, all-encom-

passing first person plural in Abuín González's discourse as it moves toward the two, final segments, "Postlinearity" and "Aesthetics of Error". Here writer and reader fuse in statements like "we human beings are no more than conductors for a process of communication, nodes of an immense web through which ideas are transmitted" and "we perceive human existence as a successive series of impulses and multidirectional collisions that resist being molded into linear schemata" (186, 193).

One fragment in this hypertext of scenarios calls for special attention because it introduces the paradox of a possible parenthesis within a web. Abuín González cleverly centres this paradox in the fragment entitled "Parenthesis: reading and understanding" where he focuses on the hermeneutic tradition of Hans Georg Gadamer. He explains that "for Hans-Georg Gadamer understanding is the basic movement of human consciousness" (67), but he leaves it to the reader to ask how Gadamer's notion of understanding can exist as a basic movement without his fundamental notion of "*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*" or consciousness exposed to the effects of history (305 ff.) Here the reader is brought face to face with both the cause-effect dimension of history and the cause-effect relation inherent in "why-be-cause" questions and answers.

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There can be no question that any reading of *Escenarios del caos*, including this one, is not programmed to traverse the empty spaces between its fragments. In spite of a brief discussion of dystopia in "Dystopia and Posthumanity: David Cronenberg" this text speaks overwhelmingly in favour of chaos and performance as a spatial act. Although the author assumes absolute responsibility for what he has written, in the end, it is the reader who must respond to the interesting questions it provokes. The texts closure of chronological understanding in favour of open spatial configurations may shift the order of value judgments from syntactic, cause and affect relationships of time toward paratactic relationships centred in liminal space but the question remains whether the "will" behind the fragments escapes the absolutes that frustrate mediating enterprises. The question remains whether the freedom inherent in performance, a freedom often synonymous with the erratic, has or has not become a new absolute and whether non-linearity, non-narrative understanding, disorder, individuality and entropy do not come extremely close to unquestionable artistic essentials. The question as to whether heterogeneity (except when link to dominant sexual practice) might not also become a steadfast prerequisite for all artistic performances also calls for an answer (40). The association of performance with the artistic scene is unquestionably one to be celebrated but the association of the term "performance" with other more ominous social practices such as "performance indicators" prompts questions of cultural control not freedom. The shift from sense understood as linearity to non-sense understood as paratactic relativity is without question a liberating experience but its unmitigated reflection may prompt a reaction "to smooth out and impose order on its structurally, ideologically and morally chaotic components" in way that breaks mediation between the two poles in binary opposition (48). The question as to whether new technology is a remedy or a poison is as old as Plato

and, although the interweaving of new technology and art may appear to sanctify new places, only time will tell whether “Saint McLuhan,” as Horrock puts it, displaces Aristotle and Saint Thomas (133). In the interim readers will be challenged to free themselves from the playful nuances Anxo Abuín González spins into the web of relationships that make *Escenarios del caos* both exciting and valuable reading.

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